Of course the Parades Commission is operating in a context that is highly politicised; though it is meant to be outside ‘political considerations, that idea was dashed when a parade on the Ormeau Road was denied in deference to the ‘Peace Process’ – which looked like not placing responsibility on republicans not to riot. The ‘political process’ has been elevated to over-write all other considerations and the consequent political interference or indifference with respect to parades has been to the detriment of the Rule of Law. No better example of that is the absolute breakdown in authority evident in violence across Northern Ireland in the week of the 12^th July 2010.  Politics and police just stood there taking the abuse and with little evidence of a longer-term response.

While parading by the Orange Order may have provided a context at the 12th, there was little evidence that the July rioters cared deeply whether the Orange Order paraded or not.  The principal battle for hearts and minds is being played out in the Republican/nationalist communities – violence in Lurgan and Londonderry, and elsewhere, was pure thuggery to demonstrate that Sinn Fein’s support for the devolution of policing means little on the streets. The new Republicans on the block have learned well from those who similarly brought anger to the streets in the past: a progression from one generation to the next.

Meanwhile a review of legislation on parades and protest is on-going. The OFMDFM consultation is now the seventh review of the Parades Commission since its inception.

From the outset the Parades Commission was an unparalleled and unwarranted interference with the peaceful expression of a people’s culture and had significant potential to undermine of the Rule of Law. There is no moral or human rights justification for political and legal interference with cultural expression: quite the contrary.  Trade Unionists claim the limitation within the OFMDFM paper are unique in Europe forget that they failed to raise a voice on the Parades Legislation which was similarly unique and intolerant.

Since the inception of the Parades Commission there has been a clear admission by Republicanism of a planned process to use the issue of parades for political advantage.

Sinn Fein has made no secret of its political activity in raising the parades issue.  In the event the political process has been used as a sledgehammer to demonise, diminish and disrupt the exercise of legal, peaceful and fundamental freedom of cultural expression.  The policy has been one of creating a cultural apartheid where no Protestant is seen, heard, or permitted within a stones throw of a designated, reserved, “sanitised” nationalist space:

There were a number of distinct advantages for Republicans in moving forward on the parades agenda. First it plays to the gallery and maintains a wedge between communities. In the absence of armed conflict it maintains a war of words that retains simmering sectarian tensions on which republicanism relies for purpose. This was a political hammer being used to crack a cultural nut. While leaders of the Orange Order may from time to time make pronouncements on broad political matters, it does not function as a political organisation. It was always poorly suited to a public political argument and certainly not to understand or challenge a political machine.

Political interference has prolonged the parades issue in Northern Ireland.  The Parades Commission was itself a buck-passing exercise by the NIO, supported by the police – a firewall to take the heat off the Secretary of State and Chief Constable.  It was born of political strategy and suckled by the political expediency of politicians who wanted to be seen as leading the fight (both sides), and by the demands of the ‘political process’ that meant not confronting the realities of rights and responsibilities as they should be within a society where the Rule of Law is paramount.

How the placing of the Parades issue into the Office of OFMDFM will not result in political interference/dealing/brokering is outside thedissenter’s ability to imagine.  The present proposals seem to have been predicated on a political deal at Hillsborough.  That the issue of Parades is being discussed in the context of a political deal is itself a weakness and indicative of a fundamental flaw in strategic thinking.  A principled and fair outcome to the resolution of parades issues should be a local matter, having due respect for the Rule of Law, and not reliant on externalities.  If the Review itself depends on a political deal, then how will parades not continue to be politicised and used to modulate tensions and division to the benefit of a few and to the detriment of all?

The process outlined by this most recent consultation process merely transfers the Parades Commission from being a quasi-judicial ‘independent’ body within the orbit of the NIO, to a quasi-judicial office within the orbit of the OFMDFM.  This does not inspire confidence in transparency, accountability or an end to political interference.    A previous ‘Quigley Report’ on parades had positive ideas with respect to an open, accountable and transparent process of addressing parading issues.  There were elements of the mediation aspects of that Report which were woolly, but if offered a strategic view rather than political fix.

The current proposals do not offer significant encouragement to believe that a Shared Future is possible while a process exists in law that can be used to politically delineate and define ‘our streets’, and ‘our territory’. That this process is given legal standing does not remove legislation on parades and protest from the status of base sectarian harassment of folks wishing to be free to express their culture or viewpoints in peace and without fear of threat or violence.

In a normal society, one in which cultural pluralism is the norm and freedom of conscience is cherished, where another’s culture and views are respected, there would be no need for parades regulation by whatever name that body is known.  The Ashdown Interim Consultation Report assumed the premise of a ‘normal’ society.  If OFMDFM believed that Northern Ireland society has the ability to move forward then why consider the regulation of a people’s culture to be at all necessary?  How does legislation that tends towards cultural apartheid and unreasonably and unfairly penalises a particular culture.

The Rule of Law should be sufficient to protect freedoms without regulatory bodies open to political interference. But authority, and the leadership that falls from that place of respect and standing in either politics or policing, seems absent. That we are where we are on parades and protests shows an attitude that all too readily accepts intolerance and exclusion as a norm, and for some is a political necessity.

The 2010 Westminster election is over.  While the poll outcome was inconclusive the upshot is a decisive shift in British Politics where a progressive coalition has burst through the liberal centre/right. In the process, there were no important phone calls to the Northern Ireland parties, who now sit on the Parliamentary margins.

The debates on national television provided an energy to the national election. Locally the election campaign was as lacklustre and uninspiring as the Party leaders on the local TV debates.

On the nationalist side the new leader of the SDLP simply argued a greener case than Sinn Fein, ceding any advantage new leadership might offer in setting the electoral debate and regaining ground in the future. Sinn Fein organised a campaign that seemed more a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections and must be disappointed that they made little inroad into the SDLP vote on polling day.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: comparative strength.

The obvious decline in SDLP votes since 1998 is not to the great benefit of Sinn Fein.  For Westminster 2001, the high point of nationalist turnout, the SDLP had 168,873 and Sinn Fein 175,932; in 2010, 110,970 and 171,942 respectively.  In percentage terms Sinn Fein is clearly outvoting the SDLP, but it has made no gains in number of votes.  The overall Nationalist/Republican vote appears relatively static.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative

Republicans, in particular, have made much of an inroad into defeating Unionism, electorally. While Unionism was once dominant electorally, this was at a time when nationalists probably failed to even register to vote. The heady early 1970s, when unionist voters turned out in great numbers, was not a time of unionist unity. Since then, nationalists and republicans have fully engaged in the electoral process, and around 200,000 have been added to the electoral register.

Electorate and turnout for elections 1969-2010: comparative.

Summarily, the increase in registered voters has been to the benefit of neither nationalists nor unionists. In recent years the electorate, unionist and nationalist, has slowly disengaged from politics. However, ignoring the numbers and entering the percentage game, Sinn Fein has gained as it holds its vote relative to others.  Somehow, despite Sinn Fein’s project seemingly stalling, Unionist Parties are presenting a picture of unionism in crisis.

Much has been made of the apparent failure of leaders (and leadership) within Unionism, and there has been a great deal of debate since the Westminster election on the topic of what the future holds for unionism.

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: comparative strength

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

The numbers suggest that the Ulster Unionist Party is bumping along and has done little to regain the electoral trust that it squandered under David Trimble. Just as the UUP climbed electoral heights in the 1990s, so it has fallen to consistent lows over the past decade.  The decline has been hard for a Party that still gives the impression that it still believes itself to the natural Party of Government. Although the UUP electoral arrangement with the Conservative Party has been derided, on the positive side, at least the Party could had the finance to run a campaign and the vote was probably no worse than if the arrangement hadn’t existed.

A lowly UUP ought to have been good news for the DUP. However, similar to their principal partners in the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP has not been able to take advantage of their rival’s electoral slide. The DUP vote has been remarkably stable over the past decade.  The Party immediately benefited from the mistrust of the Ulster Unionist Party; acting as the standard bearer of opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein. In the decade from 1998, those who became disillusioned or discontented with the UUP either left politics or joined the DUP.  Over this period the unionist electorate could be characterised as either being ‘for’ the UUP or ‘against’.

Unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010 (not including UUP/DUP): combined/cumulative

In the 2007 Assembly election there was still a broad expectation that the DUP would not enter Government with Sinn Fein. When they did, off the back of apparently verified decommissioning by the IRA (which seems to have missed 40% ), it can be no surprise that the DUP would suffer to some extent in the same way as the UUP.  That was certainly the instance in the 2009 European Election, when Jim Allister of the TUV took a signification proportion of the unionist vote.

While the TUV did less well in the Westminster election, drift from the two main parties was nevertheless marked. Trust has gone. Yes, there was an agreed unionist candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone, and the DUP stood aside in North Down. Even so, in an election when the overall unionist vote increased on the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP must be disappointed that it cannot point to any positive electoral gain.

All unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

Nationalism performed less well than unionism in the Westminster election, albeit marginally. Yet the debate post election is on the future of unionism. Inevitably this has centred on the future of the Parties, and in particular the leaderships.

No unionist leader has much to cheer about post-election.  The TUV performed poorly, though it was never likely that the European pr vote could have been replicated in the first-past-the-post Westminster poll. Still, the TUV lacked depth in its candidate selection, and Jim Allister’s political persona was one of anger.  The Unionist electorate is past anger. It wants to trust again. To do that it desires confidence in a leadership can attract talent and articulate a pathway to restoring community, cultural and political confidence. The TUV was not alone in failing to meet that expectation.

Sir Reg Empey lost in South Antrim. Perhaps he has done enough service to David Cameron’s Conservatives to gain a peerage and join David Trimble, in which case his candidature was not entirely in vain.  It was his close association with David Trimble that probably reduced his chances in South Antrim, where not even a hawkish David Burnside had been able to hold the seat. The electorate that punished the UUP then, and sent an unambiguous message on the leadership of David Trimble, was hardly likely to vote now for someone equally at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement.  Adrian Watson, the choice of the local UUP would probably have fared better as a new and local face for Westminster.

Sir Reg also lost on the wider political field. From the outset of the UUP Conservative arrangement he failed to present a convincing narrative to overcome the sense that this was a marriage of convenience: the Conservatives needed a significant electoral base in Northern Ireland and the UUP needed the money.  The UUP message that Stormont was a ‘huckster’s shop’ should have had some traction with a disillusioned electorate. However, Sir Reg’s inability to bring clarity and direction to the UCUNF (UUP/Conservative) arrangement suggested that he equally unable to manage his own neighbourhood store. There was the sluggishness in agreeing candidates. Finally, for thedissenter, Fred Cobain standing as a Conservative & Unionist?

And yet, the UUP vote broadly held up across Northern Ireland. Yes, it now has no seats at Westminster.  But it still has a base on which to build. On the wider national electoral front the politics of the nation has been trust into new territory with the Conservative/Liberal coalition (or is that Liberal Conservative coalition).  There is deep resentment of the central Conservative Party organisation among many local Conservative constituency organisations.  Although talking about decentralising power from Westminster, Cameron has strongly centralised Conservative Party organisation around his own team.  This has not delivered the majority he needed; in many instances this was down to lack of flexibility in addressing local electoral campaigns: Adrian Watson is a case in point.

What became clear on election night was that the country no longer acts uniformly. The great swingometer was made redundant on a night where local electorates seemed to take a local view – resulting in massively varying swings across the country.  It would suggest that future candidates will need to emphasise more local issues and rely less on national coat-tails.

In this respect there is certainly a place for more regionally based politically associations where the central party outlines core principles, but does not dictate local candidate selection and tolerates a degree of policy variance around the country.  If the Conservatives and the UUP can find that balance between regional and national interests then there is a future for the UUP. Otherwise, not.

At times in the run-up to and during the election the argument of the UUP almost seemed to be that the DUP couldn’t be trusted: to which the electorate added the word ‘either’. In the end the only place that this mattered was in East Belfast, where the electorate cast a plague on the UUP and DUP. Of course the rejection of a sitting MP, and in this case the leader of the DUP, was a huge slap to Peter Robinson.  In the rest of the country the DUP held its own and it seats.

The East Belfast seat was not a natural loss, had there been anyone of stature in the East Belfast DUP to have stood as an alternative to Peter Robinson: Strangford, the Westminster seat once held by Iris Robinson was retained by the DUP. The electoral strategy for the East Belfast seat has long been the strength of the Robinsons (Westminster/Assembly/Council) to bring in all others on their coat-tails.  Time for a re-think.

The apparent nature of the internal politics of the DUP suggests that there is little likelihood of Robinson being replaced as leader; for reasons not that dissimilar to the earlier thedissenter piece in the wake of revelations around Iris Robinson earlier in the year. The early DUP was shaped by Ian Paisley. The latter-day DUP has been shaped by Peter Robinson.  There is little obvious alternative to Peter Robinson’s leadership.  Peter Robinson’s East Belfast Assembly seat is relatively secure, as one of many, which assures his leadership position where it matters most to the DUP, at Stormont.

Before bringing together all these points into a broad conclusion it is worth noting the success of Naomi Long. First, by accepting David Ford at the Executive Table, the Alliance Party has been elevated to the position of central and ‘trusted’ player.  Second Naomi Long is local, and hard working. Third, Alliance has always had strength in East Belfast. Finally, she wasn’t Peter Robinson, and whether unionist or not, she isn’t perceived as nationalist.

Electoral ups and downs of principal parties: 1969-2010 *

The Alliance Party has been much stronger in the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s than it has been anytime in the past decade.  It still has a lot of work to do to grow its base, and there are not obviously an army of Long-type candidates to make an impact in 2011 at Stormont (and probably across 26 Local Government areas). In percentage terms it’s vote will look good where any general increase is a gain against an smaller voting public overall, though in pure numbers terms it has a long way to go.  Notions of some kind of renaissance in the political centre ground are premature.

Back to the big debate, within and around Unionism. The focus of that debate is numbers, and focused on whether in the forthcoming 2011 election Sinn Fein might gain a position where it may be able to lay claim to the post of First Minister.

Since the changes following the St Andrews Agreement any party with the votes and seats necessary can lay claim to the post of First Minister.  This provides for more equitable power-sharing in that it does not create a hierarchy of parties – theoretically anyone can be a First Minister. Would it make a great difference for Sinn Fein to be First Minister? If you accept Sinn Fein as a partner in Government then why not?

The most recent political push for unionist unity has arisen principally as a DUP campaign tactic to corner the UUP/Conservative arrangement, pushing at the fact that one of the certainties espoused in this arrangement was that the Conservatives were committed to stand in all 18 seats.  The agreement of a candidate on a unity-style ticket in Fermanagh South Tyrone undermined the determination of the UUP/Conservative pact. Had Rodney Connor won it would have placed even greater pressure on the UUP/Conservative pact that it failed to make a similar arrangement in South Belfast.

That the tactic in Fermanagh South Tyrone failed to deliver its intended outcome still leaves the DUP in a position to argue that it only failed because it was late in the day, the electorate was unconvinced of UUP sincerity, the Conservative link lost vital votes and anything that throws blame around and away to the DUP: this is a criticism of the DUP blame game generally and not that, conversely, the DUP is ‘to blame’.

The focus on the issue of First Minister is a tactical one – a means to give purpose to closer co-operation between the parties (if not merger). Yet the real issue is not one of tactics to meet short-term and tokenistic outcomes. The failure of Sir Reg (lost seat, lost leadership) to stabilise and provide purpose to the UUP, the DUP’s failure to dismiss the TUV altogether and to regain momentum lost in 2009, reflect deeper malaise within unionist parties.

Ironically, the arrival of the TUV brought unionist voters to the polling booths and increased the overall unionist vote would suggest that disunity has its advantages, allowing the fractious and independently minded unionist voter an avenue to express discontent with established parties.

The logic of engagement by all parties in the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement is an acceptance that the Union is safe in the hands of the unionist electorate: that is the principle of consent.  Unionist voters accept this and many seem content not to vote for parties that fail to reflect their concerns and provide competent government.   This is not a problem for unionism alone, nationalism has a similar challenge, though seems content to lose itself in the green romantic mists of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow.  A plague on all their houses?

Addressing unionist unity from a structural perspective is bound to disappoint. Political party realignment is merely mixing decks and dishing out the job cards in a different order.  The electorate is hardly likely to be impressed. Identifying a loss of voter, by class or aspiration, does not address the message sent at the Westminster election: none of the leaders of unionism presented a coherent and inspirational purpose for unionism in the twenty-first century.

A unionist should feel proud to fly the Union flag, and should not feel that it is somewhat diminished when wrapped around those who seek to lead Unionism. It should not be worn in anger, it should not cover embarrassment, and it should not be wrapped around a backroom deal.  Discussion on the Union should be a matter of substance, not tactical number crunching: it is a matter for open discussion, not whispers behind closed doors.

Unionist Parties may be under threat through a loss of relative electoral strength. That does not mean that the Union is under threat: which is not to say that the Union cannot be lost. As elsewhere, this article has been an exercise in looking at the outcomes of the Westminster election and reading the runes. There are a few pointers which may shape consideration of the future for Unionists.

• The overall nationalist vote appears static.
• Nationalist voters appear just as disengaged as unionist voters.
• The UUP might consider its future within a regional/national and liberal conservative context, but is otherwise nothing but a fading reflection of better times.
• The DUP built its presence on becoming biggest: now it is, what next?
• The unionist voter seemed uninspired by any of the unionist Parties’ offers.
• The overall unionist vote benefits from disunity, not unity.
• The SDLP was dominant in 1998. What happened?
• If Sinn Fein is a worthy party for Government, and to hold a post co-equal to the First Minister then why shouldn’t it hold the post of First Minister?
• The issue of a Sinn Fein First Minister is a narrow tactical argument that distracts from the lack of attractive leadership from either the UUP or DUP, or from anywhere elsewhere in unionist circles.
• Short-term tactical considerations will not address the future of unionism as a political cause.
• The Union is safe: at least that rests with the electorate and not the politicians.

The Westminster election changed very little. The points above have been matters for varying degree of consideration for some time. The election has simply brought them to the fore. Much of that discussion has taken place at Open Unionism and in the pages of the press, and probably around the lunch tables of Stormont buildings and meeting places elsewhere.

Tactical considerations of stopping a Sinn Fein First Minister are given an air of immediacy, including an urgency on discussion of political party restructuring. The larger and more important issue of the purpose and sense of Unionist cause is receiving less attention, perhaps because there is no personal or party gain in thinking outside the box?  (It is a lonely place outside the box, and risky.)  How does the discussion move beyond the tactical and party political to a more central discussion on the nature and future expression of Unionism fit for the twenty-first century?

Without a common understanding of the central tenets of Unionism there is little chance of Party political unity among unionists. Unionists must know what the Union is for, holding common purpose; it must not be defined by what it is not, what it is against. The electorate wishes positive, not negative, Unionism. With that central understanding would party political unionism mean anything anyway? Is unionism an ‘ism’ at all? How do we move beyond a position of being in defence of the Union to advancing and deepening the Union? These are the questions to be the subject of Looking Forward: Part 2. Later.

*/** please note that the graphs are indicative. While every effort was made to input the numbers correctly, sometimes interpretation of orginal data was difficult. I may have designated an independent in the unionist circles when it should have been nationalist: the early 1970s was a confusing time. ’Others’ sometimes includes all but the main parties; more than just the odds and sods. Data on registered electorate and turnout was not always available, and sometimes only in percentage terms. Taking all this into account,  all graphs should be viewed as broadly accurate, but mostly illustrative.  If any reader wishes to repeat the exercise and find fault, the source information is found within CAIN and ARK: knock yourself out.

So in retrospect and to bring thedissenter up to date…

Campaigning for the Westminster election in Northern Ireland had an air of reluctance, or nervousness; perhaps born out of uncertainty as to how the election would impact on the local Parties. Politics in Northern Ireland seems to have descended into a tactical contest, where any greater purpose to gaining power has been lost in the pursuit of power itself (or clinging on to the certainty of what is already held). The Westminster campaigns in Northern Ireland seemed more of a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections than one of national consequence.

The SDLP had a new leader trying to hold its vote and not lose ground to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein ran the same old faces, and hoped to gain ground on the SDLP.  Both nationalist parties begged the same votes for the same romantic notion of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow when all would be well and good – earlier, Brian Cowan had set out the real politic and focusing on bigger issues on St Patrick’s Day.  Other than for tactical considersations of the least worst option, neither nationalist Party appealed to the electorate that matters to their ultimate aspiration (again, see Brian Cowan’s words).

Peter Robinson gave himself a bad press on the eve of the election, which didn’t seem to impact on the Party as a whole. The UUP/Conservative grouping gave the appearance of being as disorganised as the huckster’s shop in which it continues to hold two Executive seats. The newcomers, the Traditional Unionist Voice, were the great unknown factor and a first-past-the-post Westminster election was the worst outing a fledgling party could face.

The Alliance Party and Naomi Long? Bless.

The 2009 European election showed, at least on the Unionist side, that the electorate no longer swallowed the warnings of the doomsayers, nor feared the Sinn Fein bogeymen on which many election strategies were based. A large proportion voted and damn the consequences.  For 2010 Westminster the unionist electorate was largely more circumspect, but hardly enthusiastic: evidenced in Fermanagh South Tyrone. Unionism is past anger; frustrated and petulant, but not angry. The simple interpretion on the electoral fortunes of the three unionist Party leaders is: ‘ a plague on all your houses’.

Unionism is in flux, and May 6th has not provided any clarity on the questions that should be asked let alone provide any answers. That debate will continue and is to be welcomed. 

Northern Ireland’s 18 Westminster seats were always going to be filled, even if choice in voting preference was diminished by the available options being well and truly woeful.  In general, commentary and analysis on the election results has been mostly inward rather than outward. The now marginal status of all local parties at Westminster may tend to exacerbate that focus. Yet change is always a time of opportunuity. The new consensus in Government at Westminster, for as long as it can last, offers such opportunity if grasped.

If this post seems to ramble a little it is because thedissenter is in a process of thinking, reassessing fundamentals, throwing the bricks in the air and rebuilding ideas. That may take some time. Absence has not brought any conclusions. In the meantime regular commentary will resume once the electoral dust has settled.

All the ingredients were there: the crisis, the Prime Ministers, the big house, the Belfast Telegraph survey, the Parties doing all night sittings and the press pack.  At the end of all that we have the “Agreement at Hillsborough Castle” as it is officially described.  Not a deal.  Not “The Hillsborough Castle Agreement”.  Nothing definitive, just ‘agreement’ as part of a step process: same process as the “Agreement at St Andrews‘.

Many are of course delighted that there was any sort of agreement at all.  Especially Gordon Brown who would undoubtedly not wish one of New Labour’s great projects to crash just before a Westminster election, and probably David Cameron who will not inherit an immediate crisis should he become Prime Minister after the General Election.  

 The ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ amounts to very little but a process that revolves around progress towards the devolution of Policing & Justice.  The only certainty is that there is a date assigned for the transfer of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly. That date appears to be conditional on a range of other points/matters/actions happening in some sort of sequence.

What are the chances of the agreement working out to a conclusion?  The Agreement is in five parts.

Section One provides a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly.  There are a series of procedural steps which, so long as Gordon Brown does not call an election in the next few weeks should see the formal transfer of powers by 12 April. 

Section Two is Parades. It is hard to see how Sinn Fein will ever accept that people lawfully and peacefully should not be subject to the sectarian harassment of unlawful violent protest, or a planned protest which lacks the discipline to behave in a civilised manner. The pursuit of cultural apartheid through designation of Protestant-free zones seems to underline republican demonisation of the Loyal Orders. Hard to see how Republicans will ever agree to a shared future when they are unable to countenance sharing a stretch of road a few times a year; not that many in the SDLP are more tolerant.

Section Three is a clever device to sideline the UUP and SDLP.  The problems with the functionality of the Executive lie in the institutional arrangements; the Executive seeks to enforce consensus among a disparate group of political parties which, leaving aside their constitutional pre-dispositions, have little in common. Section Three is not likely to amount to much more than the generation of a whinge list, but is disconnected to the issue of the devolution of Policing and Justice, and therefore is of little immediate consequence.

Section Four outlines no more than just an administrative catch-up process.  As with Section Three this is not timetabled and therefore may well be forgotten about unless there is a need to show something of progress – even if it is only seeing the Executive finally get round to doing what it ought to have already done, which if they were able to agree they would have done already.

Section Five is timetabled, and suggests that the Junior Ministers will be exceptionally busy. Not only are they putting a progress and action plan together for outstanding Executive business (Section Four), they will also be doing a report on outstanding issues from the St Andrews Agreement.  The most recent Policing and Justice ‘crisis’ has arisen from a very different determination what is meant by in paragraph 7 of the Agreement at St Andrews : “It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008.” If there is failure to even agree on what was agreed then, what presently constitutes an ‘outstanding matter’ may well be a challenge in itself.

The fanfare for this ‘agreement’ is worthy of a snake oil salesmen’s convention. Agreed, tentatively and with provisos, is a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice.  That is it. The DUP has allowed the issue of ‘community confidence’ to focus on the parades issue, but that is just one area where confidence in the Stormont administration is weak.  Lack of accountability, the chimera of collective responsibility and absent democratic counterbalance of effective opposition are fundamentals that appear not to have been discussed at Hillsborough, yet are underlying factors in the lack of unionist confidence in Stormont generally.

Sectioning parades hides the real fear of devolution of Policing and Justice with respect to that issue: Section One (9), that a future Minister could take a decision by request or otherwise, to step in to ban a parade without recourse to the Executive. Given the history of the generation of parades contention by Sinn Fein, the pattern is set.  With the Justice Minister open to d’Hondt in the next Assembly the ground is set for a heightening of conflict centred on parades, whoever gets the Justice Ministry. 

The quasi-judicial powers of the Justice Minister is the ticking time-bomb on parades. More immediately, the parades fuse is lit on this ‘Agreement’. Ashdown wasn’t even close to a credible alternative to the Parades Commission. Serious questions on the process within that ‘interim’ report remain unanswered; yet that ‘report’ is noted as a start point on which to build.  

The Hillsborough talks have demonstrated that the DUP is as useless as the UUP at negotiation: the lead-up to Hillsborough was promising, but the end result is a big disappointment.  The DUP blinked, and Sinn Fein is now piling on the pressure on parades, upping the ante and making resolution on parades nigh on impossible: the most recent outburst from Martin McGuinness is an example.  More generally, the remarks by Pat Doherty point to a longer term process of attrition; building on the undermining of cultural identity and political confidence within the broad unionist electorate.   

Sinn Fein has its date for devolution of Policing and Justice.  Once in process, how many believe there will be much concluded of Sections Two, Three, Four and Five without another ‘crisis’.

By any measure, unionist community confidence in the ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ is at best low.  The text of the published document was printed in newspapers and is readily available online as a document and subject of comment. The success of the snake oil salesman is in the ignorance and credulity of the buying public.  To presume that somehow the lack of confidence can be solved by wider publication is erroneous. 

Parades may be an obvious point of contention in this ‘Agreement’, but fundamentally the real issue is a lack of confidence in the institutions themselves into which Policing and Justice is to be devolved.  Broadly speaking, the unionist community has little desire for more snake oil from the huckster’s store, no matter how many times the bottle is rebranded ‘new & improved’.

For broad analysis on the state of the individual unionist parties by far the best has been that of the blogger Turgon on SluggerOToole.  The recent meeting at Hatfield House between the Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Patterson, and leading representatives of the DUP and UUP has created a great deal of debate on the nirvana of ‘unionist unity’. We are told the Hatfield House talks were about the UUP and DUP, and Conservatives, gaining some greater understanding in respect of future elections. Generally, however, the impact of the host party (the Conservatives) on elections is not discussed in detail. Perhaps this is because the Conservatives and the UUP are treated as one: that is a mistake; they remain two parties. Such a perspective misses the electoral questions arising from the Conservative and UUP non-merger.

Should an Assembly election to be held before Westminster elections there would be four Unionist parties in the fray as there is no agreement for Assembly elections between the UUP and Conservatives.  This would probably kill any prospect of the UUP being the largest Unionist party: the two are separate parties as we are constantly told, so they will be two separate Assembly Parties.

So too may the Conservatives. Without an arrangement with the UUP for Assembly elections the local party would rightly expect to stand, and win a few seats. But the strength of the Conservative offer is that it brings so much more to local politics than money to a party (the UUP) whose financial fortunes are much diminished. Conservative electoral strength would be exposed before the benefit of the ‘win’ at Westminster (and even one seat other than North Down will be a win, so the bar is low). The Conservatives would lose momentum.

Conversely of course the arrangement for the General Election will mean that the Conservatives who might get elected in Northern Ireland will be fully taking the Conservative whip as part of that Party, while the UUP will be taking the whip by agreement. So if, and only by example, the UUP/Con arrangement delivers four seats and two of those are Conservative it means the UUP has in effect only two seats at Westminster. Influence with the Conservative Party is thus diminished, and independence constrained by taking the Conservative Whip. Added to which the UUP has provided an electoral base for the Conservatives to make further gains in the next elections on the calendar (Assembly), and in much better shape to eat into the UUP vote than if it had no Westmnister seats in Northern Ireland. This further dmininishes UUP ambitions of regaining ground to the DUP as the largest Assembly Party.

If Westminster elections are first, in the context of a hung Parliament the two main unionist parties would be in a much stronger position with no pre-agreement with the Conservative Party. Obligations generated prior to the election severely restrain the capacity for the unionist parties to play their best hand.

It is hard to see how strategists within the DUP would not have anticipated these scenarios, or that the UUP could be so detached as to not even think about them.

Which is why any notion of talks at Hatfield being on ‘unity’ needs to be treated with caution. There can be no doubt that the Conservatives as a Party would have been fishing for DUP ideas on the future and specifically for indicators on what would happen in the event of a hung Parliament. The DUP would be similarly probing the Conservatives. The only thing on the Conservative leadership’s mind at the moment is ‘seats’. This gives the unionist parties a strong position prior to the election, or it would if the UUP was not already tied to the Conservatives.

All this speculation centres on considerations of electoral mathematics that only the timings/outcomes of the elections will prove. If a Westminster election is first, and if the Conservatives gain a majority of anything over 30 then both unionist parties will be largely irrelevant, and Northern Ireland as far down the agenda as events will allow. Which means short-term interest may be Westminster, but for Unionism there must be greater focus on Stormont.

That brings us to wider speculation of other talks and fevered speculation on any perceived signals that build on this story. Within the context of all of the above, a merger of the UUP and DUP is by far the more likely and electorally sensible in terms of unionist ‘unity’, particularly in respect of the Assembly elections.  The same sort of issues arise. This would have to be a merger and not a pact, because it is about Party and not political designation in d’Hondt. It is the largest Party that takes the First Minister role.  Something less would be enough to extract maximum value from a hung Parliament, where ten to twelve Unionist seats represent the difference. Timing will be everything.

There is a definite sense that something is stirring among unionists in Northern Ireland. It may be an interesting political Spring. Will it be a new Spring for Unionism?

Does anyone seriously suggest that Iris Robinson would have told Peter Robinson all the details about her £5,000 kick-back, or her intention at some point to keep substantially more. The meetings, the go-between, the texts? Dishonesty underlies this story at every level.

Peter Robinson would not be the first husband who wanted to believe and protect his wife, or chose what to believe at face value because it offered a pathway to quiet resolution of the issues at hand: especially when the wife has a history of depression.

Any investigation may well find Peter Robinson clear of wrong-doing; unless there are more revelations to come. The only person who might be able to tell the whole story is Iris Robinson, and we have learned enough to imagine that not even she may not be he most reliable source of information on the facts.

The big question is now political: can Peter Robinson survive as First Minister?

If the answer was based on known facts alone, then more than likely yes.

However, leadership demands that any showing of emotional vulnerability must be balanced with strength and resolution in the face of adversity. Leaders must be first in control of themselves to be in control of events, and to be able to respond appropriately and proportionally.

While emotional vulnerability may elicit some public sympathy, alone it promotes context not answers. A managed interview that is not accompanied with a detailed Q&A for the press which addresses wider issues that a short statement and the immediacy of a ‘surprise’ statement does not permit, questions will always remain. Each subsequent interview with Peter Robinson offers a snippet more that leaves a sense that there is more to the story even though not a great deal more is revealed.

Talk of the ‘Robinson brand’ in the media seems to be centred on the relative power of the Robinson family; relating that family’s political position in the context of the Paisley family, and discussion of dynasties.  There may be a common idea of how the Robinsons regarded themselves, and there is no doubt that many in the DUP have huge respect for Robinson’s political antenna and drive. But out there, among the public, is there anything that has happened over the past year, from expenses to more recent revelations, that doesn’t confirm a reserved and quietly negative view of the Robinsons?  Was there really broad public acceptance of the presentation of the happy family, the dedication to public service alone, the righteousness of evangelical faith?

There has never been a great deal of goodwill or natural empathy towards Peter Robinson the person, outside his core supporters. Politically he stood in the shadow of Ian Paisley for so long that he had no particular personality: the succession to leadership was easily interpreted as a powerplay within the DUP. That was true without the recent scandal.

Politics is never black or white. Even if Peter Robinson were a weakened leader, he is the only option for the DUP at this point in time. The DUP needs Peter Robinson because he has the political experience and tactical expertise to make them do better at the polls in Westminster and the next Assembly and elections than they would without him. He keeps the lid on the tensions between the fundamentalist core DUP and those who would fundamentally seek to appeal to a wider voting base. For a Party that promotes itself on success, changing a leader so soon after Ian Paisley’s retirement could only question the direction and political sense of the DUP.  What vision? What values? What next?

Yes, recent events may mean bleeding a few more votes, but poor results could still be even worse without rigourous political management from now to election day. Yes, expenses and the more recent scandal has hurt the DUP. Yet, if a week is long time in politics Peter Robinson has plenty of time to reorganise, re-energise and rebound.

If there were more scandal, from elsewhere within the DUP, then the challenge for the DUP would be greater, and Peter Robinson’s return even more certain. For now though, it’s his decision; one man’s call, and the man doesn’t look as if he is going anywhere far from the First Minister’s office.

Picture: parliament.uk picture gallery

The opinion polls are erratic, as discussed on thedissenter earlier, and the potential for a tightly hung Parliament is real. A party holding a small number of seats may gain considerable importance.  So the performance of local parties is of national interest: though notional until the counts are complete.

thedissenter will resist entering a seat by seat analysis: that has been undertaken elsewhere, and there is sure to be more before the date of the election is finally announced.  At this point, selection of candidates is far from complete.  There are a number of factors which have the potential to impact on turnout and final count, and this post will look at those rather than enter fanciful prediction as others have done.

Most probably there will be two elections, again, in Northern Ireland – a nationalist one and a unionist one. There may be movements on the margins, but nothing of importance.  The greatest impact on the final count is most likely going to be the polling strength of the TUV and the way in which that Party’s presence, or not, affects the electoral balance in each constituency.

There is little on the horizon that is likely to impact on the Sinn Fein vote. Some might wishfully suggest that the woeful media management around family matters might wound Gerry Adams, and by association, Sinn Fein. Suzanne Breen spelled out the case in the Tribune.  Liam Clarke lays out the questions that linger in the Sunday Times.  Yet morality is hardly an issue for the Sinn Fein voter, happy to support a Party that has ‘yet to renounce its history of violence and terror, makes the vast majority of people here, sick to their stomachs’: that would be a majority of the total population, but it seems not the ‘nationalist’ population.

Of course things might change if there was a credible nationalist alternative to Sinn Fein, but there is not.

Republicans who hold onto their Marxist socialism etc, those who abide by the ‘physical force’ tradition, or those who hold onto both, are too small in number to have an electoral impact at this time.  Even so it seems likely that there will only be a marginal, though inconsequential, shrinkage of support for Sinn Fein, if not on a matter of morals then perhaps on the other issues within the Republican family which rumble along.

The SDLP is going through a prolonged leadership contest. If the contest is not inspiring, it is because the choice holds little promise. One has built a reputation on being hard on Loyalist paramilitaries (albeit without due care to Ministerial responsibilities) and making ignorant remarks about the Loyal Orders.  The other has proved adept at building on political opportunity in retaining his seat and building a strong and respected SDLP presence in South Belfast. Neither has excelled outside their respective constituencies.

Whether a harder nationalist line or greater organizational capacity, rural nationalism or metropolitan social democracy, is chosen by the SDLP, the May (or even March) election will give little time for a new leader to make much of a mark on the political landscape.  Bar opening statements of intent, the leadership contest seems entirely internal and lacking much rigour.

The SDLP will most probably hold its own in the coming election; not least because while it has little to offer by way of alternative to Sinn Fein, Sinn Fein is not in a place where it is able to build on past success and bury the SDLP. For now, the nationalist electorate is offered stale crusty policy from both parties which will result in a stalemate within that electorate.

There is a range of factors that make the election of much greater importance to Unionism.  The Westminster expenses story has exercised the Unionist community to a far greater extent that it has within nationalism. Movies, the “Swish Family Robinson” headline, and a perception that Unionist politicians are more likely to employ family members combined to offend a Unionist sensibility that  politicians are elected to serve their constituents’ interests and not their own self-interest.

To some extent the expenses issue gave the TUV’s Jim Allister his barn storming result at the European election in June 2009 – though DUP arrogance and UUP delusion probably played far a greater part.  Whether or not the residue of this debate continues to undermine current MPs is something to consider, but would be only one factor of many in determining constituency outcomes. Some of the heat of the expenses row will be removed by sitting MPs, such as Iris Robinson, not standing again.

The debate within Unionism of ‘unity’ candidates usefully detracts from the lack of any discernable policy that makes the Conservative/UUP electoral arrangements any great force for change in the forthcoming election.  It is hard to believe that any serious unionist politician would believe that not taking an opportunity to defeat a Sinn Fein candidate (as might present itself in Fermanagh South Tyrone) will play well with the wider unionist electorate.  Realistically it is only in Fermanagh South Tyrone that any agreement has the possibility of returning a Unionist candidate.  However, the Conservative commitment to stand in every constituency in the UK means it has no time for local sensibilities and no strategy or apparent interest in inflicting a loss on Sinn Fein.

In South Belfast there is little UUP constituency infrastructure to conduct a substantial canvas – and the Assembly poll showed little chance of an Ulster Unionist win.  Furthermore the sitting SDLP MP already represents a broadly ‘conservative’ sort of approach, and the Alliance candidate a more PC choice, that undermines any gain the Conservative Party would hope to achieve from the Catholic electorate in the constituency – not that the Conservative/UUP hierarchies would be so calculatingly sectarian in their final selection.

By far the largest impact on the election will the issue of multi-mandates, or double-jobbing as it is more commonly described. Of course the legislation to enforce sole mandates must complete its course through Parliament, but already the principle has had consequences.  Jeffrey Donaldson seems to have chosen Westminster over a Ministerial position in Stormont. Mark Durkan has chosen Westminster and initiated an SDLP Leadership election. Michael McGimpsey has cited commitment to Stormont for not putting his name forward in South Belfast.

More generally, the multi-mandate is more of a challenge for the DUP than the other Parties because it has a more MPs than any other Party.  It will mean new faces entering the political frame.  The DUP has been building profile for a number of their MLAs and Councillors, though perhaps circumstances will now accelerate advancement for a few.  ‘Knowing’ your politician is important. Name recognition makes a big difference at election time.  The DUP has also been hugely effective at building a constituency network. That should stand it in good stead. Its November conference was uplifting and rallied the troops, despite what might be viewed as setbacks in the previous year. The DUP enters the election in an entirely positive frame of mind.

A haphazard constituency presence and aging membership means the Ulster Unionist Party is less than able for this election.  This may be compensated by the Conservative Party’s money and campaigning expertise: though the Conservative Party seems to be overly relying on the newness of its entry into the electoral field to garner excitement around average and fairly unknown personalities. If it were a straight DUP v UUP/Conservative contest then the DUP would race home lengths ahead.

The TUV showing at the European election, with Jim Allister thrusting into the political arena with as good as a third of the unionist vote, fundamentally altered any consideration of future unionist electoral outcomes. Of all the political leaders within Unionism, Jim Allister has the biggest headache.  The has to perform in such a way as to be seen to make an advance on the European success, or make a case for why the performance is comparable.

Maximising the TUV vote would suggest the need to stand in all 18 constituencies. However, 66,000 votes spread across 18 constituencies will not win Westminster seats.  The TUV autumn conference was notable that many of the attendees were stalwart workers who once knocked doors, placed posters, and manned phones for the UUP and DUP in past elections. These are the members with drive and devotion who delivered at the European election, but are best focused rather than spread thinly.

Of course the Ulster Unionist Party and Conservatives are banking on the TUV standing to damage the DUP vote in their favour. But this is not Dromore or the European elections. There will be no transfers available for Westminster.

The TUV has already said it will not stand in Fermanagh South Tyrone or South Belfast, leaving the other parties to look less than able to put unionist interests first and foremost – even suggesting an agreed ‘non-Party’ candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone. The TUV will not stand in North Belfast. Where there is no chance of a Unionist winning the TUV may stand a candidate to hoover additional votes.  The toughest challenges are of course where a Unionist candidate will win, of one Party or another.

Jim Allister himself has declared his candidacy for North Antrim. East Antrim where he once had a strong base, Lagan Valley and Strangford are obvious targets.  Elsewhere he has the luxury of being able to wait to decide on whether it is worth standing a candidate at all. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

In many seats there will not enough difference between the DUP and UUP canidates to matter which Party is elected, but where a TUV candidate will alter the electoral mathematics a judgment must be made as to whether  the TUV could make a positive difference.

The TUV might also be seen as merely spiteful in engaging in constituencies only to place pressure on the DUP’s sitting MP, especially when TUV support comes from across the unionist spectrum. And why give the UUP/Conservative arrangement a lucky pass? The UUP, and in particular the Conservative Party, will do the TUV no favours, and their joint inflexibility is the greatest reason why Fermanagh South Tyrone will most certainly be retained by Sinn Fein.  Why spread the TUV’s limited resources , only to give the UUP/Conservatives the benefit?

The TUV will most certainly be the election story in 2010, but it is too early to say how the Party will impact on the conduct of the campaign or the result. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

So there will be an election (or two) in 2010. A lot can happen before Election Day. Nothing else is certain.

The contemporary account of the recent conflict in Northern Ireland is told in the words of British squaddies in Soldiers’ Stories on History Channel. This Remembrance Sunday the programme will be shown at 10pm on HD.  It was shown first on 26^th October, presented by former soldier Ken Harnes.  Throughout operation banner some 300,000 British troops served in Northern Ireland, some 1300 were killed and 6000 wounded.  With the murder of soldiers still making the headlines in 2009 this programme is not entirely the historic record it ought to be.

This is a programme that presents first hand accounts, and although a little long for one programme, it still manages to offer a stark, honest and very personal account of the lives of soldiers serving in Northern Ireland over 40 years.  It provides another perspective that lacks political spin, and doesn’t seek sympathy or accolade.  A frank account, and well worth watching on the night, or keeping for later.

A record of conflict was not available following World War One.  This year the last of the veterans of this war passed on: 108 year-old William Stone, 113 year-old Henry Allingham, and 111 year-old Harry Patch.  It made the short programme of events through the Maiden City Festival all the more relevant.  The ‘Three Cheers for the Derrys!’ programme was based on the book by Gardiner Mitchell of the same name, which had the benefit of reminisces of two old soldiers, Jim Donaghy from Londonderry and Leslie Bell from Moneymore.

Elements of the programme are now available on a dedicated mini website to give voice and life to the story of the ‘The Derrys’, the 10th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. The young men who acted in the short performance as part of the programme were no older than those who had gone to war 1914-1918.

Finally, there are those left behind.  Which makes the stories in a new book to be published on Wednesday, Remembrance Day itself, a worthy addition to this selection of means of recalling the sacrifice of the few for the many.  The outline is available in Eamonn Baker’s contribution to ‘The Derrys’ project.  Remembering has grown out of research conducted over the past few years by Trevor Temple, staff member of the North West War Memorial Project. The following is the description of the book provided by Yes Publications for the launch:

“Remembering is a tapestry of stories created from edited interviews with families who lost loved ones during the First World War. Without the generous commitment and openness of all twenty eight interviewees, this book would not have been possible. Each interviewee has shared precious family stories which previously had remained hidden from our collective view.

Many interviewees had researched in loving detail the life and times of their relative. We hear for example of Wesley Maultsaid’s football skills, of Holmes Haslett’s athletic prowess, racing down the Culmore Road ahead of the mail boat on the waters of the Foyle, of Denis Doherty’s working life at McCullagh’s in Waterloo Place and on the docks, of George Hasson “sweeping” around the city. We have been privileged to gain access to the family photographs, documents, keepsakes, memorabilia used to illustrate this publication.

Though all of the interviews were conducted in the spring of 2009, more than ninety years after Armistice Day 1918, it quickly became clear that many of the interviewees were grieving over the loss of their grandfather, grand-uncle, uncle (whom they, of course, had never known personally) in ways which suggested that the family loss had never been fully resolved.”

Remembering was launched in the Tower Museum on Wednesday 11^th November 2009. Books are on sale in local bookshops from 12 November priced £10 or direct from YES! Publications, 10-12 Bishop Street, Londonderry BT48 6PW  www.yespublications.org  This community-based project was developed by Holywell Trust and funded by the Heritage Lottery Fund. 

Three very different records of soldiers’ lives and service, each making a contribution to this year’s time of Remembrance, underscoring that Remembrance is often very personal to those who served, their families and friends.  It is hard to really share those memories, those experiences.  But this is a time when we can all respectfully honour those who selflessly acted for us all, regardless though no less aware of the likely cost to themselves.

“At one end of the Ardoyne shop fronts a group of people hurled bricks, bottles, and petrol and blast bombs at the police. At the other end of the shop fronts stood another group impatiently waiting for their turn to enter the stage. Neither side was willing to be outdone by the other. Whichever dominates gets to say who does or does not have access to the short stretch of main road in front of some shops.

Both groups are Republicans, both made up of a mixture of local figures and others from further afield, and both believe they have a right to control and grant permission to walk along “their” road. In reality, a power play: desiring the power as to who gets to say no to the Unionists, the Protestants, the enemy; but also, who ‘controls’ the Ardoyne, “their community”.

One banner said “make sectarianism history”, with spokesmen telling us that they don’t want parades along “their” road.  Yet these same spokesmen would condemn those who said they didn’t want ‘them’uns’ in their community. What difference between sectarianism and racism? Fine words of condemnation mask base emotions of hate, exclusion and intolerance.

Both sides believe they represent “Republican” ideals, while both show obvious disrespect for their Protestant neighbours who in the past have been routinely demonised by republicans to challenge policing, and now demonised to gain advantage in an internal republican conflict. The rioting to order, the bus organisation, the empty condemnations and deflection of blame has been seen before – Ormeau being the last example where the majority of those later charged for disorder offences were from outside South Belfast let alone a few streets south of the Ormeau Bridge.

Dialogue is the answer? We’d like to think so. But Ardoyne republicans, said by the Parades Commission to be capable of speaking for the Ardoyne ‘community’, have been engaged in dialogue with the North & West Belfast Parades & Cultural Forum for 3 years! Included in the NWBPCF talks’ team are senior members of the local Apprentice Boys and a District officer of the Orange Order.  The Protestant community of the area is speaking with one voice locally, through the Forum, but who speaks for the Ardoyne?

It is clear that the Republican power-play has little to do with the Ardoyne community.  If dialogue about parades is about accommodation, including tolerance and respect, then perhaps three years of talking should by now have provided everyone with breathing space to move on.  While the Protestant community is demonised and abused, its culture denigrated and diminished on the back of Republican political manoeuvrings, it is the Ardoyne community that suffers while the thugs take over its streets and steal its voice.

Meanwhile, last Monday evening, less than a hundred yards from the Ardoyne shops Protestants stood patiently in Twaddell and Hesketh waiting for the homecoming parade of local Lodges.  Once the PSNI escorted the parade up the road, the Protestant community went home peacefully.

There is a lot of talk of ‘respect’, ‘rights’, and ‘shared future’.  How do Republicans expect to be respected, when a parade that would take no more than two minutes to pass Ardoyne shops is denied respect.  What rights are defended through violence against peaceful cultural expression? What shared future, when less than a hundred yards of road is claimed territorially as ‘ours’?  Sectarian apartheid is not a future of any sort! In what world is are three nights of riots a proportional response to a two minute walk past some shops?

Looking at the events in Ardoyne, is there any real difference between ‘dissidents’ and Sinn Fein other than rhetoric?  Hard to tell. Springfield, Ormeau, Dunloy, Rasharkin, Ardoyne: the difference is time and scale. Republicans share the common goal of keeping Protestants out of sight out of mind: to each hold the power to dictate cultural expression; to create a territorial exclusion zone.  Sectarian, racist, or just criminal thuggery –words and actions add up to the same difference at the Ardoyne shops.

Blaming the Loyal Orders for nights of rioting, and more generally for everything, deflects attention from the battle raging within Republicanism. However, deflecting attention and looking outside for the boyeymen, makes it even harder to provide the Ardoyne community a voice it needs to find toleration, respect and accommodation with its Protestant neighbours.”

The voting percentages show little change for any Party other than the DUP (2004/2009).

Alliance and Greens may be cock-a-hoop at their result, except that closer analysis shows they gained no more than the minor parties altogether in 2004. This takes account of the lower turnout, a drop of around 65,000 votes, to a more ‘normal’ level of voting in the European elections of around 43% – still a way to go with the UK turnout of around 34%, though roughly equal to the European-wide average (though some countries have compulsory voting).

Election details are here.

Even though Barbre DeBrun was elected on the first count, and topped the poll, Sinn Fein worked hard to stand still in this election.  Same for Alban Maginness and the SDLP.  The SDLP at least halted decline and saw the Sinn Fein percentage of the vote drop very marginally (0.3%).  While the story of the election was on the split in the Unionist vote, the nationalist parties are in a rut.  Sinn Fein’s rut is on both sides of the border – they lost their one MEP, and a decent performance in local government elections held on the same day has since been spoiled by resignations.

For Sinn Fein the question must be ‘where next?’.  For all nationalists, it must surely be dawning that a United Ireland is generations away, if ever.  The Republic of Ireland is preoccupied with its economy. Moreover, across Europe voters turned away from the left, on which both main nationalist parties loosely base their political approach: though interesting to see Sinn Fein lose in Dublin to a real socialist suggesting a squeeze for Sinn Fein between left and right.

Sinn Fein’s campaign for a United Ireland (in America) does a lot to help Jim Allister’s proposition that the Belfast Agreement was not a ‘settlement’: another Sinn Fein contradiction; if we cannot go ‘back’ to pre-Belfast Agreement, neither can we go forward to a United Ireland if a ‘settlement’ exists. If  Sinn Fein’s next step is to go off to America and argue for a United Ireland there, as Alex Kane points out in the News Letter, it might as well as no-one in Ireland is listening.

In the time since the election the SDLP hasn’t really done anything much. The post-election shuffle of committee positions in Stormont passed by almost unremarked.

The Unionist vote split broadly three ways: DUP, Diane Dodds, 88,346; UCUNF, Jim Nicholson, 82,893; TUV, Jim Allister, 66,197.

As this was an STV PR election, lets start with Jim Nicholson who topped the Unionist vote at the end of the count.  The decline in voter numbers, though a marginal increase in the percentage share due to the overall decrease in voting, leaves it impossible to know if the new collaboration with the Conservative Party was a benefit or not to the Ulster Unionists.  Either the UUP vote could have been worse, and the Tory link attracted middle class voters who would not have otherwise bothered. Or, the UUP have bottomed and the Tory link has been a convenient financial leg up until fortunes improve.

Of course the Ulster Unionists hope that the split between the DUP and TUV will deliver an extra seat in the upcoming, Westminster elections. Perhaps. Any seat would be a bonus given that it seems likely that North Down will be lost one way or another.

More interesting was the transfer of the majority of Jim Allister’s vote to Jim Nicholson.

It is not entirely correct to view Jim Allister’s TUV as ‘integrationalist’. Integrationalist has long been used as a term of abuse by devolutionists to indicate that this was a lesser Unionism, in some way; mostly to suggest that relying on the ‘untrustworthy’ Westminster establishment was plain foolish as it was in cahoots with the Pan-nationalist front.  Nevertheless it seems logical that if TUV voters are less enamoured with devolution, in principle, then the natural transfer would be to a Party that provides the stronger pan-UK link – a national representation through the UUP/Con collaboration.

Transfers will matter more at the next Assembly election, where those last few seats will be down to how the parties view each other, and where every Conservative as well as UUP vote (at present there is no agreement between the two parties for Assembly elections) will be as important as the TUV’s.  This triumvirate may provide a serious threat to the DUP in the Assembly elections because it would probably mean the final transfers will see Unionists other than the DUP elected.   Moreover, the addition of the TUV to the ballot paper seems, for now, to be shoring up the electoral turnout of the Unionist vote thereby increasing the total non-DUP vote.

The UUP have picked up on one of Jim Allister’s election themes – that the DUP/Sinn Fein led government is inherently unstable. Since the election the UUP have increasingly built up a picture that suggests that government in Northern Ireland is failing.  However, the UUP offers no alternative and no analysis as to why it would be different with an alternative arrangement of the chairs around the Executive table – currently the only possible outcome of an Assembly election.  It has hinted that a Conservative Government would bring change, though exactly what change is not elaborated – event though this doesn’t square with David Camerons endorsement of current arrangements.  To some extent this ambiguity assists the TUV: it reinforces the message that change is possible.

Since the European election the UUP is too gleefully destabilising the very institutional structures on which its future depends – the Assembly is its electoral lifeline. While seeking to undermine the DUP/Sinn Fein axis may be amusing, with some good quips, but where’s the strategy? The reshuffle of the Executive pack following an Assembly election is likely to create a TUV ‘opposition’ in Stormont, and  a Sinn Fein First Minister.  Good for democracy, but something the UUP voter is unlikely to see as attractive, and voting in Northern Ireland can be hugely tactical.  This may undermine part of that gain they would have hoped for by the TUV splitting the DUP vote, as the UUP would see it.

For the DUP the most worrying statistic much be that the overall final vote of 23.6 for the final DUP votes and 27% for the UUP/Con takes the vote split back to the electoral shares of the 2001 Westminster poll (22%/27%) or further back to the 1985 local elections (24%/29%) – 5% of Jim Allister’s vote did not transfer to anyone. This places perspective in the challenge to the DUP following the European election.

In many ways the electoral performance of Diane Dodds has left the DUP with a conundrum. In one election the DUP has lost an electorate vote that took years to build.  Where does it go to rebuild that electorate?

On the one hand it is clear that the votes borrowed from the Ulster Unionists and other liberal/integrationalist unionists have now left the DUP, and are unlikely to return. On the other hand, there is a deeply dissatisfied DUP vote that has found the confidence to vote TUV. As the DUP know from vote-building 2001-2008 the first task is to make the voter comfortable in being prepared to vote differently to their norm, and then to capture and build on that vote.  For the DUP, the Jim Allister vote represents both the loss of the votes from natural Ulster Unionists and, more worryingly from natural DUP voters.

If the Ministerial shuffle of this past month is meant to impress, then the DUP is failing to understand the challenge ahead.  What is the message of the reshuffle? Double jobbing is going? Mostly: good; but Peter Robinson has been at pains to stress that this had been planned anyway.

The DUP lacks a narrative that will either mollify those who are attracted to the TUV because of its clarity or, because it fears the TUV vote more than UCUNF, attract those who might be supportive of their success in managing the current power-sharing arrangements. So while the appointment of Nelson McCausland may be a sop to the ‘hard-core’ voter and perhaps make a start on attracting back some of those who voted TUV, it will equally annoy the very UUP/Con type voter the DUP needs to perchance attract.

So what then of the TUV?  The conditions for Jim Allister to gain his European vote has been rumbling for some time – like a volcano, it rumbles before it blows. All parties try to paint the TUV as variously a ‘one man show’, integrationalist (as if relying on Westminster was worse than sharing power with Sinn Fein), ‘intent on taking us back to the bad old days’ or ‘extreme’.

Unionists would look on the last two points and point out that Jim Allister’s dissent from the ‘new order’ is not the same as ‘dissent’ within republicanism.  He has no guns.  Both the ‘integrationalist’ tag and the ‘bad old days’ warning are based on a presumption that the current Belfast Agreement arrangements are perfectly acceptable. But neither the DUP, nor the UUP, believes that they are. The DUP agreed with the outline of Jim Allister’s critique of the arrangements before they returned from St.Andrews. The UUP hints that change will happen.

Party depth is probably the most difficult challenge ahead for Jim Allister.  For intelligence and integrity (even if you don’t agree with him) he stands heads above most of the rest of the political characters peddling their political wares in the ‘huckster’s shop’ as described by Sir Reg Empey (and watch here).  Except, of course, Jim Allister is not in the Assembly. Nor does he have any DUP defectors in the Assembly. He does have a handful of Councillors; in more way than one, a handful.

Any successful Party must have discipline – something the DUP still has, and the UUP seems to have gained some along with Conservative Party finance.  It must also have some depth, with an ability to promote its messages on a range of fronts.  To do that, it is necessary to have a group of competent advocates who are able to widen the commentary, particularly in target constituencies. Competency means staying on message, building positive profile and moving the Party agenda forward (even if only slightly, a bit at a time as the DUP did 1985-2001, and then with vigour and depth 2001-2008).

The DUP has responded quickly to the European Election result, but without any clear direction or purpose. At least the DUP have realised there is a shift in the Unionist mood, and that the TUV fight is with them in the first instance. The UUP are too busy talking up their ‘success’ to realise that they are still standing on sinking electoral sands.

Jim Allister has no more need to outline details of his future framework for political institutions in Northern Ireland than David Cameron does to detail his economic/tax plans for the nation so far from an election.  Allister’s core demand for change is shared by both the DUP and the UUP.  That change is possible is confirmed by Sinn Fein. The Alliance Party could benefit in this atmosphere if it wasn’t so busy chasing the potential of the Policing and Justice Ministry.

There is an electorate out there that is either disengaged or angry enough to vote anyone but ‘the consensus’. There are more votes out there for the TUV; mostly DUP, though plenty of others seeking a positive alternative that is credible and intellectually respectable.

The size of Jim Allister’s vote in the European Election was a shock to the political parties at Stormont because it showed a deep crack in ‘the consensus’ on which the political structures arising from the Belfast Agreement rely.

In the aftershock of the election all the focus is on the DUP’s response; though that is not to say the reaction to the vote by other parties is of no consequence.  Pretending that is not the case is delusional. For Jim Allister, small snipes seem to be enough for not to keep his quarry unsettled.  The UUP is doing half his job for him by arguing the instability and paralysis in the power-sharing arrangements. Sinn Fein, and certain SDLP representatives, continue to demonise the Loyal Orders in such a way as to show the lack of tolerance or acceptance from nationalism of a shared future – so why vote for Unionists who believe in one?

Jim Allister may well need to create a more positive narrative that has a principled core around which more Unionists, from its many shades, feel comfortable to coalesce. He may need to add depth to the TUV. However, the behaviour of main Parties at Stormont since the European Election is only helping to confirm those who voted for Jim Allister that their’s was the right choice.  At least in the short term, if Jim Allister does nothing much over the summer, things will continue to rumble along to his advantage.

So looking forward (and that is said with all the enthusiasm mustered, which is not that great) the outcome of the vote for the Northern Ireland Members of the European Parliament, June 2009, is unlikely to deliver an electoral surprise. It is probable that the same three Parties will win the seats. That doesn’t mean that the voting spread won’t be of political interest; the biggest story may well be the decline in number of people being bothered to vote.

There are three seats up for grabs under the proportional representation system used for the Northern Ireland. These are currently held by Jim Allister, elected under the DUP banner and topping the poll in 2004, Barbre de Brun, Sinn Fein, 2nd highest vote, and Jim Nicholson, UUP, 3rd and elected on final transfers.

A Province-wide campaign is a challenge to all but the larger Parties. This means that, unusually for Northern Ireland, there are relatively few candidates: just seven in the 2004 European election. The Alliance Party, Labour and the Conservative Party threw their lot behind independent John Gilliland.

In 2004, the first count results were as follows: 


Jim Allister (DUP) 175,761 (32.0%) up 3.6%; elected on first count.
Bairbre De Brun (SF) 144,541 (26.3%) up 9.0%; elected on first count.
Jim Nicholson (UUP) 91,164 (16.6%) down 1.0%. 

Martin Morgan (SDLP) 87,559 (15.9%) down12.1%. 

John Gilliland (Independent) 36,270 (6.6%).
Eamonn McCann (SEA) 9,172 (1.6%).
Lindsay Whitcroft (Green) 4,810 (0.9%).

In percentage terms the 2004 parties’ vote was almost the same in the 2007 Assembly elections. However, like for like, the 2004 European Elections saw a decline in the overall vote of around 20% from the 1999 Euro poll. While the DUP topped the poll in both instances, its vote was down around 20,000 in 2004 compared to 1999. The decline in the total unionist vote was about 75,000. Although the Sinn Fein vote was up around 27,000 the big loser was the SDLP whose vote crashed by more than half from the 190,000 votes for John Hume. The great uncertainty in the upcoming election is the extent to which the overall vote might decline and how the spread of that decline will impact on each Party – it is a factor that both unionist and nationalist parties will fear, equally.

There’s no agreed independent candidate this time. The Alliance Party has selected Ian Parsley, a young candidate who is being offered some profile, no doubt with a longer term view of election in the North Down area. In 1999 the Alliance vote was less than 15,000; the same or more would be a huge success for Alliance.

The SDLP selection of Alban Maginness seems to be a pitch for the old traditional middle class vote. Maginness is better known than Martin Morgan, the considerably younger 2004 candidate. There is nothing new to ‘bring back’ voters. The greatest threat to the SDLP is a further decline in their vote: if the SDLP can hold its vote from 2005 it would be happy.

Jim Nicholson is once again standing for the Ulster Unionist Party. The Conservative Party, with which the Ulster Unionists are now aligned, is unlikely to bring many votes. Any small increase in the UUP vote is more likely to be from some middle class Catholic voters who are unhappy with nationalist parties’ support for the end of academic selection.

No doubt Nicholson’s seat will only be secured with the transfer of votes from Jim Allister, now standing for Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV). The UUP will hope that the number of transfers might make the final vote ‘close’ and attempt to use this to vindicate its Conservative alliance. That would be wrong. Transfers to the UUP will be a protest against the DUP, not an indication of trust restored.

Of the two largest parties last time, Sinn Fein keeps Barbre de Brun as its candidate, no doubt campaigning on experience and its ‘leadership’ credentials; though some republicans may be asking where that leadership is heading. de Brun has been virtually anonymous since her election to Europe. The Sinn Fein led policy to end academic selection is as unpopular with parents of children at Catholic Grammars as much as it is unpopular among unionists. On balance though, this is more likely to hit the SDLP, who share Sinn Fein’s policy objective, and is more rooted in the middle classes than Sinn Fein. However, whether any bread and butter issue will make an impact on the European campaigns is doubtful. More fundamentally, Sinn Fein must be looking at both the last Fermanagh Council by-election and the possibility of a ‘dissident’ republican standing and wondering how well the once envied machine will be able to deliver the vote as it has done in the past.

Jim Allister’s TUV poses a threat to the overall DUP vote. There is general Unionist disaffection with the performance of (at) Stormont. It could be expected that up to about one third of the DUP vote at the 2007 Assembly election would have been with an expectation that the Party would not be entering a power-sharing government with Sinn Fein. Some of this group may well still vote for DUP as the least bad option, there will be some not vote at all and the remainder will vote for Jim Allister.

In 1999 Bob McCartney of the UK Unionist Party gained around 20,000 votes, and this vote would certainly have transferred largely to Jim Allister in 2004 – one reason for the DUP vote holding. The DUP will also have benefited in 2004 from a drift of voters away from the Ulster Unionist Party, who by that stage were disillusioned with David Trimble. It is unlikely that any more votes for Jim Allister will come from the UUP – that vote has long left the Ulster Unionist Party.

Jim Allister is likely to pick up the ‘angry’ vote of those who transferred their vote to the DUP, and feel let down, and the DUP vote that believes there is no right time to share power with IRA/Sinn Fein, and feel betrayed. The bookies may be right that Allister’s total vote will most likely amount to no more than around 30,000-40,000 votes. A higher vote and the current sense of a Unionist electorate that is deeply unsettled is actually an electorate with a seething anger towards current political leadership and direction from both Unionist parties.

What then of the DUP? The candidate is Belfast based, though Diane Dodds has a high profile as Councillor and ex-MLA in West Belfast; she is also married to the current Minister of Finance Nigel Dodds, so has high name recognition. Her views on the price of bullocks and lambs is unknown – while Allister has been very much present in the News Letter’s Saturday pullout Farming Life; a widely read farming paper across the community. There is also the possibility that Diane Dodds may suffer to some extent from the fallout from the Westminster expenses row. Some unionist voters may be unwilling to vote for yet another DUP ‘family’. A DUP election strategy based on it being the only Party that can gain more votes than Sinn Fein seems tired, and a little odd when the two parties are ‘sharing’ power in Stormont. Alternative strategies may not be available.

Jim Allister may not have much chance of retaining his European seat, but his votes will still matter and will probably be the focus of post-election media analysis. Allister’s vote represents an angry and alienated Unionist electorate that may be sidelined, but can’t be easily ignored. What will be interesting will be to review the spread of the TUV votes – will Allister’s votes be predominately urban or rural? What would be the impact at the next Westminster election of the TUV vote; where the DUP and UUP are close enough that a decent percent vote by the TUV would mean the UUP regaining a seat, possibly South Antrim – assuming the UUP is able to assure a turnout of its core vote.

There is also interest in the spread of nationalist voting. At this point we do not know if a ‘dissident’ republican will stand in opposition to Sinn Fein. As Liam Clarke says in the Sunday Times, even a 2% ‘dissident’ vote would impact on the Sinn Fein’s ambitions. Will Sinn Fein fail to gain votes, or even hold its own? Will the SDLP hold enough votes to still be in the political game come the Westminster election within the next year or so.

There is little to suggest that the outcome of the June election will be anything other than the same old parties being returned to Europe. But the disaffection with the current political leaderships may mean that a protest may be made by opting for the outsider or simply not voting. Will we be looking at another sectarian head-count in the June Euro poll? Perhaps. Perhaps also wondering where the heads have gone?

The book thoroughly lays bare the futility of the IRA’s campaign, and the lies used to propagate that campaign and on which the pursuit of its political objectives has been prosecuted.

MacDonald outlines the lies. These could be direct as in the attempt to shift the blame for the Abercorn bombing onto the British Army or a unionist grouping. Or they could be more subtle as in the effort to justify the murder of Edgar Graham as somehow inevitable through his being part of a ‘Unionist establishment’ at Queen’s University Belfast where he lectured – as if that could ever justify murder.

He outlines the disingenuous. How, if collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and British forces was endemic, as republicans strongly contend, were only 3% of those killed by loyalists over 30 years militant republicans? The IRA promoted itself as the ‘defender’ of the local catholic population in many areas: yet the single largest loss of life in the predominately nationalist Short Stand was caused by an IRA bomb exploding prematurely.

Mostly he outlines how anything now claimed to have been achieved by the IRA could well have been achieved equally through non-violence. This book is not an easy read. First, and the only criticism, it would have benefited from a stronger editorial hand in organising the information. Second, and perhaps the order of the information makes no difference, the book is depressing.

The book is depressing because it suggests that the IRA is the same as it ever was: the lies over Abercorn, the cover-up over Robert McCartney, the wall of silence over Paul Quinn.

Even more depressing is the code of republicanism in its attitude to Protestants/Unionists. With the exception of one or two who McDonald rightly praises for their individual effort, that effort seems overwhelmed by the words and deeds of others. For the most part Protestants/Unionists simply don’t matter.

McDonald’s book is an inconvenient truth for Republicans. It is a valuable handbook for anyone who wants an insight into the Republican mindset. It is a welcome contribution to understanding the present and learning from the past. To conclude on a positive note. If we learn from the past, and better understand our present, there is that little bit of extra hope for the future.

If you go expecting to see Republican propaganda on the big screen, then you’ll see Republican propaganda.

Republicans seemed to welcome the movie as a tribute to the courage of Bobby Sands and Unionists condemned the waste of State money that supported the making of the ‘Republican’ movie in Northern Ireland.

The tackling of a subject matter such as the 1981 Hunger Strike makes the movie ‘controversial’? Thought provoking perhaps, but no movie is controversial simply because of its subject. Is ‘Hunger’ a true portrayal – of course not, it is a movie. Is the treatment of the subject matter ‘fair’ – by whose judgement or against what criteria? Does it make Sands the Hero – Steve McQueen, the director, says ‘take a closer look if that is what you think.’

There has been a great deal of focus on the dialogue between Sands (played outstandingly by Michael Fassbender) and the fictional Fr Dominic Moran (Liam Cunningham). This is the most intense piece of dialogue in a movie that largely speaks through its cinematography. The movie is a triptych. To understand the importance of this dialogue it is necessary to explore before and after this centrepiece.

The first part of the film is about the Prison Officer Raymond Lohan (Stuart Graham). This is a portrait of a man on the edge. His only fleeting escape is locker room bravado with his fellow officers. Lohan is a lonely man. He dresses alone, eats alone, stands alone. His loneliness is compounded by visits to an aged mother who does not know his name. He is a man who no longer knows himself. Lost.

Then there is the new inmate, Davey Gillen (Brian Milligan) uncomfortable with his demand for political status, longing for family, out of place among his fellow inmates on the IRA dirty protest. Yet a member of the IRA and therefore obliged to conform, to believe. Trapped.

The focus of the film moves slowly towards Sands as the central subject. The encounter with Fr Moran is gripping. It is Moran who frames final act. He questions Sands’s motive in pursuing a hunger strike to the death. He points to the IRA inmates as being out of touch. Inside too long. Brutalised by the system, and yet of the system. How in such circumstances could any decision be rational? Deluded.

Sands responds as a driven and focused individual. It is his vision, his will, his decision. Moran points to the inmates as a mill stone around the neck of the IRA, the dirty protest as being a no win strategy that took the initiative away from a leadership outside the prison. Sands was taking them into a new no-win battle that would simply draw attention to IRA impotence. Sands does not accept this. Sands believes he is the future. His death will be a new dawn, an inspiration to the next generation. Martyr.

The last part of the movie guides us through the death of Sands. The brutality of the opening part of the movie is contrasted with the serene, humanity of death.

All that is left is the question posed by Fr Moran to Sands: ‘what does death achieve?’

This movie does not present Sands as a hero. He is presented as a man with purpose, but out of date and out of touch. His death was his choice, his decision: as was the death of Lohan. It was right that the film ended on the death of Sands. It was an end in more ways than one.

For the first time since reading Richard O’Rawe’s book ‘Blanketmen’, the end of ‘Hunger’ allowed me to understand why Sinn Fein/IRA/Republicans dislike O’Rawe so much. O’Rawe’s proposition is that the inmates wished to end the hunger strike after four men had died, but the outside command allowed the strike to continue to enable Owen Carron to keep the Parliamentary seat won by Bobby Sands.

Fr Moran points to the deep hole in which the ‘outside’ command found itself at the time of the hunger strikes. There was no military victory possible and the course of political discourse was being driven by factors inside the Maze prison and beyond ‘control’. Ironically the Sands hunger strike provided the IRA with a way out of that hole. The election of Sands and then Carron set them on a political path that has ultimately led them to Stormont.

Sands represents the end of an era. That is why O’Rawe has been cast out of the Republican family. He pointed out that the hunger strike became a vehicle for change; a change that ended the IRA of Bobby Sands and heralded a new political era – not quite the new dawn that Sands had anticipated. Betrayed.

Hunger is a powerful movie. There are powerful performances by the cast. There are powerful undercurrents too.

The prison is turned into a metaphor for a society that is brutalised. People, ordinary people are caught in a self-perpetuating cycle of violence being fed by alienation and disassociation from all else outside this maelstrom.

In Sands there is a man who seeks to inspire a new generation – the revolutionary vanguard to a new United Ireland. Instead, his death served a cause far removed from the one for which he was prepared to die. The Armalite placed on the shelf in exchange for the off the shelf Armani.

Sands. Lost, trapped, deluded, martyr, betrayed.

With George Bush’s approval ratings, the surprise of the current Presidential election is that Barack Obama is not leading by a far greater margin. The Republican Party is fighting the prospect of losing the Presidential election and perhaps also in both Houses of Congress.

It is a testimony to the strength of character of John McCain and the level of trust and admiration for the man that he has stayed in the race. Polls have been wrong before, and the margins at the weekend before the Presidential election are close enough for McCain to be positive.

That said, it is more than likely that Obama will win on Tuesday. On that day, and with hindsight, the Democrats will congratulate themselves on making the right choice. That will remain to be proven by Obama in Office. Certainly, he won the Democratic nomination by appealing to the Democrat grassroots, more liberal (left) than the overall Democrat registered voter who largely backed Hilary Clinton. In the course of the Presidential campaign he has been more centrist, as far as we can tell.

Will Obama be the pragmatic President or go with the liberal flow, particularly if both Houses of Congress are controlled by Democrats? We don’t know. Despite the huge election spend and thousands of miles travelled on the campaign trail, Obama has stuck to a simple constant message that gives little about the future conduct of President Obama.

Obama has been criticised for keeping the press at bay and controlling a very disciplined campaign. That would be wrong. His team understands that political victory does not happen because you are right, but because you have a message that connects with people and (even more importantly) because you are better organised than your opponent.

If both candidates have offered change, what makes the more inexperienced and relatively unknown quality of Barack Obama more popular? Both represent how Americans would like to believe themselves to be. John McCain represents the brave, redoubtable spirit of ‘never say die’. He is an independent spirit, someone who does what is right rather than what is popular and someone prepared to stand up to vested interests, even those of his own Party.

And yet. John McCain’s heroism is of another war. As the Iraqi ‘surge’ pushes the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan out of the headlines, and the battle for economic recovery is more pressing, John McCain’s strengths seem not to be for this era.

Instead it is Barack Obama who represents the moment. America is a ‘can do’ society. There is a belief that anyone can achieve success, no matter their background and no matter their start in life. It matters to America what others think of them: that it appears President Bush has made America unpopular abroad. It matters, equally, that Barack Obama is highly regarded overseas, which was seen to be demonstrated in Berlin – check out the Economist world poll, which reflects that goodwill. Obama aspires, inspires and, because of war and the economy, he is the man who at this moment most completely represents the American Dream. At this point in time, he represents what America wants to believe about itself and what it can achieve.

John McCain might very possibly be a great American President. It is not his time. The Republican Party needs to look at what McCain has achieved in this election, to the electorate he has reached outside the core Republican vote, and to the messages on which he has built his support. John McCain will not have lost the Presidential election, Barack Obama will have resolutely won.

If the Republican Party does not understand the desire of Americans for a change in their political process then it will be the biggest loser on Tuesday 4 November. While Sarah Palin might reassure the core Republican vote, that vote would not in itself elect John McCain, nor will it save Republicans from losing Congressional seats. A mean spirited Republican Party out to punish Democrats for their victory will only end up proving its own unelectability. The Republican Party needs to understand this for its own sake and to ensure that it holds Barack Obama to his message of reaching out across America to build the future, especially as it remains unclear what sort of future that will be.

Even if Democrats take Congress, House of Representatives and Senate, Obama will have been more than a significant part of that success. He be in a position to lead Congress, not follow. He will, in his own right, hold the mandate to fulfil the hopes and dreams of the American people. He will be able to shape America to his own ideal, whatever that is. Along with the American electorate we must all hope that an Obama Presidency will bring ‘change we can believe in’.

The current ‘crisis’ arises from the ambiguity within the St Andrew’s paperwork, where it says that, roughly speaking, it would be a good idea if ‘Policing and Justice’ were transferred to Stormont by May or thereabouts, 2008. It was left for the Parties to agree on the detail: the same parties who found it impossible to appoint a single ‘Victims Commissioner’ – instead we have four.

The wording at St Andrews around the transfer of Policing and Justice was the same sort of wording around Decommissioning in the Good Friday documentation. Of course Sinn Fein would do all they could to bring about decommissioning, but it was up to the IRA to do the act. Similarly, now, of course May was a target, but there was nothing to say that May was a fixed deadline for the transfer of Policing and Justice.

The disquiet around the transfer of Policing and Justice is very real. It is easy to point to Jim Allister’s ‘Traditional Unionist Voice’ and suggest that this is the only vocal dissent to the transfer of Policing and Justice. But he is not a lone voice.

David Adams writing powerfully in the Irish Times describes the prospect of giving Sinn Fein power over policing as “just madness” in the wake of the acquittal of three men charged with offences related to the murder of Robert McCartney. Hugh Jordan in the Sunday World shared similar thoughts (July 6th). A month later the Editor of the Church of Ireland Gazette, Canon Ian Ellis questioned whether there was ‘adequate confidence in the Stormont administration for the devolution justice and policing to proceed.’ Emer O’Kelly suggested that the ‘Frightening men haven’t gone away’ in the Irish Independent.

While there is both nationalist and unionist concern on the transfer of policing and justice, it is the Unionist community that is most obviously nervous, and massively suspicious, about Sinn Fein’s notion of ‘policing’ and ‘justice’. There seem little movement undertakenby Sinn Fein over the past ten years that could be described as clear-cut, unambiguous, decisive.

While there has been decommissioning by the IRA, the verification of that process was never entirely satisfactory to the unionist population. Over this past summer, the use of IRA semtex in an explosive device in Fermanagh once again raises the question of just what was decommissioned, and how much?

The Independent Monitoring Commission, which collates information from PSNI, Garda Síochána and other sources of intelligence, wants us to believe its assessment (rather than factual evidence) that the IRA is no longer engaged in activities for the purpose of terrorism.
Stormontgate revealed IRA tentacles reaching into Stormont (Castle/Buildings), the Parades Commission, the Police Ombudsman’s Office, as well as reporting on community activists working at local interfaces. Has this information gathering ceased, or has it been simply re-designated as non-military? More recently the IMC suggested that IRA intelligence gathering is to provide information on so-called dissident republicans: is this altruistic or self-serving?

While Sinn Fein would have us believe that the IRA has been decommissioned sufficiently to be no ‘threat’, actions in respect of loyal order and band parades over the summer has shown that there has been little decommissioning of cultural exclusionism and demonisation. Far from an accommodation with Protestant neighbours, the politically driven ‘resident’ committees have been hyperactive in areas across Northern Ireland – though nothing to hit the headlines.
Local Protestant communities and organisations have watched with alarm as thugs seem to act with impunity, and orchestrated protests act beyond the law. Sinn Fein has been intimately involved in ‘resident’ groups, which have operated within a campaign framework unchanged this past fifteen years – with the threat of violence turned up and down, depending on the level of pressure Sinn Fein desires to exert in the broader political process.

Devolution of policing will not change Sinn Fein’s ambiguity towards law and order on local matters such parades or on addressing republican violence (Kearney/McCartney/Quinn), which itself feeds ‘dissident’ justification that they act within the broad framework of republican ideological morality. The IRA ‘Army Council’ provides legitimacy to all, as no government that is not United Ireland Government on its terms has ultimate legitimacy in policing and justice.

The typical unionist is a rational being, instinctively doubting any romantic or institutional pleas to believe. Unionists look at the politicians, the police, the ‘independent’ Commissions, and the track record of all of these. For in among the smoke and mirrors of the political process they have learned to discern the shadows and the distorted reflections of reality.

For Sinn Fein/IRA to be considered as having substantially changed over the past ten years, it will have to appear more than changed by way of tactical emphasis.

The role that Sinn Fein would have through OFMDFM will not be ignored: in the appointment of the Attorney General (who appoints the Director of Public Prosecutions); and the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commissioner, and Commission (which makes all judicial appointments up to High Court Judges, Tribunal Chairmen and Coroners). OFMDFM may well also take responsibility to appoint the ‘independent’ members of the Policing Board. The notion that devolution of Policing and Justice would be OK if Sinn Fein does not have Ministerial responsibility will be examined closely, and ambiguity will not be acceptable.

Constructive ambiguity may have created the space to allow the first power-sharing Executive, because this was what enough of the electorate wanted to believe. Enough unionists were initially prepared to suspend their instinctive rationality in the hope that a democratic, peaceful future was possible. But process after ambiguous process has stretched belief to breaking point. Unionists have process fatigue and see no current crisis over devolution of policing and justice – only a protracted period of dealing with no definitive outcome other than a pregnant pause before the next ‘crisis’.

More cynically, however, the Ulster Unionists also may have sensed a chance to pick up a seat at the DUP’s expense. Without consensus, a by-election is to be held.

The DUP had every right to make its own choice of nominee for co-option. The Party is also to be commended for putting forward a young person who would gain valuable experience of political life, even in the small world of Northern Ireland local government.

Shame then that once the Ulster Unionists had forced a by-election the young man was unceremoniously dropped. The by-election candidate is to be Arlene Foster, a popular local politician and current Minister in Northern Ireland’s Stormont administration. An ex-Ulster Unionist, Mrs Foster is likely to be the DUP standard bearer for Westminster when a General Election is called sooner or later.

The DUP would be credited with some principle had they stuck by their nominee in the face of a by-election. That the DUP lacks the confidence in the electability of their nominee in an open contest makes the Ulster Unionists look as if they had a point in challenging the simple co-option.

In not running a candidate, the only Party to score a positive political point is the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV). TUV points to the UUP and DUP spat as an ‘unseemly dispute’ and the by-election as a ‘venture capable of strengthening Sinn Fein’. The by-election result will tell.
Leaving Fermanagh, a wider perspective might consider the actions of the DUP showing deep uncertainty in its forward path. Bringing in a big hitter for the role may prove a winning tactic, but it lacks longer-term strategy. Mrs Foster is not just seeking a dual mandate, her Party’s ambition would have her hold three political roles.

Along with its own established heavy-hitters, the defection of a small number of high profile and electable Ulster Unionists (of which Mrs Foster is one) has provided the DUP with a near monopoly of political personalities within Unionism. With little political difference between the DUP and UUP this matters greatly. The move by the UUP to create ties with the Conservatives may be an effort to seek some differentiation, but little on the main point of sharing power with Sinn Fein etc: tactical nuances rather than any points of principle separate the two.

The reliance on personalities is not a Northern Irish phenomenon. Mick Hume in spiked identifies an international trend: “we are entering an era, not of two- or even multi-party politics, so much as no-party politics.” In this context, personalities matter. Hume also points to the downside of this for political life: “As the gap between the public and the political class widens, political loyalties become more arbitrary and uncertain.” Northern Ireland is not immune to such trends.

Add the volatility and uncertainty of unionist unease at Sinn Fein in Government and it is easy to see why the DUP places reliance on personality over principle. The DUP is not strong enough to proceed with any candidate in Fermanagh at a local council level; it must use the political capital of the popular Mrs Foster.

The spat between the DUP and UUP on the rights and wrongs of a by-election is a distraction from the fact that there is little to separate the two parties. Neither is currently addressing the considerable unease among unionists on the subject of transfer of policing and justice responsibilities from Westminster to the local administration.

In the short term the continued reliance on big personality may deliver another win for the DUP. But being big is not enough in an arbitrary and uncertain political world. Winning is good; but winning comes with a price. While the two main Unionist Parties squabble, the question being increasingly asked by unionists is ‘who’s paying?’

David Cameron’s timing in the countdown to an election within the next eighteen months is entirely right. Whatever the outcome of the talks that are due to start later in the year, any output from those discussions would be at least a further year or two before anything concrete would be in place. This places the Tories being more than an English party, and a leadership with a Unionist position.

Doing something that practically articulates the Union is in stark contrast to Gordon Brown’s inability to articulate a vision on ‘Britishness’ that the Prime Minister sought to make his own. David Cameron may be doing little more than talk at this point, but he has clearly stolen another political march Labour.

For the Ulster Unionist Party there is nothing wrong with talking. Being able to engage with a political ‘winner’, as David Cameron increasingly appears to be, is a positive step for the Ulster Unionists. Furthermore, it draws a stark contrast with the modern Conservative message of liberal social and economic policy that contrasts abruptly with Iris Robinson.

DUP comment to the joint announcement of mutual interests by David Cameron and Sir Reg Empey seemed sulky. The short term benefits of saving Gordon Brown in the House of Commons is fine if those benefits are clear, certain and immediate. The DUP says there was no deal, which means they have upset the people who might well be in charge within eighteen months and gained nothing. Maybe they’ve just realised their error?

Nor, with Iris Robinson’s recent outbursts, could the Conservative Party even think about talking in the same way to the DUP as they intend to do with the Ulster Unionists. That is not to say that the lines are clear. Jeffrey Donaldson built a positive relationship with many Conservative MPs while an Ulster Unionist and no doubt has carried those over to the DUP. Such relationships are built on being personable as well as politic, though there is no doubt a meeting of minds to make such relationships endure.

Others in the DUP might be less keen on building such relationships. Equally, some in the Ulster Unionists might be wondering where a formal link to the Conservative Party might leave them, particularly in the absence of an active or coherent Labour movement in Northern Ireland.

On the face of it, the announcement of the intention to talk can do no harm in itself. Others, however, might look at the ground on which those talks are built. The common ground is a good place to start. The only point of reference we have on this is the Daily Telegraph article from which two points immediately arise.

First there is the quick gloss over history. True, the Conservatives have links to Irish Unionism back to the late 19th Century. If a week is a long time in politics then we can expect considerable change over 120 years. More recent history shows scant regard for Unionist sensibilities and principle by the three most recent Conservative Prime Ministers. Name the Conservative Secretary of State for whom Unionists have a kind word?

Would David Cameron any different? The Anglo-Irish Agreement came at a time when inside the Unionist Party there was a firm belief that relationships with the Conservative Party were improving and that the Union was safe with Margaret Thatcher. At the same time, it was the grassroots of the Conservative Party, against the wishes of the Party Leadership, who demanded Conservative organisation in Northern Ireland.

Second, it is declared that the Conservative Party ‘supports the devolution settlement’. It is not clear whether this means that the Conservative Party accepts that there will be devolved government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, or that it sees the Good Friday Agreement as a ‘settlement’. There is wriggle room in the ambiguity of the wording, to cover Scotland and Wales as well as Northern Ireland. That suits David Cameron.

If the reference to devolved settlement is a confirmation of Conservative Party endorsement of devolved government in the UK, it is a clever political move by David Cameron. Again, the Telegraph announcement serves the purposes of making a broader policy statement of how his leadership and thinking is shaping the Conservative Party. Effectively, the Conservative Party will act locally within a universal framework defined by either policy or principle.

On the other hand, David Cameron and Sir Reg Empey may be saying that the Good Friday Agreement is written in stone and that this is the devolution settlement, end of story. Its hard to see this would be the case, given that Sir Reg Empey has spent much of the summer pointing out that the Executive government is not working. Nor is the present Executive Government in anyway accountable or democratic in a ‘normal’ sense of the word. The electorate cannot vote out the government – shuffle the cards, yes, change the pack, no.

It is the lack of normality in the political process that undermines the key proposition of the Daily Telegraph piece. The entire piece is centred on the opportunity for ‘normal’ politics. Confirming belief in a settlement that entrenches sectarian politics is hardly a foundation on which to build a ‘normal’ future. It remains to be seen if the working party to be established continues to gloss over inconvenient history and current realities, or starts by addressing the democratic deficit and real policy issues that will make a ‘normal’ body politic reasonably possible.

Whether or not the working party of Conservatives and Ulster Unionists will find a mutually beneficial way forward remains to be seen. More later. For now, David Cameron has achieved a positive outcome already and anything more is win win. Sir Reg Empey has a short term gain of grabbing some media attention and being seen to be taken seriously by a big national player. However, failure to progress these tentative first steps will be viewed as retrograde. It makes no difference to David Cameron, who has already made his points. For Sir Reg Empey, the stakes are higher.

When the most recent RPA was first mooted it was sold as the chance of a lifetime to correct the horrendous mess that constitutes the ‘public sector’ in Northern Ireland. With 11 government departments, over 100 quangos, how ever many Commissioners for this and that, and 26 local councils we would have a right to feel a tad over-administered – though poorly governed for all that.

And yet the ‘Executive’ review of public administration seems to have concentrated on the area that covers the least in terms of public expenditure – the councils. Still, it is to be guessed that civil servants hidden away in the depths of Education, Health, Planning and Roads will be breathing a collective sigh of relief. Not for them the trials of exposure to local accountability – the Assembly committees I hear you say? Try a yet another cold, dark, wet Monday night in front of 20 or so angry, though rather well informed, local Councillors.

Sadly for all the posturing, twisting and obfuscation of groups such as the NI Local Government Association, local government in this part of the world remains incredibly weak. The review announces that the 11 new councils will have ‘some parts of planning’; in the rest of the UK local councils are the ‘place shapers’. Here they will be given ‘local economic development and tourism’; activities they have been engaged in for over 20 years already. There is still talk of the mythical ‘power of wellbeing’; what power, whose wellbeing? Still, it will be a little more that the ‘3Bs’ – bins, bogs and burials?

Even after review, what passes for local government in Northern Ireland will hardly be unrecognisable to a Mancunian, a Londoner, a Glaswegian, or a New Yorker and, yes, even to a Dubliner.

So, why is it likely that this latest review is, ultimately, likely to deliver so little? Is it that the 50 or so Councillors/former Councillors who are now MLAs recognise the dangers in their erstwhile colleagues having increased powers? Or is it that the civil service want to keep things cosy in Belfast? Perhaps there is a bit of both involved. Mostly however, it is hard to find substantial gains for effectiveness or efficiency in public administration from this review. Gains, perhaps, but none amount to effective or efficient local government.

From a Unionist perspective, the configuration is the best possible available; there is a Unionist council west of the Bann (Limavady/Coleraine/Ballymoney/Moyle) and a Unionist council on the border (Armagh/Craigavon/Banbridge). It means the first election is the European challenge of 2009, which marginalises smaller parties and maximises the significant voting blocs, which suits both the DUP and Sinn Fein. For all Parties it maximises the number of councillors: a little something for everyone.

There’s the rub. If it really was about effective, efficient, value for money local services we wouldn’t have over 100 quangos, multiple education systems and enforced coalition government with a Ministry for all. We wouldn’t be focusing on how there is a little something for everyone – all gain and no pain means little deviation from the status quo.

The UK economy is currently hovering on the edge of significant slow-down and perhaps even recession. Public spending is forecast to rise to almost 40% of GDP – over 40% is the UK Treasury’s definition of failure and the trigger for corrective action. In Northern Ireland public spending accounts for over two-thirds of our GDP – what does that say about the economy of Northern Ireland? Public Sector funding in the Republic is below 40%. If Northern Ireland is to be competitive in a global world, Corporation Tax should not be slashed without a similar slash made to the ‘public service’.

Arlene Foster reviewed local councils within her Ministerial remit. If there had been a substantive and serious review of public administration in Northern Ireland, it would not have stopped at local councils.

Submitted by Ardmachian

First, from the DUP perspective. Paisley was pushed. This can be said with some certainty because the reason behind the timing was so fundamentally flawed. How does the replacement of the ‘hard man’ of Ulster politics likely to save the DUP from Tradtiional Unionist Voice (TUV) led by ex-DUP Jim Allister MEP.

From a UUP perspective, hoping that voters will flood back to you because the others have arrived ten years too late is wishful thinking. There is nothing in the past year to make the electorate believe that voting UUP is a better bet – a better bet than what? Which is why a convergence of the two parties is almost inevitable.

The current signals from Sinn Fein indicate that it recognises the potential to be the largest party in any forthcoming election and taking the prized First Ministership. Sinn Fein has looked at the Dromore by-election and noted that where the DUP had previously swept the UUP off the board, the DUP did not achieve the vote it expected. They will have noted that the TUV took votes from both DUP and UUP. Which would suggest that in an election, the TUV would represent a significant minority voice and take a number of seat in the Assembly’s multimember constituency, PR election.

Widening the prespective, Sinn Fein anticipates that the failure of the Assembly to perform positively on any issue will impact much more negatively on Unionist parties than nationalist ones. They are probably right.

In recent months Sinn Fein has been markedly increasing its green rhetoric, and has been vociferous in blaming Unionists for lack of movement on issues close to the heart of its own constituency – reinforcing a victim mentality has always worked in the past.

A quiet summer will be more to do with tactics to convince Unionists of the safety in transfer of policing and justice than any sincere intention to resolve the parades issue.

Sinn Fein will most certainly not want to enter an election following Conor Murphy’s Ministry announcement of water charges – for which Sinn Fein will most certainly not be able to shift the blame. An election and Ministry reshuffle is about the only face-saving circumstance where Sinn Fein would allow itself to dump the disaster that is Catrina Ruane in Education.

There is every reason for Sinn Fein to see advantage in an election before the full term of this Assembly – sooner rather than later would no doubt be its preference.

For either the DUP or UUP to fail to perform as the largest party following an election would send Unionism into a tailspin of recrimination and self-doubt. Any groups emerging would be based on personality. The debate would focus on who has the biggest claim to be the leader of Unionism, when in fact no-one would be giving a lead at all.

Any suggestion that a DUP and UUP merger of some sort would provide a single Unionist Party is too late. Although the appeal of TUV is currently narrow and serves principally as a magnet for dissent, it has all the hallmarks of a credible political movement that will in time transform itself into a political force. There are now two Unionist groupings in Northern Ireland – those in the house and those without a key to the door, just yet.

In truth, there is now little political difference between the DUP and UUP, other than ego, personality, and history. With the departure of Ian Paisley there is no good reason to remain apart. Electorally, there is every good reason to join together.