It was hard enough to achieve Conservative Party organisation in Northern Ireland in the first instance, back in the 1980s. Central office was hostile, and much of the Party leadership at best reluctant to become involved in the region. On the ground it might have seemed mad to set up Conservative branches in Northern Ireland at the end of 10 years of Thatcher Government and in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. There was also an Ulster Unionist Party which was dominant within the unionist electorate and, despite the recent history, remained on friendly terms with Conservatives generally at senior levels and in Parliament.

Despite the turmoil, naysayers, hostility and challenges, the determination of those early pioneers of the Conservative Party in Northern Ireland gained Council seats and had a reasonable stab at the North Down Westminster seat.

Fast forward thirty years and we find a Central Office bending over backwards to be helpful, a Party leader (now Prime Minister) who visits, espouses unionism, and encourages the local Party to be local and relevant to Northern Ireland.

Some local Conservatives, however, think the Conservative brand is bad and that is why they ended with nothing, zip, nadda after three consecutive elections – don’t think they see Jim Nicholson as ‘one of us’ – though some might point to other reasons for the Northern Ireland Conservatives to gain electoral traction.

thedissenter has not  been convinced of any principled or particularly practical or positive thinking  around the revamping, relaunching and repackaging of the Northern Ireland  Conservatives under David Cameron: electoral positioning always seemed to dominate his relationship to Northern Ireland; though not the only area that seems calculated and poorly considered.  But support from the central Party, including finance, is real and appears genuine.

Since the Northern Ireland Assembly elections there has been a bubbling undercurrent seeking to change the name of  the Northern Ireland Conservatives to something else. This was flagged up by Alex Kane in the News Letter. This resulted in a response from the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Conservatives Irwin Armstrong to which Alex responded in his weekly column.

Unfortunately for Irwin Armstong and the Northern Ireland Conservatives, those bubbles keep on rising to the top.

No doubt well-meaning, the thinking of those seeking change in the Conservative name are naively missing the point. There is a deep lack of political capacity within the Northern Ireland Conservatives, mostly being freshmen to politics, and inevitably there are those who would seem to be imposing an agenda on a relatively weak body politic. This is reflected in the arguments being made to underscore the case for changing the Conservative Party name in Northern Ireland.

Discussion around the  positioning for a newly titled Party is presented as being one where “centrist, moderate, pro-UK politics, can be delivered, in a way that engages people of all classes, genders, religious persuasions and ethnicities.” Fine. At the same time it is also suggested that there is great reservoir of support for a moderate centrist grouping among those disillusioned with the direction of the so-called ‘centre-ground’ as it presently exists. This does beg the question that if a centrist moderate proposition is not in the so-called centre ground, where is it?

The centrist moderate proposition seems to be revolve around everything that is ‘non-sectarian’; excluding the Alliance Party which is apparently a usurper in the centre, being in fact a product of sectarianism: thedissenter understands how the Alliance could be described as itself a product of sectarianism, but that does not make it sectarian. Defining something by what you are ‘non-of’ does not define what you are, it merely narrows the parameters to a greater or lesser extent.

Where is the centre of politics in Northern Ireland?  thedissenter is asking because this impacts on what might be the name of any new centrist-rightish Party that is not in the so-called centre ground. This question seems to be a preoccupation of those who are seeking to re-style the Northern Ireland Conservatives. Can it be described with terms such as ‘Right’  which suggests ideology?  Can it be described as ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’, which have their difficulties for positioning your politics not least among the unionist electorate. Being truly liberal is certainly not being in the centre, and is positively radical rather than perceptively moderate in respect of policy development.

Then there is image and moving forward. If there is to be a break and repositioning away from the ‘Conservative Party’ brand then there needs to be a distinct local identity. Those taking the lead would need  to be local. That would also mean creating some distance with the central Conservative Party. Being a local cheerleader for David Cameron is a non-starter. Any plan to bring in big Conservative names as speakers would seem counter-intuitive.

Tie your funding, timetable and proposition to the Conservative Central Office and leading names of the Conservative Party and people will see that as being Conservative: if it looks Conservative, talks Conservative and walks alongside the Conservatives, then it is a Conservative Party. If you act and work as Conservative in all but name, why not be Conservative in name?

So let us presume the new Party proposition and new name is sorted. Where would the new ‘not-the-Conservative-Party’ voters be found? Yes there are many people who do not vote in elections. The argument goes that once a proposition that will be attractive to the ‘disillusioned’ is found, hey presto you can create a new space in Northern Ireland politics. Perhaps. Only if you understand who isn’t voting, and the sort of proposition that might capture their attention.  There has been a great deal of discussion about the BMW & BBQ group, with little convincing evidence that this is where elusive voters are to be found.

In the run-up to the 2011 Assembly elections the Belfast Telegraph launched ‘True Colours’ which was a chance for readers to see which Party they might support: a questionnaire based on manifesto points. Not only did the result provide the Party for which you are most likely to vote, it also provided percentages on how close you were to other parties. Manifesto positions were not generally presented in forthright, black and white, like it or reject it terms – plenty of wriggle room. So change an answer here or there, and you could easily change your ‘Party preference’ outcome.

What was most striking about the True Colours exercise was how little it took to change Party, and how much of each Party (in percentage terms) with which you agreed (according to the exercise).  In summary, there wasn’t much between the Northern Ireland Parties’ manifestos on the left/right index: take away the ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’ labels and they are all much of a muchness: middle-class, middle of the road; and effectively aimed at the BMW & BBQ set.

If you are looking for a disillusioned and non-voting public in Northern Ireland, by far the largest fertile territory would be the large sprawling estates in areas across Northern Ireland, but particularly in the larger towns and cities. Anecdotally, as few as twenty-percent of the electorate might turn out to vote from these areas. The UUP, which once held sway here, lost that vote a long time ago to the DUP, mostly. The DUP has more recently lost the trust and confidence among the estates as it moved into the UUP’s urban middle-class vote. Neither the DUP or UUP appear to have any strategy to win votes back.

A presumption that this electorate is alien to a Conservative message is wrong. Certainly it would be a challenge to win over.

Northern Ireland needs the sort of radical restructuring in economic and political outlook of the Thatcher years, updated, of course. More of the same will not deliver. What is absent from the discussion among Conservatives in Northern Ireland is what would make them stand out in respect of policy and principle that relates and connects with a broad base of unionist opinion.  In respect of available vote,  however, that will need to be wider and deeper than the existing parties to succeed.

Thatcher years saw Conservative policy standing up to entrenched interests which resisted change: policy that empowered the individual over the State, breaking monopolies of economic and political patronage. It championed the small businessman. It championed meritocracy and freedom: individual rights against the overbearing State.

No doubt the Conservatives would see the vast ‘loyalist’ (or ‘nationalist’) estates beyond their reach. That is not necessarily so. Thatcher built a policy agenda that addressed the economy and reform which appealed to that very constituency;  building an electoral base that carried the Conservative Party to successive election victories for well over a decade.

Putting principle at the core of policy development, Margaret Thatcher communicated a populist policy agenda that re-engaged the aspirant classes to the Conservative Party – much to the horror of the paternalist One Nation grandees, and to the Left.

There seems to be a similar debate in Scotland , though in truth the Scottish Conservative Party has elected representatives at all levels on which to build.

While there was little difference in votes at the 2010 Westminster election between the SNP, Liberals and Conservatives behind Labour, the Tory vote is spread too thinly to gain seats. The Conservatives rose to third largest Party at the Holyrood election, even through the electoral gap between the Parties was more marked. Then there are the obvious reasons not to change the Conservative Party name in Scotland which have been articulated elsewhere.

While history has been unkind, that latent base in Scotland may make it difficult to claim ‘we were Tory, but we are not any more, so forget about all that, we are all new and improved’.

Although very different in demography and politics, for the Conservative Party the discussion over names in Scotland and Northern Ireland has coincided. The same issues ought to be at the core of consideration.

• If a constituent part of the Conservative family in the UK includes formal association with Conservative Central Office and Party structures, then what benefit would realistically accrue with distance from the name ‘Conservative’?
• Where do you find an electorate that is not already bombarded with political offers that are at least as attractive on the broad centre ground, but for whom a new ’distinctive’ message may be attractive?
• How distinctively right-wing (philosophically, politically, economically) will you be to create a substantive real difference between you and other Parties? There is presently only technocratic differences; no matter what the roots, constitutions, or rhetoric of those Parties might present to the contrary.How do you find a local non-nationalist message that creates a distinctively regional voice that is not incompatible with your national unionist position.
• The largest disengaged, disillusioned voting group is among the aspirant working people in urban estates across the country. How do you re-engage the aspirant working people that you have abandoned or ignored?
• What if the largest disengaged, disillusioned voting group wants to have confidence in a Party that offers a more strident populist unionism that would potentially upset that huge vote you don’t have and have little hope of achieving because the element of the electorate to which you are most sensitive (to the exclusion of those who might conceivably vote for you) is overwhelmingly a) nationalist b) traditionally left of centre and c) hates Tories of any colour (or name).

There is absolutely nothing wrong with a debate among Conservatives about the need to re-imagine the Party or restore its appeal to the electorate.  First things first. What electorate is it that you are challenging to reconsider voting  for a conservative Party, and what is the proposition that will convince them to give Conservatism a chance?

The electorate is not stupid and will look for substance over presentation, a unity of purpose in moving forward and a principle and policy that is coherent, credible and meaningful to them by values (usually historical/familial), present circumstances and future aspiration for themselves and their family. The first thing they will not think about is the name of the Party they are voting for, it will be an affinity and confidence in the values, policy and vision of a real alternative in which they can believe.

If we move away from politics and into the business of branding, of which name and visual image is a small part, we remember the successful Accenture or British Gas, while forgetting the failures such as Consignia or the visual disaster of British Airways World designs. We also neglect the most successful longevity of identity of companies such as Shell, or the ever changing IBM which still manages to remain true to its core purpose of making useful technology for businesses.  Evolution, not revolution. At the heart of any successful company is a certainty in its purpose and the determination, ideas and aptitude to deliver in such a way that exudes confidence to customers that the product or service is right for them.

The Conservative Party in Scotland and Northern Ireland needs to forget about changing name until they work out what they exist to do, and have a clear vision for Scotland or Northern Ireland and a clear idea (policy framework) of how to get there. Otherwise the Party may well invest in a big rebranding only to find that the electorate looks past that branding to see little to make Conservatism, by any name, any more attractive than it ever was.

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The Northern Ireland electorate heads towards the 5 May with little enthusiasm for the choice being presented, little interest in the institutions, and little understanding of what the Assembly has achieved over its past four years.

No doubt there will be general media attention in the run-up to the election on issues around the budget, perhaps, education, almost certainly, and health.  Why bother? With all the main Parties at the Executive table, and assured a place if not the same seats following the election, the electorate has little alternative but to vote for the same old same old, or not at all.

Constitutional matters are never far away from the discussions and serve all parties well in avoiding having to answer the question of what has actually been achieved for the past four years. Some would say that a full four years was an achievement (ignoring the Sinn Fein six months sulk over the delay in transferring Policing & Justice). With nine years prior practice, it was about time a full term was possible – the Assembly has been in existence since 1998.

It seems that everything remotely positive is claimed by all, whether Unionist, Nationalist or Republican, DUP, UUP, SDLP and Sinn Fein, and even Alliance. Who wouldn’t or couldn’t claim to be responsible for free bus passes and prescriptions, or low household rates and taxes? Just don’t mention or question the cost.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty arises for the UUP and SDLP who will of course wish to claim the specific successes of their Ministers. This inherently also praises the Executive and the institutions, and the two large parties with whom they are in the Executive alongside. This also lauds the huckster’s shop, built with ugly scaffolding. Following Hillsborough 2010 (Section 3) it was the UUP and SDLP leaderships who were charged with bringing forward recommendations on improving the working of the Executive? Not much progress there.

For the DUP and Sinn Fein there is a fine balance to be walked between condemning coalition partners, with whom the success of the past four years must be shared, while claiming that it is they who have held the entire edifice together. Balanced indeed; while seeking the adsorption or marginalisation of their two respective principal rivals.  At the same time the two largest parties must also ensure that they keep the UUP and SDLP on the inside and not drive either or both into opposition outside the Executive, even if an ‘unofficial’ opposition.

In the short term the DUP and Sinn Fein would find an ‘opposition’ easy enough to handle. However, over the next four years the collective ‘blame’ for all the hard decisions (and at this point those decisions are barely being admitted) would be shared alone by the DUP and Sinn Fein together. This will involve implementing fiscal tightening and, as would seem likely, increasing the burden of tax (called rates/charges/levies) on individual householders and businesses.

The most recent outcry over the decision by Michael McGimpsey as Health Minister to postpone the new radiotherapy unit at Altnagelvin is a good example of political rhetoric trumping rational discussion of the issues, and the absurdity of political posturing when all parties are in Government. Was McGimpsey’s decision political? Was the decision by Barbre de Brun to place a new maternity unit at the Royal Victoria in West Belfast, rather than at the City Hospital in South Belfast political? Was Martin McGuinness’s decision to abolish the 11+ within his final days of being Education Minister political? Is the decision to fund the A5 rather than other bottleneck and poor links inside Northern Ireland political?  All of these decisions could be believed, or presented, as playing to ‘core’ constituencies. The fallout from the decision was certainly political. Of course it was, its politics; a politics without purpose or progression. A politics of the past. The politics of blame.

Martin McGuinness’s statement provided a clear demonstration of the dysfunctional nature of the Stormont structures and the consequential ease of placing decisions into a sectarian context: shoring up that ugly scaffolding. Ministers are able in the first instance to make decisions outside the collective of the Executive. There followed a response from Ministerial colleagues that was also outside the collective. A Government that is also it’s own opposition is, at best, confused. This doomed the Major government, ultimately, when the country was presented with an credible alternative. Ministers of the Stormont Executive lack the democratic credentials of being accountable or responsible to anyone, even within their own collective. Where is the credible political alternative in Northern Ireland?

Northern Ireland needs a political opposition. True, it would be fair to say that neither the UUP nor SDLP would be likely to offer much by way of policy alternative to the DUP or SF in the near term – though in the bigger national picture, Ed Milliband does not seem to be doing too badly at present.

The absence of any coherent alternative proposition does not help an opposition in the run-up to an election. David Cameron might not have had to enter coalition politics had he been able to convince the electorate on what he actually believed: many are still unsure, which may be why Ed Milliband does not have to try too hard just now. Lesson learned?

Once the election is over in May it will be at least three years before the next scheduled election (Europe 2014). A lot can happen in politics over the course of three years. There is plenty of time for any Party at Stormont to become a challenging opposition and to provide an entirely valid and valuable ground-breaking democratic function. An opposition holds the potential of bringing accountability to the Executive and to the process of Government.

It is entirely wrong to suggest that there needs to be money to create an opposition at Stormont. It does not. It takes courage, imagination and determination to fulfil an essential function of democratic government.  Hopefully, in time, an opposition party (or parties) could show the electorate that there is an alternative leadership that is worth voting into the Executive to take the top posts, on merit of ideas and policy commitment.

Of course Parties need to get over the idea of a natural place in Government, or that there is some right to be at the Executive table by virtue of being.  Both counts ignore electoral will. The electorate should have the right to choose a Government through the ballot box rather than the dictate of legislative pre-ordination.  But to choose a government there must be a choice. What choice has the electorate in the forthcoming election to the NI Assembly?  Will anyone’s vote be cast with the hope of change?

There is an argument that opposition might tinker with ‘stability’ of the current institutions. Underlying that argument is an attitude that that the electorate should not be trusted with that choice, that it is not mature enough to make a choice, or that the electorate is somehow not ready to make that choice? Is the Northern Ireland electorate less ready than Iraq’s to make that choice?  Is choice in the face of instability not an essential aspect of embedding democracy in any state, divided or not? The streets of North Africa and Middle East are alive with the sound of the people demanding the right to vote for a government of their choice where previously, for example, in the ‘democracies’ of Syria and Egypt a vote returned the same old government time and time again.

Are democratic elections, the right to choose and to change your government, not the universal principle being hailed as fundamental across the world? Are the consequences of Western powers choosing stability over democratic change not being felt by the people of Libya today, or the protesters in Bahrain, or Yemen, or Syria, or China? Hasn’t ‘stability’ been the cause used to justify the suppression of democratic movements in these countries and the acquiescence of the West, left and right?

Stability is much over-rated, and can easily tend towards stagnation and sterility in ideas and innovation, in politics every bit as much as economy. Ultimately this leads to the suppression of any alternative because the elite have nothing to offer but more of the same, lacking the intellectual coherence to justify their status and resorting to a corruption of the process of government to avoid the emergence of any challenge to the status quo.

So the challenge to the UUP and SDLP is whether they will continue to shore up the DUP and SF oligarchy or strike a blow for democracy by making the ‘game-changing’ move into opposition. Are they part of the self -regarding political class, caring for the few, or do they care for the many in Northern Ireland ready and willing to move on to real, meaningful change. Are the UUP and/or SDLP chicken, comfortable with the status quo and unwilling to move on? Or will they provide the egg start of a new beginning, and a positive future politics bringing new life and to a sterile coop?

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The UK Government’s economic measures to tackle the country’s financial deficit will start to impact on all citizens in 2011. It will be a tough year ahead for everyone. The cost of living is rising, with households already noticing  increased costs creeping through to the weekly shopping. Just as households need to keep their spending under control, the need for good and efficient government at all levels is essential. Northern Ireland is not an exception in this regard.

Northern Ireland media focus in early 2011 seems to be on health inefficiencies and disorganisation, before that water was in chaos; before that, roads; an education department at odds with its schools; an agriculture minister who failed to properly account for the land being used for farming. And so on…

With each Department being largely independent of the Executive, except when requiring collective cover, it is no surprise that initial budget ‘agreement’ failed to indicate anything more than broad allocation of spending across Departments. Subsequent budget negotiation appears to be largely through the media rather than round the Executive table. The budget process is not building confidence. Rather than rethinking and shrinking government, the talk is of expanding revenue – taxing to spend on the same old, same old.

It is difficult to be very positive about politics in Northern Ireland in the months, or years, ahead. In almost every aspect of Government the Stormont Executive is a sorry excuse. Inspiration, ideas and impact are absent. Ideology, intransigence and incompetence seem to be the order of the day, to a greater or lesser degree.

Of course Party leaflets will drop through the letter boxes in the run-up to May’s election outlining the achievements of this government, of which almost every Northern Ireland political Party is now part.  Some of this is already being tested by the DUP and Sinn Fein, to greater or lesser success. Most 2011 election information will be little different to that provided for the Westminster election in 2010 – can anyone remember any of the key election promises from less than a year ago? Fine words bearing little momentum towards, or even capacity to kick start, necessary change.

There is no doubt that Northern Ireland would benefit from an effective opposition.

If ever there were a time for the UUP and SDLP to ditch government and enter ‘opposition’ it would be now. They are largely irrelevant to a Government steered by the DUP and Sinn Fein, serving only to underscore the validity of the system; strengthened in 2010 by the arrival of the Alliance Party to the trough.

Of course there is no ‘money’ available for an official opposition. Naturally, financial consideration comes before principle and doing the right thing.

The failure of a DUP/Sinn Fein led government is no surprise because there is no common cause; no common vision binding together the programme for government. Compulsory or enforced coalition, with a prohibition on voting a party out of government guarantees deadlock and failure.

Far from being “an extraordinary endorsement” of progress in NI, as suggested by Secretary of State Owen Paterson, Martin McGuinness as First Minister would only prove that the deck chairs on the Titanic have once again been moved.

The jobs that seem safe at present are those of the political class, who huddle around any of their number under threat. This represents the most often quoted success of Stormont, that it exists. That seems to be enough for our politicians. In the words of Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness respectively, following on from Hillsborough 2010:

“… there will be no going back to the past.”

“We need to make life better for our children and for our grandchildren.”

Of course we cannot go back in time, but neither should we stagnate without change. With the authority of power comes responsibility to use that power wisely ‘for our children’; and if the electorate believes that power is not being used wisely, that the future being shaped by an administration is not attractive, then surely it should have the democratic choice to vote for change.

The Belfast Agreement is over twelve years old.  It was a creation of its moment. Time to move on.

A government that cannot be fundamentally changed has no democratic mandate. Just ask an Egyptian.

Commentators seemed to view the overwhelming victory of Tom Elliott in the Ulster Unionist Party leadership contest as the Party taking a ‘traditional’ and safe option, rather than the more media savvy and ‘liberal’ option of Basil McCrea.  There is something about that analysis that seems too simple to thedissenter.

The result would suggest that ‘liberal’ unionism is now a marginalised group of around 30% of the Party.  If this group is passionate about change and maximised its vote, in fact it is only 15% of the Party; as the 1000 or so attending the election meeting amounts to around half the membership. What this actually represents is a decreasing element in the Ulster Unionist Party, which broadly reflects a wider disillusionment and disaffection with liberal Unionism that has been building for some time, the outcome of which is electoral decline.

Most would agree with the notion that while David Trimble may have been elected as a ‘hardliner’ he ended up a ‘liberal’. Trimble’s successor was not a hardliner. The battle for the leadership in 2005 was hardly one which reflected a strengthening of the ‘hard line’ within the Party: quite the opposite. David Trimble’s right-hand and supporter of UUP acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement won in 2005, defeating Alan McFarland (who would not be described as a champion of ‘traditional’ unionism). David McNarry, who also ran in the three-way race, gained only 8% of the votes, while McFarland gained 43% and Sir Reg Empey won when McNarry’s vote transferred to the least worst alternative of Sir Reg who had gained 48% in the first round of voting.

In that context the vote for Basil McCrea of around 30% was a surprise and represented either a sharp decline in liberal unionism or a woefully bad liberal champion.

Why did Basil lose?

First Basil. Basil McCrea is intelligent and articulate. He has been described as modern and media savvy. It is certainly the case that Basil is a crowd pleaser, not least the media crowd. He has the eye for a media or photo opportunity. He uses what is to hand and uses it well. Yet, there is another side to this. It is exemplified by two points in his campaign.

One: the post from Jeff Peel which pointed to Basil’s previous dalliance with the Northern Ireland Conservatives; in response to which Basil wisely stayed silent. Two: was his campaign launch speech.  His speech was well received, as being current and addressing the ‘now’: any analysis shows it exactly ticked a range of current themes. That is what Basil seems to do best. He is a man for the moment, as with his interest at a point in time with the Conservative Party. This does not lead to consistency, and nor does it indicate deep commitment to policy or principle in pursuit of political advantage.

Second, what of liberal unionism? This is not a fixed or settled idea. Bob McCartney might be considered a ‘hard line’ unionist, but he is undoubtedly a liberal in broad political outlook.  Alex Kane presents the case for being uncompromising as a unionist, but a hardliner?

There are many who describe themselves as ‘liberal unionist’, not least in the blogosphere. There has been questioning over what has happened over the past year with UCUNF and moving forward. However, some of those who comment or blog from this personally considered perspective too often seem to be embarrassed by party political unionism in any form; sometimes suggesting that liberal unionists should in fact be ‘neutral’ on the union (surely a contradiction). These tend to have a quintessential negative view on political Unionism – that it fails to be positive, progressive, fair, inclusive, non-sectarian.  This leaves others to presume that political unionism is therefore negative, reactionary, partisan, narrow and sectarian; though sometimes little is left to presume.

Yet, the present champions of liberal unionism lack a distinctive narrative that does not belittle other Unionists or offer a coherent policy agenda as an alternative.  Liberal unionists may retort, ‘an alternative to what?’; perhaps, but that does not amount to a cast iron liberal case.

Nor have the emergent political champions of liberal unionism acted in such a way that evidences a mature political personality. Basil McCrea wanders around with barely concealed resentment at having lost, Trevor Ringland petulantly struts out of the Party, and Paula Bradshaw snipes from her blog. Coming together around a broad ‘2010 Group’, perhaps being joined by Alan McFarland (?), they might well have a useful forum to consider why it was they lost rather than the UUP.

Besides a lack of narrative, and poor leadership, liberal unionism is not of this political moment. Sullied by the collapse of electorate trust in the UUP under David Trimble’s leadership, compounded by the hapless political ineptitude of Sir Reg Empey, ‘liberal unionism’ has been to the fore of Ulster Unionism for more than a decade and seems to have left, literally, the Party in a state of near terminal decline. To that extent, the election of Tom Elliott is more properly viewed as evidence of the membership’s determination to stop the ‘liberal’ rot.

This reflects widespread unease among the unionist population about the political future. While the Union 2021 series in the News Letter has evidenced remarkable confidence in the Union, that does not alleviate unease at the unrelenting obstruction of Sinn Fein to making Northern Ireland work – not least in respect of education – and a perceived inability of Unionist politicians (not unique to the UUP) to present a framework for moving forward that out-politics Sinn Fein.

Although Basil McCrea lost the leadership contest in the Ulster Unionist Party, the margin by which Tom took the leadership is flattering.  Neither candidate presented much by way of a vision for either the Party or Northern Ireland through the leadership campaign. Both placed undue focus on Party structural issues of little interest to the electorate, or generated rhetorical disputes on hypothetical scenarios. Neither showed an ability to rise above well-worn propositions.

Tom was not Basil. Still, there were factors Tom Elliott’s favour, and it would be wrong to suggest that his vote was largely undeserved. Perhaps not an exceptional speaker, but at least what he says is consistent and thoughtful – even if not always articulate; the GAA/Gay Pride kerfuffle was the result of clumsiness rather than any malicious prejudice.  On balance what may be regarded as personality or presentational weaknesses in Tom Elliott are capable of being corrected in time, whereas Basil is just Basil.

The strength of numbers turning out to vote for Tom from his local constituency Association shows strength in organisation and loyalty, which is mutual.  The Ulster Unionist Party was once a formidable machine. 40 years of conflict took its toll on Unionist Party organisation; as communities disintegrated, the middle classes first fled to surburbia, eschewed political affiliation and preferred to keep their heads down. Even so, when David Trimble became leader of the UUP there was a strong quotient of younger politicos, and a decent constituency worker network. When trust broke down internally and with the wider Ulster Unionist electorate, the Party lost its youth, many of its best election workers, and depth in membership (yes that includes the break with the Orange Order). The Party lost what remained of its innate ability to connect across the wide range of ‘constituencies’ that make up the Unionist electorate. Fermanagh is an exception. The rest of the Party wants some of what Fermanagh has managed to retain, and a leader who knows what that might be.

The Ulster Unionist Party which Tom Elliott inherits is very much smaller than it was a decade ago: though not necessarily smaller than the DUP at organisational or Constituency level. It may not have the workers it once had, but then the TUV Annual Conference is populated with UUP and DUP election workers. However, a smaller party means that local cliques, personal fiefs and sometimes family allegiances have a disproportionate say in candidate selection and a wholly negative impact on recruitment.

Tom Elliott needs to focus on building the organisation but this is hampered by the state in which he finds the Party – aging, clique-ridden and drifting. Thrust into this mix is the selection process, which complicates Tom’s capacity to build party unity as a first step in strengthening the UUP’s core and building membership to extend reach and gain electoral impact. A look around the process, so far, of selecting candidates for next year’s Assembly elections presents the scale of the challenge and the complexity created by the two/three tier selection process: originally planned under Trimble’s leadership to help quell/suppress dissenting candidates.

It is viewed by the liberal wing of the UUP that the lack of female representation is to the detriment of the Party’s electoral fortunes, though it didn’t seem to do the DUP any harm in 2010. Following the failure of the most prominent female candidate in the 2010 Westminster election, Paula Bradshaw, to gain Assembly selection at the first hurdle in South Belfast, the issue of female candidates has once again come to the fore. It should be noted that in pure mathematic and electoral considerations the spread of the three candidates recommended from the initial South Belfast Constituency selection meeting made sense, taking a start point that Michael McGimpsey, the current Minister for Health, was a shoe-in. Paula Bradshaw has since left the Party.

Although David McClarty gained over half the votes of those gathered for the East Londonderry Constituency selection meeting, the second stage constituency/HQ election meeting selected the two candidates are supported by less than half of the constituency in the first instance. But David McClarty cannot now be selected on appeal to the Party Executive without the second most popular candidate being selected.  The problem? That would mean candidates would both be men. On the other hand, there is a risk of alienating or demoralising a substantial proportion of the constituency association.

The Party’s Women’s Development Officer Sandra Overend was selected as one of two being put forward to the second stage of selection in Mid Ulster.  However, her margin of victory was less than the number of family members at the meeting (she is daughter of Billy Armstrong, the sitting MLA). Oddly, the other candidate, a more experienced election campaigner, has since withdrawn from the selection process before the second stage: now no-one will able to suggest that Sandra Overend was selected on the basis of family connections or because she is a woman. She will probably join Jo-Anne Dobson  from Upper Bann, to whom she presented the UUP Woman of the Year Award early in 2010,  as one of two female candidates on the Party ticket for the 2011 Assembly elections. Jo-Anne was second, undoubtedly by merit, in a field of six seeking selection in Upper Bann.

Tom Elliott has a considerable challenge to present a credible Assembly candidate team, with a credible policy agenda (not being the DUP is TUV territory now) and a sense that the Ulster Unionist Party is worth voting for.  Many blame poor public relations or lack of media sense, or lack of Party discipline as the reason for the UUP failure to connect with the electorate. Perhaps. More likely it has been a central vacuum in leadership and organisation, an absense of firm sense of purpose and apalling people management that is hampering the Party from moving out of the doldrums and onto improved electoral success.  If there is a selection process which is endeavouring to politically engineer success (women √, youth √ loyal to leader√ etc √) it will inevitably fail where it lacks a direction as to what the Party is trying to build; focusing on the Party rather than the electorate or driven by personality rather than political sense.

The greatest challenge for the UUP (shared by all unionist Parties) is moving out of ‘peace process’ narrative that is deeply resented and mistrusted by the broad unionist electorate and to abandon any hint of ‘constructive ambiguity’ which is viewed as corrupting.  Tom Elliott needs to be both liberal in the ‘live and live’ sense while having the strength of being honest and direct to the electorate (and political opponents) even if at times that could be challenged as ‘hardline’.

Given the strength of the Fermanagh organisation the Ulster Unionist Party membership may believe that Tom Elliott is the man to bring all the pieces together, in every sense, and to define a purposeful UUP with a distinct and positive outlook on moving Northern Ireland forward. This is essential to his most urgent task to reverse the UUP’s electoral flat-lining.

Basil lost the UUP leadership election. Tom Elliott has a great deal of work to do to prove that the 70% of the evening’s Party voters made the right choice, and he only has six months in which to at least start to make a difference.  There is no doubt that Basil McCrea is ready and willing to be first to resume the challenge should Tom fail to make that start.

The 2010 Westminster election is over.  While the poll outcome was inconclusive the upshot is a decisive shift in British Politics where a progressive coalition has burst through the liberal centre/right. In the process, there were no important phone calls to the Northern Ireland parties, who now sit on the Parliamentary margins.

The debates on national television provided an energy to the national election. Locally the election campaign was as lacklustre and uninspiring as the Party leaders on the local TV debates.

On the nationalist side the new leader of the SDLP simply argued a greener case than Sinn Fein, ceding any advantage new leadership might offer in setting the electoral debate and regaining ground in the future. Sinn Fein organised a campaign that seemed more a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections and must be disappointed that they made little inroad into the SDLP vote on polling day.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: comparative strength.

The obvious decline in SDLP votes since 1998 is not to the great benefit of Sinn Fein.  For Westminster 2001, the high point of nationalist turnout, the SDLP had 168,873 and Sinn Fein 175,932; in 2010, 110,970 and 171,942 respectively.  In percentage terms Sinn Fein is clearly outvoting the SDLP, but it has made no gains in number of votes.  The overall Nationalist/Republican vote appears relatively static.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative

Republicans, in particular, have made much of an inroad into defeating Unionism, electorally. While Unionism was once dominant electorally, this was at a time when nationalists probably failed to even register to vote. The heady early 1970s, when unionist voters turned out in great numbers, was not a time of unionist unity. Since then, nationalists and republicans have fully engaged in the electoral process, and around 200,000 have been added to the electoral register.

Electorate and turnout for elections 1969-2010: comparative.

Summarily, the increase in registered voters has been to the benefit of neither nationalists nor unionists. In recent years the electorate, unionist and nationalist, has slowly disengaged from politics. However, ignoring the numbers and entering the percentage game, Sinn Fein has gained as it holds its vote relative to others.  Somehow, despite Sinn Fein’s project seemingly stalling, Unionist Parties are presenting a picture of unionism in crisis.

Much has been made of the apparent failure of leaders (and leadership) within Unionism, and there has been a great deal of debate since the Westminster election on the topic of what the future holds for unionism.

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: comparative strength

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

The numbers suggest that the Ulster Unionist Party is bumping along and has done little to regain the electoral trust that it squandered under David Trimble. Just as the UUP climbed electoral heights in the 1990s, so it has fallen to consistent lows over the past decade.  The decline has been hard for a Party that still gives the impression that it still believes itself to the natural Party of Government. Although the UUP electoral arrangement with the Conservative Party has been derided, on the positive side, at least the Party could had the finance to run a campaign and the vote was probably no worse than if the arrangement hadn’t existed.

A lowly UUP ought to have been good news for the DUP. However, similar to their principal partners in the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP has not been able to take advantage of their rival’s electoral slide. The DUP vote has been remarkably stable over the past decade.  The Party immediately benefited from the mistrust of the Ulster Unionist Party; acting as the standard bearer of opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein. In the decade from 1998, those who became disillusioned or discontented with the UUP either left politics or joined the DUP.  Over this period the unionist electorate could be characterised as either being ‘for’ the UUP or ‘against’.

Unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010 (not including UUP/DUP): combined/cumulative

In the 2007 Assembly election there was still a broad expectation that the DUP would not enter Government with Sinn Fein. When they did, off the back of apparently verified decommissioning by the IRA (which seems to have missed 40% ), it can be no surprise that the DUP would suffer to some extent in the same way as the UUP.  That was certainly the instance in the 2009 European Election, when Jim Allister of the TUV took a signification proportion of the unionist vote.

While the TUV did less well in the Westminster election, drift from the two main parties was nevertheless marked. Trust has gone. Yes, there was an agreed unionist candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone, and the DUP stood aside in North Down. Even so, in an election when the overall unionist vote increased on the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP must be disappointed that it cannot point to any positive electoral gain.

All unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

Nationalism performed less well than unionism in the Westminster election, albeit marginally. Yet the debate post election is on the future of unionism. Inevitably this has centred on the future of the Parties, and in particular the leaderships.

No unionist leader has much to cheer about post-election.  The TUV performed poorly, though it was never likely that the European pr vote could have been replicated in the first-past-the-post Westminster poll. Still, the TUV lacked depth in its candidate selection, and Jim Allister’s political persona was one of anger.  The Unionist electorate is past anger. It wants to trust again. To do that it desires confidence in a leadership can attract talent and articulate a pathway to restoring community, cultural and political confidence. The TUV was not alone in failing to meet that expectation.

Sir Reg Empey lost in South Antrim. Perhaps he has done enough service to David Cameron’s Conservatives to gain a peerage and join David Trimble, in which case his candidature was not entirely in vain.  It was his close association with David Trimble that probably reduced his chances in South Antrim, where not even a hawkish David Burnside had been able to hold the seat. The electorate that punished the UUP then, and sent an unambiguous message on the leadership of David Trimble, was hardly likely to vote now for someone equally at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement.  Adrian Watson, the choice of the local UUP would probably have fared better as a new and local face for Westminster.

Sir Reg also lost on the wider political field. From the outset of the UUP Conservative arrangement he failed to present a convincing narrative to overcome the sense that this was a marriage of convenience: the Conservatives needed a significant electoral base in Northern Ireland and the UUP needed the money.  The UUP message that Stormont was a ‘huckster’s shop’ should have had some traction with a disillusioned electorate. However, Sir Reg’s inability to bring clarity and direction to the UCUNF (UUP/Conservative) arrangement suggested that he equally unable to manage his own neighbourhood store. There was the sluggishness in agreeing candidates. Finally, for thedissenter, Fred Cobain standing as a Conservative & Unionist?

And yet, the UUP vote broadly held up across Northern Ireland. Yes, it now has no seats at Westminster.  But it still has a base on which to build. On the wider national electoral front the politics of the nation has been trust into new territory with the Conservative/Liberal coalition (or is that Liberal Conservative coalition).  There is deep resentment of the central Conservative Party organisation among many local Conservative constituency organisations.  Although talking about decentralising power from Westminster, Cameron has strongly centralised Conservative Party organisation around his own team.  This has not delivered the majority he needed; in many instances this was down to lack of flexibility in addressing local electoral campaigns: Adrian Watson is a case in point.

What became clear on election night was that the country no longer acts uniformly. The great swingometer was made redundant on a night where local electorates seemed to take a local view – resulting in massively varying swings across the country.  It would suggest that future candidates will need to emphasise more local issues and rely less on national coat-tails.

In this respect there is certainly a place for more regionally based politically associations where the central party outlines core principles, but does not dictate local candidate selection and tolerates a degree of policy variance around the country.  If the Conservatives and the UUP can find that balance between regional and national interests then there is a future for the UUP. Otherwise, not.

At times in the run-up to and during the election the argument of the UUP almost seemed to be that the DUP couldn’t be trusted: to which the electorate added the word ‘either’. In the end the only place that this mattered was in East Belfast, where the electorate cast a plague on the UUP and DUP. Of course the rejection of a sitting MP, and in this case the leader of the DUP, was a huge slap to Peter Robinson.  In the rest of the country the DUP held its own and it seats.

The East Belfast seat was not a natural loss, had there been anyone of stature in the East Belfast DUP to have stood as an alternative to Peter Robinson: Strangford, the Westminster seat once held by Iris Robinson was retained by the DUP. The electoral strategy for the East Belfast seat has long been the strength of the Robinsons (Westminster/Assembly/Council) to bring in all others on their coat-tails.  Time for a re-think.

The apparent nature of the internal politics of the DUP suggests that there is little likelihood of Robinson being replaced as leader; for reasons not that dissimilar to the earlier thedissenter piece in the wake of revelations around Iris Robinson earlier in the year. The early DUP was shaped by Ian Paisley. The latter-day DUP has been shaped by Peter Robinson.  There is little obvious alternative to Peter Robinson’s leadership.  Peter Robinson’s East Belfast Assembly seat is relatively secure, as one of many, which assures his leadership position where it matters most to the DUP, at Stormont.

Before bringing together all these points into a broad conclusion it is worth noting the success of Naomi Long. First, by accepting David Ford at the Executive Table, the Alliance Party has been elevated to the position of central and ‘trusted’ player.  Second Naomi Long is local, and hard working. Third, Alliance has always had strength in East Belfast. Finally, she wasn’t Peter Robinson, and whether unionist or not, she isn’t perceived as nationalist.

Electoral ups and downs of principal parties: 1969-2010 *

The Alliance Party has been much stronger in the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s than it has been anytime in the past decade.  It still has a lot of work to do to grow its base, and there are not obviously an army of Long-type candidates to make an impact in 2011 at Stormont (and probably across 26 Local Government areas). In percentage terms it’s vote will look good where any general increase is a gain against an smaller voting public overall, though in pure numbers terms it has a long way to go.  Notions of some kind of renaissance in the political centre ground are premature.

Back to the big debate, within and around Unionism. The focus of that debate is numbers, and focused on whether in the forthcoming 2011 election Sinn Fein might gain a position where it may be able to lay claim to the post of First Minister.

Since the changes following the St Andrews Agreement any party with the votes and seats necessary can lay claim to the post of First Minister.  This provides for more equitable power-sharing in that it does not create a hierarchy of parties – theoretically anyone can be a First Minister. Would it make a great difference for Sinn Fein to be First Minister? If you accept Sinn Fein as a partner in Government then why not?

The most recent political push for unionist unity has arisen principally as a DUP campaign tactic to corner the UUP/Conservative arrangement, pushing at the fact that one of the certainties espoused in this arrangement was that the Conservatives were committed to stand in all 18 seats.  The agreement of a candidate on a unity-style ticket in Fermanagh South Tyrone undermined the determination of the UUP/Conservative pact. Had Rodney Connor won it would have placed even greater pressure on the UUP/Conservative pact that it failed to make a similar arrangement in South Belfast.

That the tactic in Fermanagh South Tyrone failed to deliver its intended outcome still leaves the DUP in a position to argue that it only failed because it was late in the day, the electorate was unconvinced of UUP sincerity, the Conservative link lost vital votes and anything that throws blame around and away to the DUP: this is a criticism of the DUP blame game generally and not that, conversely, the DUP is ‘to blame’.

The focus on the issue of First Minister is a tactical one – a means to give purpose to closer co-operation between the parties (if not merger). Yet the real issue is not one of tactics to meet short-term and tokenistic outcomes. The failure of Sir Reg (lost seat, lost leadership) to stabilise and provide purpose to the UUP, the DUP’s failure to dismiss the TUV altogether and to regain momentum lost in 2009, reflect deeper malaise within unionist parties.

Ironically, the arrival of the TUV brought unionist voters to the polling booths and increased the overall unionist vote would suggest that disunity has its advantages, allowing the fractious and independently minded unionist voter an avenue to express discontent with established parties.

The logic of engagement by all parties in the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement is an acceptance that the Union is safe in the hands of the unionist electorate: that is the principle of consent.  Unionist voters accept this and many seem content not to vote for parties that fail to reflect their concerns and provide competent government.   This is not a problem for unionism alone, nationalism has a similar challenge, though seems content to lose itself in the green romantic mists of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow.  A plague on all their houses?

Addressing unionist unity from a structural perspective is bound to disappoint. Political party realignment is merely mixing decks and dishing out the job cards in a different order.  The electorate is hardly likely to be impressed. Identifying a loss of voter, by class or aspiration, does not address the message sent at the Westminster election: none of the leaders of unionism presented a coherent and inspirational purpose for unionism in the twenty-first century.

A unionist should feel proud to fly the Union flag, and should not feel that it is somewhat diminished when wrapped around those who seek to lead Unionism. It should not be worn in anger, it should not cover embarrassment, and it should not be wrapped around a backroom deal.  Discussion on the Union should be a matter of substance, not tactical number crunching: it is a matter for open discussion, not whispers behind closed doors.

Unionist Parties may be under threat through a loss of relative electoral strength. That does not mean that the Union is under threat: which is not to say that the Union cannot be lost. As elsewhere, this article has been an exercise in looking at the outcomes of the Westminster election and reading the runes. There are a few pointers which may shape consideration of the future for Unionists.

• The overall nationalist vote appears static.
• Nationalist voters appear just as disengaged as unionist voters.
• The UUP might consider its future within a regional/national and liberal conservative context, but is otherwise nothing but a fading reflection of better times.
• The DUP built its presence on becoming biggest: now it is, what next?
• The unionist voter seemed uninspired by any of the unionist Parties’ offers.
• The overall unionist vote benefits from disunity, not unity.
• The SDLP was dominant in 1998. What happened?
• If Sinn Fein is a worthy party for Government, and to hold a post co-equal to the First Minister then why shouldn’t it hold the post of First Minister?
• The issue of a Sinn Fein First Minister is a narrow tactical argument that distracts from the lack of attractive leadership from either the UUP or DUP, or from anywhere elsewhere in unionist circles.
• Short-term tactical considerations will not address the future of unionism as a political cause.
• The Union is safe: at least that rests with the electorate and not the politicians.

The Westminster election changed very little. The points above have been matters for varying degree of consideration for some time. The election has simply brought them to the fore. Much of that discussion has taken place at Open Unionism and in the pages of the press, and probably around the lunch tables of Stormont buildings and meeting places elsewhere.

Tactical considerations of stopping a Sinn Fein First Minister are given an air of immediacy, including an urgency on discussion of political party restructuring. The larger and more important issue of the purpose and sense of Unionist cause is receiving less attention, perhaps because there is no personal or party gain in thinking outside the box?  (It is a lonely place outside the box, and risky.)  How does the discussion move beyond the tactical and party political to a more central discussion on the nature and future expression of Unionism fit for the twenty-first century?

Without a common understanding of the central tenets of Unionism there is little chance of Party political unity among unionists. Unionists must know what the Union is for, holding common purpose; it must not be defined by what it is not, what it is against. The electorate wishes positive, not negative, Unionism. With that central understanding would party political unionism mean anything anyway? Is unionism an ‘ism’ at all? How do we move beyond a position of being in defence of the Union to advancing and deepening the Union? These are the questions to be the subject of Looking Forward: Part 2. Later.

*/** please note that the graphs are indicative. While every effort was made to input the numbers correctly, sometimes interpretation of orginal data was difficult. I may have designated an independent in the unionist circles when it should have been nationalist: the early 1970s was a confusing time. ’Others’ sometimes includes all but the main parties; more than just the odds and sods. Data on registered electorate and turnout was not always available, and sometimes only in percentage terms. Taking all this into account,  all graphs should be viewed as broadly accurate, but mostly illustrative.  If any reader wishes to repeat the exercise and find fault, the source information is found within CAIN and ARK: knock yourself out.

So in retrospect and to bring thedissenter up to date…

Campaigning for the Westminster election in Northern Ireland had an air of reluctance, or nervousness; perhaps born out of uncertainty as to how the election would impact on the local Parties. Politics in Northern Ireland seems to have descended into a tactical contest, where any greater purpose to gaining power has been lost in the pursuit of power itself (or clinging on to the certainty of what is already held). The Westminster campaigns in Northern Ireland seemed more of a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections than one of national consequence.

The SDLP had a new leader trying to hold its vote and not lose ground to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein ran the same old faces, and hoped to gain ground on the SDLP.  Both nationalist parties begged the same votes for the same romantic notion of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow when all would be well and good – earlier, Brian Cowan had set out the real politic and focusing on bigger issues on St Patrick’s Day.  Other than for tactical considersations of the least worst option, neither nationalist Party appealed to the electorate that matters to their ultimate aspiration (again, see Brian Cowan’s words).

Peter Robinson gave himself a bad press on the eve of the election, which didn’t seem to impact on the Party as a whole. The UUP/Conservative grouping gave the appearance of being as disorganised as the huckster’s shop in which it continues to hold two Executive seats. The newcomers, the Traditional Unionist Voice, were the great unknown factor and a first-past-the-post Westminster election was the worst outing a fledgling party could face.

The Alliance Party and Naomi Long? Bless.

The 2009 European election showed, at least on the Unionist side, that the electorate no longer swallowed the warnings of the doomsayers, nor feared the Sinn Fein bogeymen on which many election strategies were based. A large proportion voted and damn the consequences.  For 2010 Westminster the unionist electorate was largely more circumspect, but hardly enthusiastic: evidenced in Fermanagh South Tyrone. Unionism is past anger; frustrated and petulant, but not angry. The simple interpretion on the electoral fortunes of the three unionist Party leaders is: ‘ a plague on all your houses’.

Unionism is in flux, and May 6th has not provided any clarity on the questions that should be asked let alone provide any answers. That debate will continue and is to be welcomed. 

Northern Ireland’s 18 Westminster seats were always going to be filled, even if choice in voting preference was diminished by the available options being well and truly woeful.  In general, commentary and analysis on the election results has been mostly inward rather than outward. The now marginal status of all local parties at Westminster may tend to exacerbate that focus. Yet change is always a time of opportunuity. The new consensus in Government at Westminster, for as long as it can last, offers such opportunity if grasped.

If this post seems to ramble a little it is because thedissenter is in a process of thinking, reassessing fundamentals, throwing the bricks in the air and rebuilding ideas. That may take some time. Absence has not brought any conclusions. In the meantime regular commentary will resume once the electoral dust has settled.

For broad analysis on the state of the individual unionist parties by far the best has been that of the blogger Turgon on SluggerOToole.  The recent meeting at Hatfield House between the Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Patterson, and leading representatives of the DUP and UUP has created a great deal of debate on the nirvana of ‘unionist unity’. We are told the Hatfield House talks were about the UUP and DUP, and Conservatives, gaining some greater understanding in respect of future elections. Generally, however, the impact of the host party (the Conservatives) on elections is not discussed in detail. Perhaps this is because the Conservatives and the UUP are treated as one: that is a mistake; they remain two parties. Such a perspective misses the electoral questions arising from the Conservative and UUP non-merger.

Should an Assembly election to be held before Westminster elections there would be four Unionist parties in the fray as there is no agreement for Assembly elections between the UUP and Conservatives.  This would probably kill any prospect of the UUP being the largest Unionist party: the two are separate parties as we are constantly told, so they will be two separate Assembly Parties.

So too may the Conservatives. Without an arrangement with the UUP for Assembly elections the local party would rightly expect to stand, and win a few seats. But the strength of the Conservative offer is that it brings so much more to local politics than money to a party (the UUP) whose financial fortunes are much diminished. Conservative electoral strength would be exposed before the benefit of the ‘win’ at Westminster (and even one seat other than North Down will be a win, so the bar is low). The Conservatives would lose momentum.

Conversely of course the arrangement for the General Election will mean that the Conservatives who might get elected in Northern Ireland will be fully taking the Conservative whip as part of that Party, while the UUP will be taking the whip by agreement. So if, and only by example, the UUP/Con arrangement delivers four seats and two of those are Conservative it means the UUP has in effect only two seats at Westminster. Influence with the Conservative Party is thus diminished, and independence constrained by taking the Conservative Whip. Added to which the UUP has provided an electoral base for the Conservatives to make further gains in the next elections on the calendar (Assembly), and in much better shape to eat into the UUP vote than if it had no Westmnister seats in Northern Ireland. This further dmininishes UUP ambitions of regaining ground to the DUP as the largest Assembly Party.

If Westminster elections are first, in the context of a hung Parliament the two main unionist parties would be in a much stronger position with no pre-agreement with the Conservative Party. Obligations generated prior to the election severely restrain the capacity for the unionist parties to play their best hand.

It is hard to see how strategists within the DUP would not have anticipated these scenarios, or that the UUP could be so detached as to not even think about them.

Which is why any notion of talks at Hatfield being on ‘unity’ needs to be treated with caution. There can be no doubt that the Conservatives as a Party would have been fishing for DUP ideas on the future and specifically for indicators on what would happen in the event of a hung Parliament. The DUP would be similarly probing the Conservatives. The only thing on the Conservative leadership’s mind at the moment is ‘seats’. This gives the unionist parties a strong position prior to the election, or it would if the UUP was not already tied to the Conservatives.

All this speculation centres on considerations of electoral mathematics that only the timings/outcomes of the elections will prove. If a Westminster election is first, and if the Conservatives gain a majority of anything over 30 then both unionist parties will be largely irrelevant, and Northern Ireland as far down the agenda as events will allow. Which means short-term interest may be Westminster, but for Unionism there must be greater focus on Stormont.

That brings us to wider speculation of other talks and fevered speculation on any perceived signals that build on this story. Within the context of all of the above, a merger of the UUP and DUP is by far the more likely and electorally sensible in terms of unionist ‘unity’, particularly in respect of the Assembly elections.  The same sort of issues arise. This would have to be a merger and not a pact, because it is about Party and not political designation in d’Hondt. It is the largest Party that takes the First Minister role.  Something less would be enough to extract maximum value from a hung Parliament, where ten to twelve Unionist seats represent the difference. Timing will be everything.

There is a definite sense that something is stirring among unionists in Northern Ireland. It may be an interesting political Spring. Will it be a new Spring for Unionism?

Picture: parliament.uk picture gallery

The opinion polls are erratic, as discussed on thedissenter earlier, and the potential for a tightly hung Parliament is real. A party holding a small number of seats may gain considerable importance.  So the performance of local parties is of national interest: though notional until the counts are complete.

thedissenter will resist entering a seat by seat analysis: that has been undertaken elsewhere, and there is sure to be more before the date of the election is finally announced.  At this point, selection of candidates is far from complete.  There are a number of factors which have the potential to impact on turnout and final count, and this post will look at those rather than enter fanciful prediction as others have done.

Most probably there will be two elections, again, in Northern Ireland – a nationalist one and a unionist one. There may be movements on the margins, but nothing of importance.  The greatest impact on the final count is most likely going to be the polling strength of the TUV and the way in which that Party’s presence, or not, affects the electoral balance in each constituency.

There is little on the horizon that is likely to impact on the Sinn Fein vote. Some might wishfully suggest that the woeful media management around family matters might wound Gerry Adams, and by association, Sinn Fein. Suzanne Breen spelled out the case in the Tribune.  Liam Clarke lays out the questions that linger in the Sunday Times.  Yet morality is hardly an issue for the Sinn Fein voter, happy to support a Party that has ‘yet to renounce its history of violence and terror, makes the vast majority of people here, sick to their stomachs’: that would be a majority of the total population, but it seems not the ‘nationalist’ population.

Of course things might change if there was a credible nationalist alternative to Sinn Fein, but there is not.

Republicans who hold onto their Marxist socialism etc, those who abide by the ‘physical force’ tradition, or those who hold onto both, are too small in number to have an electoral impact at this time.  Even so it seems likely that there will only be a marginal, though inconsequential, shrinkage of support for Sinn Fein, if not on a matter of morals then perhaps on the other issues within the Republican family which rumble along.

The SDLP is going through a prolonged leadership contest. If the contest is not inspiring, it is because the choice holds little promise. One has built a reputation on being hard on Loyalist paramilitaries (albeit without due care to Ministerial responsibilities) and making ignorant remarks about the Loyal Orders.  The other has proved adept at building on political opportunity in retaining his seat and building a strong and respected SDLP presence in South Belfast. Neither has excelled outside their respective constituencies.

Whether a harder nationalist line or greater organizational capacity, rural nationalism or metropolitan social democracy, is chosen by the SDLP, the May (or even March) election will give little time for a new leader to make much of a mark on the political landscape.  Bar opening statements of intent, the leadership contest seems entirely internal and lacking much rigour.

The SDLP will most probably hold its own in the coming election; not least because while it has little to offer by way of alternative to Sinn Fein, Sinn Fein is not in a place where it is able to build on past success and bury the SDLP. For now, the nationalist electorate is offered stale crusty policy from both parties which will result in a stalemate within that electorate.

There is a range of factors that make the election of much greater importance to Unionism.  The Westminster expenses story has exercised the Unionist community to a far greater extent that it has within nationalism. Movies, the “Swish Family Robinson” headline, and a perception that Unionist politicians are more likely to employ family members combined to offend a Unionist sensibility that  politicians are elected to serve their constituents’ interests and not their own self-interest.

To some extent the expenses issue gave the TUV’s Jim Allister his barn storming result at the European election in June 2009 – though DUP arrogance and UUP delusion probably played far a greater part.  Whether or not the residue of this debate continues to undermine current MPs is something to consider, but would be only one factor of many in determining constituency outcomes. Some of the heat of the expenses row will be removed by sitting MPs, such as Iris Robinson, not standing again.

The debate within Unionism of ‘unity’ candidates usefully detracts from the lack of any discernable policy that makes the Conservative/UUP electoral arrangements any great force for change in the forthcoming election.  It is hard to believe that any serious unionist politician would believe that not taking an opportunity to defeat a Sinn Fein candidate (as might present itself in Fermanagh South Tyrone) will play well with the wider unionist electorate.  Realistically it is only in Fermanagh South Tyrone that any agreement has the possibility of returning a Unionist candidate.  However, the Conservative commitment to stand in every constituency in the UK means it has no time for local sensibilities and no strategy or apparent interest in inflicting a loss on Sinn Fein.

In South Belfast there is little UUP constituency infrastructure to conduct a substantial canvas – and the Assembly poll showed little chance of an Ulster Unionist win.  Furthermore the sitting SDLP MP already represents a broadly ‘conservative’ sort of approach, and the Alliance candidate a more PC choice, that undermines any gain the Conservative Party would hope to achieve from the Catholic electorate in the constituency – not that the Conservative/UUP hierarchies would be so calculatingly sectarian in their final selection.

By far the largest impact on the election will the issue of multi-mandates, or double-jobbing as it is more commonly described. Of course the legislation to enforce sole mandates must complete its course through Parliament, but already the principle has had consequences.  Jeffrey Donaldson seems to have chosen Westminster over a Ministerial position in Stormont. Mark Durkan has chosen Westminster and initiated an SDLP Leadership election. Michael McGimpsey has cited commitment to Stormont for not putting his name forward in South Belfast.

More generally, the multi-mandate is more of a challenge for the DUP than the other Parties because it has a more MPs than any other Party.  It will mean new faces entering the political frame.  The DUP has been building profile for a number of their MLAs and Councillors, though perhaps circumstances will now accelerate advancement for a few.  ‘Knowing’ your politician is important. Name recognition makes a big difference at election time.  The DUP has also been hugely effective at building a constituency network. That should stand it in good stead. Its November conference was uplifting and rallied the troops, despite what might be viewed as setbacks in the previous year. The DUP enters the election in an entirely positive frame of mind.

A haphazard constituency presence and aging membership means the Ulster Unionist Party is less than able for this election.  This may be compensated by the Conservative Party’s money and campaigning expertise: though the Conservative Party seems to be overly relying on the newness of its entry into the electoral field to garner excitement around average and fairly unknown personalities. If it were a straight DUP v UUP/Conservative contest then the DUP would race home lengths ahead.

The TUV showing at the European election, with Jim Allister thrusting into the political arena with as good as a third of the unionist vote, fundamentally altered any consideration of future unionist electoral outcomes. Of all the political leaders within Unionism, Jim Allister has the biggest headache.  The has to perform in such a way as to be seen to make an advance on the European success, or make a case for why the performance is comparable.

Maximising the TUV vote would suggest the need to stand in all 18 constituencies. However, 66,000 votes spread across 18 constituencies will not win Westminster seats.  The TUV autumn conference was notable that many of the attendees were stalwart workers who once knocked doors, placed posters, and manned phones for the UUP and DUP in past elections. These are the members with drive and devotion who delivered at the European election, but are best focused rather than spread thinly.

Of course the Ulster Unionist Party and Conservatives are banking on the TUV standing to damage the DUP vote in their favour. But this is not Dromore or the European elections. There will be no transfers available for Westminster.

The TUV has already said it will not stand in Fermanagh South Tyrone or South Belfast, leaving the other parties to look less than able to put unionist interests first and foremost – even suggesting an agreed ‘non-Party’ candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone. The TUV will not stand in North Belfast. Where there is no chance of a Unionist winning the TUV may stand a candidate to hoover additional votes.  The toughest challenges are of course where a Unionist candidate will win, of one Party or another.

Jim Allister himself has declared his candidacy for North Antrim. East Antrim where he once had a strong base, Lagan Valley and Strangford are obvious targets.  Elsewhere he has the luxury of being able to wait to decide on whether it is worth standing a candidate at all. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

In many seats there will not enough difference between the DUP and UUP canidates to matter which Party is elected, but where a TUV candidate will alter the electoral mathematics a judgment must be made as to whether  the TUV could make a positive difference.

The TUV might also be seen as merely spiteful in engaging in constituencies only to place pressure on the DUP’s sitting MP, especially when TUV support comes from across the unionist spectrum. And why give the UUP/Conservative arrangement a lucky pass? The UUP, and in particular the Conservative Party, will do the TUV no favours, and their joint inflexibility is the greatest reason why Fermanagh South Tyrone will most certainly be retained by Sinn Fein.  Why spread the TUV’s limited resources , only to give the UUP/Conservatives the benefit?

The TUV will most certainly be the election story in 2010, but it is too early to say how the Party will impact on the conduct of the campaign or the result. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

So there will be an election (or two) in 2010. A lot can happen before Election Day. Nothing else is certain.

Electorally, the Conservatives need a substantial swing to ensure a majority. UKPollingReport provides a fun way of keeping in touch with what the latest poll means with a simple swing calculator. A simple exercise on this swingometer shows the volatility of the electorate, and the electoral challenge that faces the Conservatives until May 2010.

This graph was grabbed on the 6th October.

For this example thedissenter  is using the YouGov daily poll (chosen only because this is best suited for the example). You may want to play with numbers from the ICM Guardian monthly polls, or any other of your choice. There will be plenty of opportunity to test the swingometer with the many polls that will appear frequently in the media over the coming months. Using the poll of 6th October provides the Conservatives with a comfortable majority of around  sixty (Con 41, Lab 28, LD 18), just two weeks before the 22nd October poll shows the majority was a less comfortable twenty-four (Con 39, Lab 27, LD 20). The poll on the 22nd showed a very high ‘others’ at 14%.

The strength of ‘others’ is always greater in the aftermath of a European election: when the British electorate seems to enjoy itself by giving one in the eye to Europe and with the other end of the stick one in the eye to the big three established parties. However, the polling of ‘others’ seems to be more resilient this time, and the distance between the European election and the General Election will be less than a year.

It may be that the relative voting strength of ‘others’ at election time that, perhaps for the first time, will be a significant factor in determining the formation of the next Government. For example, the poll on the 22nd October showed a high percentage of ‘others’, but just 2% more for Labour (and less for ‘others’) would have meant that the Conservatives would fall three short of an overall majority. However, 2% for Labour and just one more percentage point for the Conservatives (‘others down 3%) and a majority of twelve is generated for the Tories.

The Conservatives polling is staying stubbornly around the 40%, give or take, rarely allowing for a majority of more than 20 seats, which must be very uncomfortable for Conservative strategists. There is no doubt that a significant percentage of the ‘others’ polling is UKIP, which tends to eat into Conservative votes for the most part; which is why the promise of a referendum on Europe is so important.

While there is no ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the argument that the only Party to offer a referendum is the Conservative Party may be enough to assure that UKIP voters will vote Conservative; UKIP voters having little chance of seeing a UKIP candidate elected and Europe being the only issue they care much about, believing they can win a no campaign.

It is therefore a major question for the Conservative Party as to what the approach will be if Lisbon is ratified before May. As a Treaty, Lisbon would be almost impossible to unravel. While not in power, the Conservatives have little ability to influence the advance of the European project before May 2010. Even if elected, by wandering off with its Teddy Bear from the centre of European dialogue the Conservative Party is unlikely to have sufficient weight to achieve a great deal, or indeed any deal.

Yet without a sufficiently ‘robust’ Conservative approach on Europe for home consumption, and it is far from clear what that could be, the UKIP voter is fickle enough to vote in protest regardless – because to the UKIP voter only Europe matters. While much of the New Labour vote may simply not vote for Labour in 2010, most likely the UKIP vote will go to the polling booths one way or another.

Feedback from the Conservative Party Conference this week has been that there is not the anticipation that there was in the 1996 Labour Conference, when there was a similarly tired and unfocused Government and power seemed within grasp. European policy has added weight in the Conservative election planning because it is abundantly clear from any of the three Party Conferences in recent weeks that there is little chance of offering the electorate a cheerful message of better times ahead. Every vote will count in May 2010.

The difficulty is that while Europe is a factor in securing votes from potential UKIP voters, that same factor makes the Cameron approach to Europe potentially divisive within the Conservative Party. However, thedissenter would expect the prospect of power to outweigh principle for all Conservatives, pre-election, even though whatever the approach adopted should Lisbon be ratified before a British election will need to sound sufficiently antagonistic towards Europe to keep the European sceptic vote on side. Conservative Europhiles will swallow hard and bide their time.

Of course all this is speculation, the swingometer is fun, and the election still some months away. It is, however, abundantly clear that a Conservative majority following a May election is not a certainty at this point in time and there is every chance of a very tight result.

So Europe matters.

So too might Northern Ireland, for once, though not as an election campaign issue.

The Europe factor makes it especially difficult at this point in time to be certain of a Conservative majority in 2010. This may make the couple of seats that may arise from the UCUNF project in Northern Ireland of greater importance to David Cameron than might be generally presumed.

The ‘Others’ and the 18 Northern Ireland seats are generally considered to be part of the opposition against which the pollsters calculate an anticipated majority. Two UCUNF seats could make all the difference between ‘losing’ and the slimmest of majorities. By the same token, so would that block of DUP seats – it would be interesting to see how practical politics would then impact on the Conservative/UUP compact.

Which is why doubts will always hang over what really matters to David Cameron’s Conservative Party. When practicality is the driving force, neither principle nor partnership will be allowed to stand in the way.

The voting percentages show little change for any Party other than the DUP (2004/2009).

Alliance and Greens may be cock-a-hoop at their result, except that closer analysis shows they gained no more than the minor parties altogether in 2004. This takes account of the lower turnout, a drop of around 65,000 votes, to a more ‘normal’ level of voting in the European elections of around 43% – still a way to go with the UK turnout of around 34%, though roughly equal to the European-wide average (though some countries have compulsory voting).

Election details are here.

Even though Barbre DeBrun was elected on the first count, and topped the poll, Sinn Fein worked hard to stand still in this election.  Same for Alban Maginness and the SDLP.  The SDLP at least halted decline and saw the Sinn Fein percentage of the vote drop very marginally (0.3%).  While the story of the election was on the split in the Unionist vote, the nationalist parties are in a rut.  Sinn Fein’s rut is on both sides of the border – they lost their one MEP, and a decent performance in local government elections held on the same day has since been spoiled by resignations.

For Sinn Fein the question must be ‘where next?’.  For all nationalists, it must surely be dawning that a United Ireland is generations away, if ever.  The Republic of Ireland is preoccupied with its economy. Moreover, across Europe voters turned away from the left, on which both main nationalist parties loosely base their political approach: though interesting to see Sinn Fein lose in Dublin to a real socialist suggesting a squeeze for Sinn Fein between left and right.

Sinn Fein’s campaign for a United Ireland (in America) does a lot to help Jim Allister’s proposition that the Belfast Agreement was not a ‘settlement’: another Sinn Fein contradiction; if we cannot go ‘back’ to pre-Belfast Agreement, neither can we go forward to a United Ireland if a ‘settlement’ exists. If  Sinn Fein’s next step is to go off to America and argue for a United Ireland there, as Alex Kane points out in the News Letter, it might as well as no-one in Ireland is listening.

In the time since the election the SDLP hasn’t really done anything much. The post-election shuffle of committee positions in Stormont passed by almost unremarked.

The Unionist vote split broadly three ways: DUP, Diane Dodds, 88,346; UCUNF, Jim Nicholson, 82,893; TUV, Jim Allister, 66,197.

As this was an STV PR election, lets start with Jim Nicholson who topped the Unionist vote at the end of the count.  The decline in voter numbers, though a marginal increase in the percentage share due to the overall decrease in voting, leaves it impossible to know if the new collaboration with the Conservative Party was a benefit or not to the Ulster Unionists.  Either the UUP vote could have been worse, and the Tory link attracted middle class voters who would not have otherwise bothered. Or, the UUP have bottomed and the Tory link has been a convenient financial leg up until fortunes improve.

Of course the Ulster Unionists hope that the split between the DUP and TUV will deliver an extra seat in the upcoming, Westminster elections. Perhaps. Any seat would be a bonus given that it seems likely that North Down will be lost one way or another.

More interesting was the transfer of the majority of Jim Allister’s vote to Jim Nicholson.

It is not entirely correct to view Jim Allister’s TUV as ‘integrationalist’. Integrationalist has long been used as a term of abuse by devolutionists to indicate that this was a lesser Unionism, in some way; mostly to suggest that relying on the ‘untrustworthy’ Westminster establishment was plain foolish as it was in cahoots with the Pan-nationalist front.  Nevertheless it seems logical that if TUV voters are less enamoured with devolution, in principle, then the natural transfer would be to a Party that provides the stronger pan-UK link – a national representation through the UUP/Con collaboration.

Transfers will matter more at the next Assembly election, where those last few seats will be down to how the parties view each other, and where every Conservative as well as UUP vote (at present there is no agreement between the two parties for Assembly elections) will be as important as the TUV’s.  This triumvirate may provide a serious threat to the DUP in the Assembly elections because it would probably mean the final transfers will see Unionists other than the DUP elected.   Moreover, the addition of the TUV to the ballot paper seems, for now, to be shoring up the electoral turnout of the Unionist vote thereby increasing the total non-DUP vote.

The UUP have picked up on one of Jim Allister’s election themes – that the DUP/Sinn Fein led government is inherently unstable. Since the election the UUP have increasingly built up a picture that suggests that government in Northern Ireland is failing.  However, the UUP offers no alternative and no analysis as to why it would be different with an alternative arrangement of the chairs around the Executive table – currently the only possible outcome of an Assembly election.  It has hinted that a Conservative Government would bring change, though exactly what change is not elaborated – event though this doesn’t square with David Camerons endorsement of current arrangements.  To some extent this ambiguity assists the TUV: it reinforces the message that change is possible.

Since the European election the UUP is too gleefully destabilising the very institutional structures on which its future depends – the Assembly is its electoral lifeline. While seeking to undermine the DUP/Sinn Fein axis may be amusing, with some good quips, but where’s the strategy? The reshuffle of the Executive pack following an Assembly election is likely to create a TUV ‘opposition’ in Stormont, and  a Sinn Fein First Minister.  Good for democracy, but something the UUP voter is unlikely to see as attractive, and voting in Northern Ireland can be hugely tactical.  This may undermine part of that gain they would have hoped for by the TUV splitting the DUP vote, as the UUP would see it.

For the DUP the most worrying statistic much be that the overall final vote of 23.6 for the final DUP votes and 27% for the UUP/Con takes the vote split back to the electoral shares of the 2001 Westminster poll (22%/27%) or further back to the 1985 local elections (24%/29%) – 5% of Jim Allister’s vote did not transfer to anyone. This places perspective in the challenge to the DUP following the European election.

In many ways the electoral performance of Diane Dodds has left the DUP with a conundrum. In one election the DUP has lost an electorate vote that took years to build.  Where does it go to rebuild that electorate?

On the one hand it is clear that the votes borrowed from the Ulster Unionists and other liberal/integrationalist unionists have now left the DUP, and are unlikely to return. On the other hand, there is a deeply dissatisfied DUP vote that has found the confidence to vote TUV. As the DUP know from vote-building 2001-2008 the first task is to make the voter comfortable in being prepared to vote differently to their norm, and then to capture and build on that vote.  For the DUP, the Jim Allister vote represents both the loss of the votes from natural Ulster Unionists and, more worryingly from natural DUP voters.

If the Ministerial shuffle of this past month is meant to impress, then the DUP is failing to understand the challenge ahead.  What is the message of the reshuffle? Double jobbing is going? Mostly: good; but Peter Robinson has been at pains to stress that this had been planned anyway.

The DUP lacks a narrative that will either mollify those who are attracted to the TUV because of its clarity or, because it fears the TUV vote more than UCUNF, attract those who might be supportive of their success in managing the current power-sharing arrangements. So while the appointment of Nelson McCausland may be a sop to the ‘hard-core’ voter and perhaps make a start on attracting back some of those who voted TUV, it will equally annoy the very UUP/Con type voter the DUP needs to perchance attract.

So what then of the TUV?  The conditions for Jim Allister to gain his European vote has been rumbling for some time – like a volcano, it rumbles before it blows. All parties try to paint the TUV as variously a ‘one man show’, integrationalist (as if relying on Westminster was worse than sharing power with Sinn Fein), ‘intent on taking us back to the bad old days’ or ‘extreme’.

Unionists would look on the last two points and point out that Jim Allister’s dissent from the ‘new order’ is not the same as ‘dissent’ within republicanism.  He has no guns.  Both the ‘integrationalist’ tag and the ‘bad old days’ warning are based on a presumption that the current Belfast Agreement arrangements are perfectly acceptable. But neither the DUP, nor the UUP, believes that they are. The DUP agreed with the outline of Jim Allister’s critique of the arrangements before they returned from St.Andrews. The UUP hints that change will happen.

Party depth is probably the most difficult challenge ahead for Jim Allister.  For intelligence and integrity (even if you don’t agree with him) he stands heads above most of the rest of the political characters peddling their political wares in the ‘huckster’s shop’ as described by Sir Reg Empey (and watch here).  Except, of course, Jim Allister is not in the Assembly. Nor does he have any DUP defectors in the Assembly. He does have a handful of Councillors; in more way than one, a handful.

Any successful Party must have discipline – something the DUP still has, and the UUP seems to have gained some along with Conservative Party finance.  It must also have some depth, with an ability to promote its messages on a range of fronts.  To do that, it is necessary to have a group of competent advocates who are able to widen the commentary, particularly in target constituencies. Competency means staying on message, building positive profile and moving the Party agenda forward (even if only slightly, a bit at a time as the DUP did 1985-2001, and then with vigour and depth 2001-2008).

The DUP has responded quickly to the European Election result, but without any clear direction or purpose. At least the DUP have realised there is a shift in the Unionist mood, and that the TUV fight is with them in the first instance. The UUP are too busy talking up their ‘success’ to realise that they are still standing on sinking electoral sands.

Jim Allister has no more need to outline details of his future framework for political institutions in Northern Ireland than David Cameron does to detail his economic/tax plans for the nation so far from an election.  Allister’s core demand for change is shared by both the DUP and the UUP.  That change is possible is confirmed by Sinn Fein. The Alliance Party could benefit in this atmosphere if it wasn’t so busy chasing the potential of the Policing and Justice Ministry.

There is an electorate out there that is either disengaged or angry enough to vote anyone but ‘the consensus’. There are more votes out there for the TUV; mostly DUP, though plenty of others seeking a positive alternative that is credible and intellectually respectable.

The size of Jim Allister’s vote in the European Election was a shock to the political parties at Stormont because it showed a deep crack in ‘the consensus’ on which the political structures arising from the Belfast Agreement rely.

In the aftershock of the election all the focus is on the DUP’s response; though that is not to say the reaction to the vote by other parties is of no consequence.  Pretending that is not the case is delusional. For Jim Allister, small snipes seem to be enough for not to keep his quarry unsettled.  The UUP is doing half his job for him by arguing the instability and paralysis in the power-sharing arrangements. Sinn Fein, and certain SDLP representatives, continue to demonise the Loyal Orders in such a way as to show the lack of tolerance or acceptance from nationalism of a shared future – so why vote for Unionists who believe in one?

Jim Allister may well need to create a more positive narrative that has a principled core around which more Unionists, from its many shades, feel comfortable to coalesce. He may need to add depth to the TUV. However, the behaviour of main Parties at Stormont since the European Election is only helping to confirm those who voted for Jim Allister that their’s was the right choice.  At least in the short term, if Jim Allister does nothing much over the summer, things will continue to rumble along to his advantage.