Electorally, the Conservatives need a substantial swing to ensure a majority. UKPollingReport provides a fun way of keeping in touch with what the latest poll means with a simple swing calculator. A simple exercise on this swingometer shows the volatility of the electorate, and the electoral challenge that faces the Conservatives until May 2010.

This graph was grabbed on the 6th October.

For this example thedissenter  is using the YouGov daily poll (chosen only because this is best suited for the example). You may want to play with numbers from the ICM Guardian monthly polls, or any other of your choice. There will be plenty of opportunity to test the swingometer with the many polls that will appear frequently in the media over the coming months. Using the poll of 6th October provides the Conservatives with a comfortable majority of around  sixty (Con 41, Lab 28, LD 18), just two weeks before the 22nd October poll shows the majority was a less comfortable twenty-four (Con 39, Lab 27, LD 20). The poll on the 22nd showed a very high ‘others’ at 14%.

The strength of ‘others’ is always greater in the aftermath of a European election: when the British electorate seems to enjoy itself by giving one in the eye to Europe and with the other end of the stick one in the eye to the big three established parties. However, the polling of ‘others’ seems to be more resilient this time, and the distance between the European election and the General Election will be less than a year.

It may be that the relative voting strength of ‘others’ at election time that, perhaps for the first time, will be a significant factor in determining the formation of the next Government. For example, the poll on the 22nd October showed a high percentage of ‘others’, but just 2% more for Labour (and less for ‘others’) would have meant that the Conservatives would fall three short of an overall majority. However, 2% for Labour and just one more percentage point for the Conservatives (‘others down 3%) and a majority of twelve is generated for the Tories.

The Conservatives polling is staying stubbornly around the 40%, give or take, rarely allowing for a majority of more than 20 seats, which must be very uncomfortable for Conservative strategists. There is no doubt that a significant percentage of the ‘others’ polling is UKIP, which tends to eat into Conservative votes for the most part; which is why the promise of a referendum on Europe is so important.

While there is no ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the argument that the only Party to offer a referendum is the Conservative Party may be enough to assure that UKIP voters will vote Conservative; UKIP voters having little chance of seeing a UKIP candidate elected and Europe being the only issue they care much about, believing they can win a no campaign.

It is therefore a major question for the Conservative Party as to what the approach will be if Lisbon is ratified before May. As a Treaty, Lisbon would be almost impossible to unravel. While not in power, the Conservatives have little ability to influence the advance of the European project before May 2010. Even if elected, by wandering off with its Teddy Bear from the centre of European dialogue the Conservative Party is unlikely to have sufficient weight to achieve a great deal, or indeed any deal.

Yet without a sufficiently ‘robust’ Conservative approach on Europe for home consumption, and it is far from clear what that could be, the UKIP voter is fickle enough to vote in protest regardless – because to the UKIP voter only Europe matters. While much of the New Labour vote may simply not vote for Labour in 2010, most likely the UKIP vote will go to the polling booths one way or another.

Feedback from the Conservative Party Conference this week has been that there is not the anticipation that there was in the 1996 Labour Conference, when there was a similarly tired and unfocused Government and power seemed within grasp. European policy has added weight in the Conservative election planning because it is abundantly clear from any of the three Party Conferences in recent weeks that there is little chance of offering the electorate a cheerful message of better times ahead. Every vote will count in May 2010.

The difficulty is that while Europe is a factor in securing votes from potential UKIP voters, that same factor makes the Cameron approach to Europe potentially divisive within the Conservative Party. However, thedissenter would expect the prospect of power to outweigh principle for all Conservatives, pre-election, even though whatever the approach adopted should Lisbon be ratified before a British election will need to sound sufficiently antagonistic towards Europe to keep the European sceptic vote on side. Conservative Europhiles will swallow hard and bide their time.

Of course all this is speculation, the swingometer is fun, and the election still some months away. It is, however, abundantly clear that a Conservative majority following a May election is not a certainty at this point in time and there is every chance of a very tight result.

So Europe matters.

So too might Northern Ireland, for once, though not as an election campaign issue.

The Europe factor makes it especially difficult at this point in time to be certain of a Conservative majority in 2010. This may make the couple of seats that may arise from the UCUNF project in Northern Ireland of greater importance to David Cameron than might be generally presumed.

The ‘Others’ and the 18 Northern Ireland seats are generally considered to be part of the opposition against which the pollsters calculate an anticipated majority. Two UCUNF seats could make all the difference between ‘losing’ and the slimmest of majorities. By the same token, so would that block of DUP seats – it would be interesting to see how practical politics would then impact on the Conservative/UUP compact.

Which is why doubts will always hang over what really matters to David Cameron’s Conservative Party. When practicality is the driving force, neither principle nor partnership will be allowed to stand in the way.

The voting percentages show little change for any Party other than the DUP (2004/2009).

Alliance and Greens may be cock-a-hoop at their result, except that closer analysis shows they gained no more than the minor parties altogether in 2004. This takes account of the lower turnout, a drop of around 65,000 votes, to a more ‘normal’ level of voting in the European elections of around 43% – still a way to go with the UK turnout of around 34%, though roughly equal to the European-wide average (though some countries have compulsory voting).

Election details are here.

Even though Barbre DeBrun was elected on the first count, and topped the poll, Sinn Fein worked hard to stand still in this election.  Same for Alban Maginness and the SDLP.  The SDLP at least halted decline and saw the Sinn Fein percentage of the vote drop very marginally (0.3%).  While the story of the election was on the split in the Unionist vote, the nationalist parties are in a rut.  Sinn Fein’s rut is on both sides of the border – they lost their one MEP, and a decent performance in local government elections held on the same day has since been spoiled by resignations.

For Sinn Fein the question must be ‘where next?’.  For all nationalists, it must surely be dawning that a United Ireland is generations away, if ever.  The Republic of Ireland is preoccupied with its economy. Moreover, across Europe voters turned away from the left, on which both main nationalist parties loosely base their political approach: though interesting to see Sinn Fein lose in Dublin to a real socialist suggesting a squeeze for Sinn Fein between left and right.

Sinn Fein’s campaign for a United Ireland (in America) does a lot to help Jim Allister’s proposition that the Belfast Agreement was not a ‘settlement’: another Sinn Fein contradiction; if we cannot go ‘back’ to pre-Belfast Agreement, neither can we go forward to a United Ireland if a ‘settlement’ exists. If  Sinn Fein’s next step is to go off to America and argue for a United Ireland there, as Alex Kane points out in the News Letter, it might as well as no-one in Ireland is listening.

In the time since the election the SDLP hasn’t really done anything much. The post-election shuffle of committee positions in Stormont passed by almost unremarked.

The Unionist vote split broadly three ways: DUP, Diane Dodds, 88,346; UCUNF, Jim Nicholson, 82,893; TUV, Jim Allister, 66,197.

As this was an STV PR election, lets start with Jim Nicholson who topped the Unionist vote at the end of the count.  The decline in voter numbers, though a marginal increase in the percentage share due to the overall decrease in voting, leaves it impossible to know if the new collaboration with the Conservative Party was a benefit or not to the Ulster Unionists.  Either the UUP vote could have been worse, and the Tory link attracted middle class voters who would not have otherwise bothered. Or, the UUP have bottomed and the Tory link has been a convenient financial leg up until fortunes improve.

Of course the Ulster Unionists hope that the split between the DUP and TUV will deliver an extra seat in the upcoming, Westminster elections. Perhaps. Any seat would be a bonus given that it seems likely that North Down will be lost one way or another.

More interesting was the transfer of the majority of Jim Allister’s vote to Jim Nicholson.

It is not entirely correct to view Jim Allister’s TUV as ‘integrationalist’. Integrationalist has long been used as a term of abuse by devolutionists to indicate that this was a lesser Unionism, in some way; mostly to suggest that relying on the ‘untrustworthy’ Westminster establishment was plain foolish as it was in cahoots with the Pan-nationalist front.  Nevertheless it seems logical that if TUV voters are less enamoured with devolution, in principle, then the natural transfer would be to a Party that provides the stronger pan-UK link – a national representation through the UUP/Con collaboration.

Transfers will matter more at the next Assembly election, where those last few seats will be down to how the parties view each other, and where every Conservative as well as UUP vote (at present there is no agreement between the two parties for Assembly elections) will be as important as the TUV’s.  This triumvirate may provide a serious threat to the DUP in the Assembly elections because it would probably mean the final transfers will see Unionists other than the DUP elected.   Moreover, the addition of the TUV to the ballot paper seems, for now, to be shoring up the electoral turnout of the Unionist vote thereby increasing the total non-DUP vote.

The UUP have picked up on one of Jim Allister’s election themes – that the DUP/Sinn Fein led government is inherently unstable. Since the election the UUP have increasingly built up a picture that suggests that government in Northern Ireland is failing.  However, the UUP offers no alternative and no analysis as to why it would be different with an alternative arrangement of the chairs around the Executive table – currently the only possible outcome of an Assembly election.  It has hinted that a Conservative Government would bring change, though exactly what change is not elaborated – event though this doesn’t square with David Camerons endorsement of current arrangements.  To some extent this ambiguity assists the TUV: it reinforces the message that change is possible.

Since the European election the UUP is too gleefully destabilising the very institutional structures on which its future depends – the Assembly is its electoral lifeline. While seeking to undermine the DUP/Sinn Fein axis may be amusing, with some good quips, but where’s the strategy? The reshuffle of the Executive pack following an Assembly election is likely to create a TUV ‘opposition’ in Stormont, and  a Sinn Fein First Minister.  Good for democracy, but something the UUP voter is unlikely to see as attractive, and voting in Northern Ireland can be hugely tactical.  This may undermine part of that gain they would have hoped for by the TUV splitting the DUP vote, as the UUP would see it.

For the DUP the most worrying statistic much be that the overall final vote of 23.6 for the final DUP votes and 27% for the UUP/Con takes the vote split back to the electoral shares of the 2001 Westminster poll (22%/27%) or further back to the 1985 local elections (24%/29%) – 5% of Jim Allister’s vote did not transfer to anyone. This places perspective in the challenge to the DUP following the European election.

In many ways the electoral performance of Diane Dodds has left the DUP with a conundrum. In one election the DUP has lost an electorate vote that took years to build.  Where does it go to rebuild that electorate?

On the one hand it is clear that the votes borrowed from the Ulster Unionists and other liberal/integrationalist unionists have now left the DUP, and are unlikely to return. On the other hand, there is a deeply dissatisfied DUP vote that has found the confidence to vote TUV. As the DUP know from vote-building 2001-2008 the first task is to make the voter comfortable in being prepared to vote differently to their norm, and then to capture and build on that vote.  For the DUP, the Jim Allister vote represents both the loss of the votes from natural Ulster Unionists and, more worryingly from natural DUP voters.

If the Ministerial shuffle of this past month is meant to impress, then the DUP is failing to understand the challenge ahead.  What is the message of the reshuffle? Double jobbing is going? Mostly: good; but Peter Robinson has been at pains to stress that this had been planned anyway.

The DUP lacks a narrative that will either mollify those who are attracted to the TUV because of its clarity or, because it fears the TUV vote more than UCUNF, attract those who might be supportive of their success in managing the current power-sharing arrangements. So while the appointment of Nelson McCausland may be a sop to the ‘hard-core’ voter and perhaps make a start on attracting back some of those who voted TUV, it will equally annoy the very UUP/Con type voter the DUP needs to perchance attract.

So what then of the TUV?  The conditions for Jim Allister to gain his European vote has been rumbling for some time – like a volcano, it rumbles before it blows. All parties try to paint the TUV as variously a ‘one man show’, integrationalist (as if relying on Westminster was worse than sharing power with Sinn Fein), ‘intent on taking us back to the bad old days’ or ‘extreme’.

Unionists would look on the last two points and point out that Jim Allister’s dissent from the ‘new order’ is not the same as ‘dissent’ within republicanism.  He has no guns.  Both the ‘integrationalist’ tag and the ‘bad old days’ warning are based on a presumption that the current Belfast Agreement arrangements are perfectly acceptable. But neither the DUP, nor the UUP, believes that they are. The DUP agreed with the outline of Jim Allister’s critique of the arrangements before they returned from St.Andrews. The UUP hints that change will happen.

Party depth is probably the most difficult challenge ahead for Jim Allister.  For intelligence and integrity (even if you don’t agree with him) he stands heads above most of the rest of the political characters peddling their political wares in the ‘huckster’s shop’ as described by Sir Reg Empey (and watch here).  Except, of course, Jim Allister is not in the Assembly. Nor does he have any DUP defectors in the Assembly. He does have a handful of Councillors; in more way than one, a handful.

Any successful Party must have discipline – something the DUP still has, and the UUP seems to have gained some along with Conservative Party finance.  It must also have some depth, with an ability to promote its messages on a range of fronts.  To do that, it is necessary to have a group of competent advocates who are able to widen the commentary, particularly in target constituencies. Competency means staying on message, building positive profile and moving the Party agenda forward (even if only slightly, a bit at a time as the DUP did 1985-2001, and then with vigour and depth 2001-2008).

The DUP has responded quickly to the European Election result, but without any clear direction or purpose. At least the DUP have realised there is a shift in the Unionist mood, and that the TUV fight is with them in the first instance. The UUP are too busy talking up their ‘success’ to realise that they are still standing on sinking electoral sands.

Jim Allister has no more need to outline details of his future framework for political institutions in Northern Ireland than David Cameron does to detail his economic/tax plans for the nation so far from an election.  Allister’s core demand for change is shared by both the DUP and the UUP.  That change is possible is confirmed by Sinn Fein. The Alliance Party could benefit in this atmosphere if it wasn’t so busy chasing the potential of the Policing and Justice Ministry.

There is an electorate out there that is either disengaged or angry enough to vote anyone but ‘the consensus’. There are more votes out there for the TUV; mostly DUP, though plenty of others seeking a positive alternative that is credible and intellectually respectable.

The size of Jim Allister’s vote in the European Election was a shock to the political parties at Stormont because it showed a deep crack in ‘the consensus’ on which the political structures arising from the Belfast Agreement rely.

In the aftershock of the election all the focus is on the DUP’s response; though that is not to say the reaction to the vote by other parties is of no consequence.  Pretending that is not the case is delusional. For Jim Allister, small snipes seem to be enough for not to keep his quarry unsettled.  The UUP is doing half his job for him by arguing the instability and paralysis in the power-sharing arrangements. Sinn Fein, and certain SDLP representatives, continue to demonise the Loyal Orders in such a way as to show the lack of tolerance or acceptance from nationalism of a shared future – so why vote for Unionists who believe in one?

Jim Allister may well need to create a more positive narrative that has a principled core around which more Unionists, from its many shades, feel comfortable to coalesce. He may need to add depth to the TUV. However, the behaviour of main Parties at Stormont since the European Election is only helping to confirm those who voted for Jim Allister that their’s was the right choice.  At least in the short term, if Jim Allister does nothing much over the summer, things will continue to rumble along to his advantage.

The UUP presents its link with the Conservative Party as a way of being at the centre of UK politics.  At the same time that link is likely to push the UUP to the margins of Europe.

The UUP alignment with the Conservatives is presented as part of a wider vision for ‘The Union’, and for the UUP to be at the centre of national discourse.  As we edge towards the European Election, should Jim Nicholson win one of the three Northern Ireland seats he will return to Europe as part of a Conservative led group at the margins of European discourse.

Currently the British Conservatives in the European Parliament are closely associated with the European Peoples Party (EPP) and European Democrats (ED), collectively the EPP-ED.  That is to change following the upcoming European Election in June, with David Cameron committed to leaving the EPP-ED.

The EPP is broadly Christian Democrat in nature and very pro-European Union/Unity.  It is also very much dominated by the Germanic view of ‘social market economy’.  It broadly expects others to share that view.  They are more comfortable with ‘social market’ than ‘free market’, more statist than liberal.  The ED is broadly balanced to believe more in the free market than the social market and more liberal than statist.  The groups probably share more in underlying principle than either would credit the other.

Within the EPP, for example, among the Spanish Popular Party and the Swedish Moderates, there are friends to be found for British Conservatives. But the Conservatives are committed to abandoning these natural friends.

Membership of a group brings the strength in numbers that is necessary to wheel and deal for committee places and influence within the Parliament, as much in Europe as in Westminster. Dan Hannan MEP outlines his support of the Conservative decision to break from the EPP. From Dan Hannan’s position, leaving the EPP makes sense. What is not explained is why this can’t be done within the EPP-ED, building coalitions of like-minded liberal-conservatives from the ED base and using the EPP-ED strength to shift policy.

David Cameron has made a considerable effort to present the Conservative Party as a modern, progressive centre-right party committed to restoring economic prosperity, combined with a strong sense of social justice. The ED is expressly committed to democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, national sovereignty, free enterprise, minimal regulation, low taxation, private ownership, respect and security for every individual and a strong transatlantic alliance. What in that commitment is out of step with the Conservative Party manifesto for Europe, or indeed for the UK?

The ED cannot make a difference within the EPP-ED because it has not the seven parties to work from a position of strength: it currently has five parties; the two from UK, the Czech ODS, the Portuguese Popular Party and Italian Pensioners Party.  The Conservative party has committed to finding new allies. Possibly. From eastern Europe? There are plenty; many unstable, few unaligned. There is certainly room to work. Eastern Europeans to the centre right feel abandoned by the larger nations – and voted for a Europe of free nations, not a nation-numbing collective. A strong (small, broad c) conservative vision would perhaps help shape politics on a wider arena, a conservatism beyond Britain – a vision for a European big house, perhaps, built on principle and not Party interests. Not while the British Conservatives allow British domestic politics dictate European engagement: actually, British Conservative house-keeping dictating European engagement.

What is not clear is why the Conservatives have decided to cut themselves off from the major and strong centre-right grouping rather than work from within, and what they have to offer that would be particularly attractive or particularly different from what would be possible building from that ED base.

The Conservative Party is heading off into a political corner with its teddy bear.  The Party has reached this point after years of neglect in international relations. While taking part in structures such as the old European Democrat Union (EDU) and International Democrat Union (IDU) the Conservative engagement was at best perfuctory – by default rather than design. True, engagement at IDU level with our American friends was undertaken with greater enthusiasm, though little more purpose. But at Euro level there was always exasperation and confusion as to what it was all about.

International relations in the Conservative Party was most often left to enthusiastic individuals, who threw their heart and soul into carving a relevant and significant place for the Party internationally. But more often than not they were left alone, and without a respected Party role.

The Germans with their powerful Stifung (foundations) and the Swedes with a fundamental commitment to international relations bring purpose to all their European activities and engage in a structured and measured way at all levels from youth through to senior Party activity. Against this, Conservative functionality in engagement meant it often looked out of place or out of step with European colleagues because it was defracted and half-hearted.  Current policy will appear to Europeans as churlish and pointless.

Whether or not the Conservative Party is associated with the EPP would not have been relevant to Northern Ireland’s European vote without the recent Conservative/UUP link-up.  Jim Nicholson made a point in his News Letter web chat that he had “been elected by other MEP colleagues during the last five years to sit on the bureau of the Parliament.” This is in no small part a consequence of his long standing association with the EPP.  What happens when he exits from that group?

Through the Conservative link, the representation in Europe will be significantly weakened as the Conservatives group, UUP in tow, go off to do its own thing. That matters. With Nicholson elected it will mean that none of the MEPS will be part of a significant group – though the EPP could be practical enough to make offers to either Diane Dodds or Jim Allister to retain a British component in its group.   But as it seems likely, all Northern Ireland MEPs would be linked to marginal groups, or be independent.  The strength of connections to major political groups, and the centres of influence that these represent, will be lost completely.

No matter how much the Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists promote their link as strengthening the Union, in Europe it will inevitably result in a reduction in Unionist influence. While many Conservatives believe that Europe doesn’t matter, that attitude is something Northern Ireland can ill afford.

So looking forward (and that is said with all the enthusiasm mustered, which is not that great) the outcome of the vote for the Northern Ireland Members of the European Parliament, June 2009, is unlikely to deliver an electoral surprise. It is probable that the same three Parties will win the seats. That doesn’t mean that the voting spread won’t be of political interest; the biggest story may well be the decline in number of people being bothered to vote.

There are three seats up for grabs under the proportional representation system used for the Northern Ireland. These are currently held by Jim Allister, elected under the DUP banner and topping the poll in 2004, Barbre de Brun, Sinn Fein, 2nd highest vote, and Jim Nicholson, UUP, 3rd and elected on final transfers.

A Province-wide campaign is a challenge to all but the larger Parties. This means that, unusually for Northern Ireland, there are relatively few candidates: just seven in the 2004 European election. The Alliance Party, Labour and the Conservative Party threw their lot behind independent John Gilliland.

In 2004, the first count results were as follows: 


Jim Allister (DUP) 175,761 (32.0%) up 3.6%; elected on first count.
Bairbre De Brun (SF) 144,541 (26.3%) up 9.0%; elected on first count.
Jim Nicholson (UUP) 91,164 (16.6%) down 1.0%. 

Martin Morgan (SDLP) 87,559 (15.9%) down12.1%. 

John Gilliland (Independent) 36,270 (6.6%).
Eamonn McCann (SEA) 9,172 (1.6%).
Lindsay Whitcroft (Green) 4,810 (0.9%).

In percentage terms the 2004 parties’ vote was almost the same in the 2007 Assembly elections. However, like for like, the 2004 European Elections saw a decline in the overall vote of around 20% from the 1999 Euro poll. While the DUP topped the poll in both instances, its vote was down around 20,000 in 2004 compared to 1999. The decline in the total unionist vote was about 75,000. Although the Sinn Fein vote was up around 27,000 the big loser was the SDLP whose vote crashed by more than half from the 190,000 votes for John Hume. The great uncertainty in the upcoming election is the extent to which the overall vote might decline and how the spread of that decline will impact on each Party – it is a factor that both unionist and nationalist parties will fear, equally.

There’s no agreed independent candidate this time. The Alliance Party has selected Ian Parsley, a young candidate who is being offered some profile, no doubt with a longer term view of election in the North Down area. In 1999 the Alliance vote was less than 15,000; the same or more would be a huge success for Alliance.

The SDLP selection of Alban Maginness seems to be a pitch for the old traditional middle class vote. Maginness is better known than Martin Morgan, the considerably younger 2004 candidate. There is nothing new to ‘bring back’ voters. The greatest threat to the SDLP is a further decline in their vote: if the SDLP can hold its vote from 2005 it would be happy.

Jim Nicholson is once again standing for the Ulster Unionist Party. The Conservative Party, with which the Ulster Unionists are now aligned, is unlikely to bring many votes. Any small increase in the UUP vote is more likely to be from some middle class Catholic voters who are unhappy with nationalist parties’ support for the end of academic selection.

No doubt Nicholson’s seat will only be secured with the transfer of votes from Jim Allister, now standing for Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV). The UUP will hope that the number of transfers might make the final vote ‘close’ and attempt to use this to vindicate its Conservative alliance. That would be wrong. Transfers to the UUP will be a protest against the DUP, not an indication of trust restored.

Of the two largest parties last time, Sinn Fein keeps Barbre de Brun as its candidate, no doubt campaigning on experience and its ‘leadership’ credentials; though some republicans may be asking where that leadership is heading. de Brun has been virtually anonymous since her election to Europe. The Sinn Fein led policy to end academic selection is as unpopular with parents of children at Catholic Grammars as much as it is unpopular among unionists. On balance though, this is more likely to hit the SDLP, who share Sinn Fein’s policy objective, and is more rooted in the middle classes than Sinn Fein. However, whether any bread and butter issue will make an impact on the European campaigns is doubtful. More fundamentally, Sinn Fein must be looking at both the last Fermanagh Council by-election and the possibility of a ‘dissident’ republican standing and wondering how well the once envied machine will be able to deliver the vote as it has done in the past.

Jim Allister’s TUV poses a threat to the overall DUP vote. There is general Unionist disaffection with the performance of (at) Stormont. It could be expected that up to about one third of the DUP vote at the 2007 Assembly election would have been with an expectation that the Party would not be entering a power-sharing government with Sinn Fein. Some of this group may well still vote for DUP as the least bad option, there will be some not vote at all and the remainder will vote for Jim Allister.

In 1999 Bob McCartney of the UK Unionist Party gained around 20,000 votes, and this vote would certainly have transferred largely to Jim Allister in 2004 – one reason for the DUP vote holding. The DUP will also have benefited in 2004 from a drift of voters away from the Ulster Unionist Party, who by that stage were disillusioned with David Trimble. It is unlikely that any more votes for Jim Allister will come from the UUP – that vote has long left the Ulster Unionist Party.

Jim Allister is likely to pick up the ‘angry’ vote of those who transferred their vote to the DUP, and feel let down, and the DUP vote that believes there is no right time to share power with IRA/Sinn Fein, and feel betrayed. The bookies may be right that Allister’s total vote will most likely amount to no more than around 30,000-40,000 votes. A higher vote and the current sense of a Unionist electorate that is deeply unsettled is actually an electorate with a seething anger towards current political leadership and direction from both Unionist parties.

What then of the DUP? The candidate is Belfast based, though Diane Dodds has a high profile as Councillor and ex-MLA in West Belfast; she is also married to the current Minister of Finance Nigel Dodds, so has high name recognition. Her views on the price of bullocks and lambs is unknown – while Allister has been very much present in the News Letter’s Saturday pullout Farming Life; a widely read farming paper across the community. There is also the possibility that Diane Dodds may suffer to some extent from the fallout from the Westminster expenses row. Some unionist voters may be unwilling to vote for yet another DUP ‘family’. A DUP election strategy based on it being the only Party that can gain more votes than Sinn Fein seems tired, and a little odd when the two parties are ‘sharing’ power in Stormont. Alternative strategies may not be available.

Jim Allister may not have much chance of retaining his European seat, but his votes will still matter and will probably be the focus of post-election media analysis. Allister’s vote represents an angry and alienated Unionist electorate that may be sidelined, but can’t be easily ignored. What will be interesting will be to review the spread of the TUV votes – will Allister’s votes be predominately urban or rural? What would be the impact at the next Westminster election of the TUV vote; where the DUP and UUP are close enough that a decent percent vote by the TUV would mean the UUP regaining a seat, possibly South Antrim – assuming the UUP is able to assure a turnout of its core vote.

There is also interest in the spread of nationalist voting. At this point we do not know if a ‘dissident’ republican will stand in opposition to Sinn Fein. As Liam Clarke says in the Sunday Times, even a 2% ‘dissident’ vote would impact on the Sinn Fein’s ambitions. Will Sinn Fein fail to gain votes, or even hold its own? Will the SDLP hold enough votes to still be in the political game come the Westminster election within the next year or so.

There is little to suggest that the outcome of the June election will be anything other than the same old parties being returned to Europe. But the disaffection with the current political leaderships may mean that a protest may be made by opting for the outsider or simply not voting. Will we be looking at another sectarian head-count in the June Euro poll? Perhaps. Perhaps also wondering where the heads have gone?