It was hard enough to achieve Conservative Party organisation in Northern Ireland in the first instance, back in the 1980s. Central office was hostile, and much of the Party leadership at best reluctant to become involved in the region. On the ground it might have seemed mad to set up Conservative branches in Northern Ireland at the end of 10 years of Thatcher Government and in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. There was also an Ulster Unionist Party which was dominant within the unionist electorate and, despite the recent history, remained on friendly terms with Conservatives generally at senior levels and in Parliament.

Despite the turmoil, naysayers, hostility and challenges, the determination of those early pioneers of the Conservative Party in Northern Ireland gained Council seats and had a reasonable stab at the North Down Westminster seat.

Fast forward thirty years and we find a Central Office bending over backwards to be helpful, a Party leader (now Prime Minister) who visits, espouses unionism, and encourages the local Party to be local and relevant to Northern Ireland.

Some local Conservatives, however, think the Conservative brand is bad and that is why they ended with nothing, zip, nadda after three consecutive elections – don’t think they see Jim Nicholson as ‘one of us’ – though some might point to other reasons for the Northern Ireland Conservatives to gain electoral traction.

thedissenter has not  been convinced of any principled or particularly practical or positive thinking  around the revamping, relaunching and repackaging of the Northern Ireland  Conservatives under David Cameron: electoral positioning always seemed to dominate his relationship to Northern Ireland; though not the only area that seems calculated and poorly considered.  But support from the central Party, including finance, is real and appears genuine.

Since the Northern Ireland Assembly elections there has been a bubbling undercurrent seeking to change the name of  the Northern Ireland Conservatives to something else. This was flagged up by Alex Kane in the News Letter. This resulted in a response from the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Conservatives Irwin Armstrong to which Alex responded in his weekly column.

Unfortunately for Irwin Armstong and the Northern Ireland Conservatives, those bubbles keep on rising to the top.

No doubt well-meaning, the thinking of those seeking change in the Conservative name are naively missing the point. There is a deep lack of political capacity within the Northern Ireland Conservatives, mostly being freshmen to politics, and inevitably there are those who would seem to be imposing an agenda on a relatively weak body politic. This is reflected in the arguments being made to underscore the case for changing the Conservative Party name in Northern Ireland.

Discussion around the  positioning for a newly titled Party is presented as being one where “centrist, moderate, pro-UK politics, can be delivered, in a way that engages people of all classes, genders, religious persuasions and ethnicities.” Fine. At the same time it is also suggested that there is great reservoir of support for a moderate centrist grouping among those disillusioned with the direction of the so-called ‘centre-ground’ as it presently exists. This does beg the question that if a centrist moderate proposition is not in the so-called centre ground, where is it?

The centrist moderate proposition seems to be revolve around everything that is ‘non-sectarian’; excluding the Alliance Party which is apparently a usurper in the centre, being in fact a product of sectarianism: thedissenter understands how the Alliance could be described as itself a product of sectarianism, but that does not make it sectarian. Defining something by what you are ‘non-of’ does not define what you are, it merely narrows the parameters to a greater or lesser extent.

Where is the centre of politics in Northern Ireland?  thedissenter is asking because this impacts on what might be the name of any new centrist-rightish Party that is not in the so-called centre ground. This question seems to be a preoccupation of those who are seeking to re-style the Northern Ireland Conservatives. Can it be described with terms such as ‘Right’  which suggests ideology?  Can it be described as ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’, which have their difficulties for positioning your politics not least among the unionist electorate. Being truly liberal is certainly not being in the centre, and is positively radical rather than perceptively moderate in respect of policy development.

Then there is image and moving forward. If there is to be a break and repositioning away from the ‘Conservative Party’ brand then there needs to be a distinct local identity. Those taking the lead would need  to be local. That would also mean creating some distance with the central Conservative Party. Being a local cheerleader for David Cameron is a non-starter. Any plan to bring in big Conservative names as speakers would seem counter-intuitive.

Tie your funding, timetable and proposition to the Conservative Central Office and leading names of the Conservative Party and people will see that as being Conservative: if it looks Conservative, talks Conservative and walks alongside the Conservatives, then it is a Conservative Party. If you act and work as Conservative in all but name, why not be Conservative in name?

So let us presume the new Party proposition and new name is sorted. Where would the new ‘not-the-Conservative-Party’ voters be found? Yes there are many people who do not vote in elections. The argument goes that once a proposition that will be attractive to the ‘disillusioned’ is found, hey presto you can create a new space in Northern Ireland politics. Perhaps. Only if you understand who isn’t voting, and the sort of proposition that might capture their attention.  There has been a great deal of discussion about the BMW & BBQ group, with little convincing evidence that this is where elusive voters are to be found.

In the run-up to the 2011 Assembly elections the Belfast Telegraph launched ‘True Colours’ which was a chance for readers to see which Party they might support: a questionnaire based on manifesto points. Not only did the result provide the Party for which you are most likely to vote, it also provided percentages on how close you were to other parties. Manifesto positions were not generally presented in forthright, black and white, like it or reject it terms – plenty of wriggle room. So change an answer here or there, and you could easily change your ‘Party preference’ outcome.

What was most striking about the True Colours exercise was how little it took to change Party, and how much of each Party (in percentage terms) with which you agreed (according to the exercise).  In summary, there wasn’t much between the Northern Ireland Parties’ manifestos on the left/right index: take away the ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’ labels and they are all much of a muchness: middle-class, middle of the road; and effectively aimed at the BMW & BBQ set.

If you are looking for a disillusioned and non-voting public in Northern Ireland, by far the largest fertile territory would be the large sprawling estates in areas across Northern Ireland, but particularly in the larger towns and cities. Anecdotally, as few as twenty-percent of the electorate might turn out to vote from these areas. The UUP, which once held sway here, lost that vote a long time ago to the DUP, mostly. The DUP has more recently lost the trust and confidence among the estates as it moved into the UUP’s urban middle-class vote. Neither the DUP or UUP appear to have any strategy to win votes back.

A presumption that this electorate is alien to a Conservative message is wrong. Certainly it would be a challenge to win over.

Northern Ireland needs the sort of radical restructuring in economic and political outlook of the Thatcher years, updated, of course. More of the same will not deliver. What is absent from the discussion among Conservatives in Northern Ireland is what would make them stand out in respect of policy and principle that relates and connects with a broad base of unionist opinion.  In respect of available vote,  however, that will need to be wider and deeper than the existing parties to succeed.

Thatcher years saw Conservative policy standing up to entrenched interests which resisted change: policy that empowered the individual over the State, breaking monopolies of economic and political patronage. It championed the small businessman. It championed meritocracy and freedom: individual rights against the overbearing State.

No doubt the Conservatives would see the vast ‘loyalist’ (or ‘nationalist’) estates beyond their reach. That is not necessarily so. Thatcher built a policy agenda that addressed the economy and reform which appealed to that very constituency;  building an electoral base that carried the Conservative Party to successive election victories for well over a decade.

Putting principle at the core of policy development, Margaret Thatcher communicated a populist policy agenda that re-engaged the aspirant classes to the Conservative Party – much to the horror of the paternalist One Nation grandees, and to the Left.

There seems to be a similar debate in Scotland , though in truth the Scottish Conservative Party has elected representatives at all levels on which to build.

While there was little difference in votes at the 2010 Westminster election between the SNP, Liberals and Conservatives behind Labour, the Tory vote is spread too thinly to gain seats. The Conservatives rose to third largest Party at the Holyrood election, even through the electoral gap between the Parties was more marked. Then there are the obvious reasons not to change the Conservative Party name in Scotland which have been articulated elsewhere.

While history has been unkind, that latent base in Scotland may make it difficult to claim ‘we were Tory, but we are not any more, so forget about all that, we are all new and improved’.

Although very different in demography and politics, for the Conservative Party the discussion over names in Scotland and Northern Ireland has coincided. The same issues ought to be at the core of consideration.

• If a constituent part of the Conservative family in the UK includes formal association with Conservative Central Office and Party structures, then what benefit would realistically accrue with distance from the name ‘Conservative’?
• Where do you find an electorate that is not already bombarded with political offers that are at least as attractive on the broad centre ground, but for whom a new ’distinctive’ message may be attractive?
• How distinctively right-wing (philosophically, politically, economically) will you be to create a substantive real difference between you and other Parties? There is presently only technocratic differences; no matter what the roots, constitutions, or rhetoric of those Parties might present to the contrary.How do you find a local non-nationalist message that creates a distinctively regional voice that is not incompatible with your national unionist position.
• The largest disengaged, disillusioned voting group is among the aspirant working people in urban estates across the country. How do you re-engage the aspirant working people that you have abandoned or ignored?
• What if the largest disengaged, disillusioned voting group wants to have confidence in a Party that offers a more strident populist unionism that would potentially upset that huge vote you don’t have and have little hope of achieving because the element of the electorate to which you are most sensitive (to the exclusion of those who might conceivably vote for you) is overwhelmingly a) nationalist b) traditionally left of centre and c) hates Tories of any colour (or name).

There is absolutely nothing wrong with a debate among Conservatives about the need to re-imagine the Party or restore its appeal to the electorate.  First things first. What electorate is it that you are challenging to reconsider voting  for a conservative Party, and what is the proposition that will convince them to give Conservatism a chance?

The electorate is not stupid and will look for substance over presentation, a unity of purpose in moving forward and a principle and policy that is coherent, credible and meaningful to them by values (usually historical/familial), present circumstances and future aspiration for themselves and their family. The first thing they will not think about is the name of the Party they are voting for, it will be an affinity and confidence in the values, policy and vision of a real alternative in which they can believe.

If we move away from politics and into the business of branding, of which name and visual image is a small part, we remember the successful Accenture or British Gas, while forgetting the failures such as Consignia or the visual disaster of British Airways World designs. We also neglect the most successful longevity of identity of companies such as Shell, or the ever changing IBM which still manages to remain true to its core purpose of making useful technology for businesses.  Evolution, not revolution. At the heart of any successful company is a certainty in its purpose and the determination, ideas and aptitude to deliver in such a way that exudes confidence to customers that the product or service is right for them.

The Conservative Party in Scotland and Northern Ireland needs to forget about changing name until they work out what they exist to do, and have a clear vision for Scotland or Northern Ireland and a clear idea (policy framework) of how to get there. Otherwise the Party may well invest in a big rebranding only to find that the electorate looks past that branding to see little to make Conservatism, by any name, any more attractive than it ever was.

The 2010 Westminster election is over.  While the poll outcome was inconclusive the upshot is a decisive shift in British Politics where a progressive coalition has burst through the liberal centre/right. In the process, there were no important phone calls to the Northern Ireland parties, who now sit on the Parliamentary margins.

The debates on national television provided an energy to the national election. Locally the election campaign was as lacklustre and uninspiring as the Party leaders on the local TV debates.

On the nationalist side the new leader of the SDLP simply argued a greener case than Sinn Fein, ceding any advantage new leadership might offer in setting the electoral debate and regaining ground in the future. Sinn Fein organised a campaign that seemed more a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections and must be disappointed that they made little inroad into the SDLP vote on polling day.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: comparative strength.

The obvious decline in SDLP votes since 1998 is not to the great benefit of Sinn Fein.  For Westminster 2001, the high point of nationalist turnout, the SDLP had 168,873 and Sinn Fein 175,932; in 2010, 110,970 and 171,942 respectively.  In percentage terms Sinn Fein is clearly outvoting the SDLP, but it has made no gains in number of votes.  The overall Nationalist/Republican vote appears relatively static.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative

Republicans, in particular, have made much of an inroad into defeating Unionism, electorally. While Unionism was once dominant electorally, this was at a time when nationalists probably failed to even register to vote. The heady early 1970s, when unionist voters turned out in great numbers, was not a time of unionist unity. Since then, nationalists and republicans have fully engaged in the electoral process, and around 200,000 have been added to the electoral register.

Electorate and turnout for elections 1969-2010: comparative.

Summarily, the increase in registered voters has been to the benefit of neither nationalists nor unionists. In recent years the electorate, unionist and nationalist, has slowly disengaged from politics. However, ignoring the numbers and entering the percentage game, Sinn Fein has gained as it holds its vote relative to others.  Somehow, despite Sinn Fein’s project seemingly stalling, Unionist Parties are presenting a picture of unionism in crisis.

Much has been made of the apparent failure of leaders (and leadership) within Unionism, and there has been a great deal of debate since the Westminster election on the topic of what the future holds for unionism.

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: comparative strength

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

The numbers suggest that the Ulster Unionist Party is bumping along and has done little to regain the electoral trust that it squandered under David Trimble. Just as the UUP climbed electoral heights in the 1990s, so it has fallen to consistent lows over the past decade.  The decline has been hard for a Party that still gives the impression that it still believes itself to the natural Party of Government. Although the UUP electoral arrangement with the Conservative Party has been derided, on the positive side, at least the Party could had the finance to run a campaign and the vote was probably no worse than if the arrangement hadn’t existed.

A lowly UUP ought to have been good news for the DUP. However, similar to their principal partners in the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP has not been able to take advantage of their rival’s electoral slide. The DUP vote has been remarkably stable over the past decade.  The Party immediately benefited from the mistrust of the Ulster Unionist Party; acting as the standard bearer of opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein. In the decade from 1998, those who became disillusioned or discontented with the UUP either left politics or joined the DUP.  Over this period the unionist electorate could be characterised as either being ‘for’ the UUP or ‘against’.

Unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010 (not including UUP/DUP): combined/cumulative

In the 2007 Assembly election there was still a broad expectation that the DUP would not enter Government with Sinn Fein. When they did, off the back of apparently verified decommissioning by the IRA (which seems to have missed 40% ), it can be no surprise that the DUP would suffer to some extent in the same way as the UUP.  That was certainly the instance in the 2009 European Election, when Jim Allister of the TUV took a signification proportion of the unionist vote.

While the TUV did less well in the Westminster election, drift from the two main parties was nevertheless marked. Trust has gone. Yes, there was an agreed unionist candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone, and the DUP stood aside in North Down. Even so, in an election when the overall unionist vote increased on the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP must be disappointed that it cannot point to any positive electoral gain.

All unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

Nationalism performed less well than unionism in the Westminster election, albeit marginally. Yet the debate post election is on the future of unionism. Inevitably this has centred on the future of the Parties, and in particular the leaderships.

No unionist leader has much to cheer about post-election.  The TUV performed poorly, though it was never likely that the European pr vote could have been replicated in the first-past-the-post Westminster poll. Still, the TUV lacked depth in its candidate selection, and Jim Allister’s political persona was one of anger.  The Unionist electorate is past anger. It wants to trust again. To do that it desires confidence in a leadership can attract talent and articulate a pathway to restoring community, cultural and political confidence. The TUV was not alone in failing to meet that expectation.

Sir Reg Empey lost in South Antrim. Perhaps he has done enough service to David Cameron’s Conservatives to gain a peerage and join David Trimble, in which case his candidature was not entirely in vain.  It was his close association with David Trimble that probably reduced his chances in South Antrim, where not even a hawkish David Burnside had been able to hold the seat. The electorate that punished the UUP then, and sent an unambiguous message on the leadership of David Trimble, was hardly likely to vote now for someone equally at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement.  Adrian Watson, the choice of the local UUP would probably have fared better as a new and local face for Westminster.

Sir Reg also lost on the wider political field. From the outset of the UUP Conservative arrangement he failed to present a convincing narrative to overcome the sense that this was a marriage of convenience: the Conservatives needed a significant electoral base in Northern Ireland and the UUP needed the money.  The UUP message that Stormont was a ‘huckster’s shop’ should have had some traction with a disillusioned electorate. However, Sir Reg’s inability to bring clarity and direction to the UCUNF (UUP/Conservative) arrangement suggested that he equally unable to manage his own neighbourhood store. There was the sluggishness in agreeing candidates. Finally, for thedissenter, Fred Cobain standing as a Conservative & Unionist?

And yet, the UUP vote broadly held up across Northern Ireland. Yes, it now has no seats at Westminster.  But it still has a base on which to build. On the wider national electoral front the politics of the nation has been trust into new territory with the Conservative/Liberal coalition (or is that Liberal Conservative coalition).  There is deep resentment of the central Conservative Party organisation among many local Conservative constituency organisations.  Although talking about decentralising power from Westminster, Cameron has strongly centralised Conservative Party organisation around his own team.  This has not delivered the majority he needed; in many instances this was down to lack of flexibility in addressing local electoral campaigns: Adrian Watson is a case in point.

What became clear on election night was that the country no longer acts uniformly. The great swingometer was made redundant on a night where local electorates seemed to take a local view – resulting in massively varying swings across the country.  It would suggest that future candidates will need to emphasise more local issues and rely less on national coat-tails.

In this respect there is certainly a place for more regionally based politically associations where the central party outlines core principles, but does not dictate local candidate selection and tolerates a degree of policy variance around the country.  If the Conservatives and the UUP can find that balance between regional and national interests then there is a future for the UUP. Otherwise, not.

At times in the run-up to and during the election the argument of the UUP almost seemed to be that the DUP couldn’t be trusted: to which the electorate added the word ‘either’. In the end the only place that this mattered was in East Belfast, where the electorate cast a plague on the UUP and DUP. Of course the rejection of a sitting MP, and in this case the leader of the DUP, was a huge slap to Peter Robinson.  In the rest of the country the DUP held its own and it seats.

The East Belfast seat was not a natural loss, had there been anyone of stature in the East Belfast DUP to have stood as an alternative to Peter Robinson: Strangford, the Westminster seat once held by Iris Robinson was retained by the DUP. The electoral strategy for the East Belfast seat has long been the strength of the Robinsons (Westminster/Assembly/Council) to bring in all others on their coat-tails.  Time for a re-think.

The apparent nature of the internal politics of the DUP suggests that there is little likelihood of Robinson being replaced as leader; for reasons not that dissimilar to the earlier thedissenter piece in the wake of revelations around Iris Robinson earlier in the year. The early DUP was shaped by Ian Paisley. The latter-day DUP has been shaped by Peter Robinson.  There is little obvious alternative to Peter Robinson’s leadership.  Peter Robinson’s East Belfast Assembly seat is relatively secure, as one of many, which assures his leadership position where it matters most to the DUP, at Stormont.

Before bringing together all these points into a broad conclusion it is worth noting the success of Naomi Long. First, by accepting David Ford at the Executive Table, the Alliance Party has been elevated to the position of central and ‘trusted’ player.  Second Naomi Long is local, and hard working. Third, Alliance has always had strength in East Belfast. Finally, she wasn’t Peter Robinson, and whether unionist or not, she isn’t perceived as nationalist.

Electoral ups and downs of principal parties: 1969-2010 *

The Alliance Party has been much stronger in the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s than it has been anytime in the past decade.  It still has a lot of work to do to grow its base, and there are not obviously an army of Long-type candidates to make an impact in 2011 at Stormont (and probably across 26 Local Government areas). In percentage terms it’s vote will look good where any general increase is a gain against an smaller voting public overall, though in pure numbers terms it has a long way to go.  Notions of some kind of renaissance in the political centre ground are premature.

Back to the big debate, within and around Unionism. The focus of that debate is numbers, and focused on whether in the forthcoming 2011 election Sinn Fein might gain a position where it may be able to lay claim to the post of First Minister.

Since the changes following the St Andrews Agreement any party with the votes and seats necessary can lay claim to the post of First Minister.  This provides for more equitable power-sharing in that it does not create a hierarchy of parties – theoretically anyone can be a First Minister. Would it make a great difference for Sinn Fein to be First Minister? If you accept Sinn Fein as a partner in Government then why not?

The most recent political push for unionist unity has arisen principally as a DUP campaign tactic to corner the UUP/Conservative arrangement, pushing at the fact that one of the certainties espoused in this arrangement was that the Conservatives were committed to stand in all 18 seats.  The agreement of a candidate on a unity-style ticket in Fermanagh South Tyrone undermined the determination of the UUP/Conservative pact. Had Rodney Connor won it would have placed even greater pressure on the UUP/Conservative pact that it failed to make a similar arrangement in South Belfast.

That the tactic in Fermanagh South Tyrone failed to deliver its intended outcome still leaves the DUP in a position to argue that it only failed because it was late in the day, the electorate was unconvinced of UUP sincerity, the Conservative link lost vital votes and anything that throws blame around and away to the DUP: this is a criticism of the DUP blame game generally and not that, conversely, the DUP is ‘to blame’.

The focus on the issue of First Minister is a tactical one – a means to give purpose to closer co-operation between the parties (if not merger). Yet the real issue is not one of tactics to meet short-term and tokenistic outcomes. The failure of Sir Reg (lost seat, lost leadership) to stabilise and provide purpose to the UUP, the DUP’s failure to dismiss the TUV altogether and to regain momentum lost in 2009, reflect deeper malaise within unionist parties.

Ironically, the arrival of the TUV brought unionist voters to the polling booths and increased the overall unionist vote would suggest that disunity has its advantages, allowing the fractious and independently minded unionist voter an avenue to express discontent with established parties.

The logic of engagement by all parties in the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement is an acceptance that the Union is safe in the hands of the unionist electorate: that is the principle of consent.  Unionist voters accept this and many seem content not to vote for parties that fail to reflect their concerns and provide competent government.   This is not a problem for unionism alone, nationalism has a similar challenge, though seems content to lose itself in the green romantic mists of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow.  A plague on all their houses?

Addressing unionist unity from a structural perspective is bound to disappoint. Political party realignment is merely mixing decks and dishing out the job cards in a different order.  The electorate is hardly likely to be impressed. Identifying a loss of voter, by class or aspiration, does not address the message sent at the Westminster election: none of the leaders of unionism presented a coherent and inspirational purpose for unionism in the twenty-first century.

A unionist should feel proud to fly the Union flag, and should not feel that it is somewhat diminished when wrapped around those who seek to lead Unionism. It should not be worn in anger, it should not cover embarrassment, and it should not be wrapped around a backroom deal.  Discussion on the Union should be a matter of substance, not tactical number crunching: it is a matter for open discussion, not whispers behind closed doors.

Unionist Parties may be under threat through a loss of relative electoral strength. That does not mean that the Union is under threat: which is not to say that the Union cannot be lost. As elsewhere, this article has been an exercise in looking at the outcomes of the Westminster election and reading the runes. There are a few pointers which may shape consideration of the future for Unionists.

• The overall nationalist vote appears static.
• Nationalist voters appear just as disengaged as unionist voters.
• The UUP might consider its future within a regional/national and liberal conservative context, but is otherwise nothing but a fading reflection of better times.
• The DUP built its presence on becoming biggest: now it is, what next?
• The unionist voter seemed uninspired by any of the unionist Parties’ offers.
• The overall unionist vote benefits from disunity, not unity.
• The SDLP was dominant in 1998. What happened?
• If Sinn Fein is a worthy party for Government, and to hold a post co-equal to the First Minister then why shouldn’t it hold the post of First Minister?
• The issue of a Sinn Fein First Minister is a narrow tactical argument that distracts from the lack of attractive leadership from either the UUP or DUP, or from anywhere elsewhere in unionist circles.
• Short-term tactical considerations will not address the future of unionism as a political cause.
• The Union is safe: at least that rests with the electorate and not the politicians.

The Westminster election changed very little. The points above have been matters for varying degree of consideration for some time. The election has simply brought them to the fore. Much of that discussion has taken place at Open Unionism and in the pages of the press, and probably around the lunch tables of Stormont buildings and meeting places elsewhere.

Tactical considerations of stopping a Sinn Fein First Minister are given an air of immediacy, including an urgency on discussion of political party restructuring. The larger and more important issue of the purpose and sense of Unionist cause is receiving less attention, perhaps because there is no personal or party gain in thinking outside the box?  (It is a lonely place outside the box, and risky.)  How does the discussion move beyond the tactical and party political to a more central discussion on the nature and future expression of Unionism fit for the twenty-first century?

Without a common understanding of the central tenets of Unionism there is little chance of Party political unity among unionists. Unionists must know what the Union is for, holding common purpose; it must not be defined by what it is not, what it is against. The electorate wishes positive, not negative, Unionism. With that central understanding would party political unionism mean anything anyway? Is unionism an ‘ism’ at all? How do we move beyond a position of being in defence of the Union to advancing and deepening the Union? These are the questions to be the subject of Looking Forward: Part 2. Later.

*/** please note that the graphs are indicative. While every effort was made to input the numbers correctly, sometimes interpretation of orginal data was difficult. I may have designated an independent in the unionist circles when it should have been nationalist: the early 1970s was a confusing time. ’Others’ sometimes includes all but the main parties; more than just the odds and sods. Data on registered electorate and turnout was not always available, and sometimes only in percentage terms. Taking all this into account,  all graphs should be viewed as broadly accurate, but mostly illustrative.  If any reader wishes to repeat the exercise and find fault, the source information is found within CAIN and ARK: knock yourself out.

So in retrospect and to bring thedissenter up to date…

Campaigning for the Westminster election in Northern Ireland had an air of reluctance, or nervousness; perhaps born out of uncertainty as to how the election would impact on the local Parties. Politics in Northern Ireland seems to have descended into a tactical contest, where any greater purpose to gaining power has been lost in the pursuit of power itself (or clinging on to the certainty of what is already held). The Westminster campaigns in Northern Ireland seemed more of a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections than one of national consequence.

The SDLP had a new leader trying to hold its vote and not lose ground to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein ran the same old faces, and hoped to gain ground on the SDLP.  Both nationalist parties begged the same votes for the same romantic notion of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow when all would be well and good – earlier, Brian Cowan had set out the real politic and focusing on bigger issues on St Patrick’s Day.  Other than for tactical considersations of the least worst option, neither nationalist Party appealed to the electorate that matters to their ultimate aspiration (again, see Brian Cowan’s words).

Peter Robinson gave himself a bad press on the eve of the election, which didn’t seem to impact on the Party as a whole. The UUP/Conservative grouping gave the appearance of being as disorganised as the huckster’s shop in which it continues to hold two Executive seats. The newcomers, the Traditional Unionist Voice, were the great unknown factor and a first-past-the-post Westminster election was the worst outing a fledgling party could face.

The Alliance Party and Naomi Long? Bless.

The 2009 European election showed, at least on the Unionist side, that the electorate no longer swallowed the warnings of the doomsayers, nor feared the Sinn Fein bogeymen on which many election strategies were based. A large proportion voted and damn the consequences.  For 2010 Westminster the unionist electorate was largely more circumspect, but hardly enthusiastic: evidenced in Fermanagh South Tyrone. Unionism is past anger; frustrated and petulant, but not angry. The simple interpretion on the electoral fortunes of the three unionist Party leaders is: ‘ a plague on all your houses’.

Unionism is in flux, and May 6th has not provided any clarity on the questions that should be asked let alone provide any answers. That debate will continue and is to be welcomed. 

Northern Ireland’s 18 Westminster seats were always going to be filled, even if choice in voting preference was diminished by the available options being well and truly woeful.  In general, commentary and analysis on the election results has been mostly inward rather than outward. The now marginal status of all local parties at Westminster may tend to exacerbate that focus. Yet change is always a time of opportunuity. The new consensus in Government at Westminster, for as long as it can last, offers such opportunity if grasped.

If this post seems to ramble a little it is because thedissenter is in a process of thinking, reassessing fundamentals, throwing the bricks in the air and rebuilding ideas. That may take some time. Absence has not brought any conclusions. In the meantime regular commentary will resume once the electoral dust has settled.

For broad analysis on the state of the individual unionist parties by far the best has been that of the blogger Turgon on SluggerOToole.  The recent meeting at Hatfield House between the Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Patterson, and leading representatives of the DUP and UUP has created a great deal of debate on the nirvana of ‘unionist unity’. We are told the Hatfield House talks were about the UUP and DUP, and Conservatives, gaining some greater understanding in respect of future elections. Generally, however, the impact of the host party (the Conservatives) on elections is not discussed in detail. Perhaps this is because the Conservatives and the UUP are treated as one: that is a mistake; they remain two parties. Such a perspective misses the electoral questions arising from the Conservative and UUP non-merger.

Should an Assembly election to be held before Westminster elections there would be four Unionist parties in the fray as there is no agreement for Assembly elections between the UUP and Conservatives.  This would probably kill any prospect of the UUP being the largest Unionist party: the two are separate parties as we are constantly told, so they will be two separate Assembly Parties.

So too may the Conservatives. Without an arrangement with the UUP for Assembly elections the local party would rightly expect to stand, and win a few seats. But the strength of the Conservative offer is that it brings so much more to local politics than money to a party (the UUP) whose financial fortunes are much diminished. Conservative electoral strength would be exposed before the benefit of the ‘win’ at Westminster (and even one seat other than North Down will be a win, so the bar is low). The Conservatives would lose momentum.

Conversely of course the arrangement for the General Election will mean that the Conservatives who might get elected in Northern Ireland will be fully taking the Conservative whip as part of that Party, while the UUP will be taking the whip by agreement. So if, and only by example, the UUP/Con arrangement delivers four seats and two of those are Conservative it means the UUP has in effect only two seats at Westminster. Influence with the Conservative Party is thus diminished, and independence constrained by taking the Conservative Whip. Added to which the UUP has provided an electoral base for the Conservatives to make further gains in the next elections on the calendar (Assembly), and in much better shape to eat into the UUP vote than if it had no Westmnister seats in Northern Ireland. This further dmininishes UUP ambitions of regaining ground to the DUP as the largest Assembly Party.

If Westminster elections are first, in the context of a hung Parliament the two main unionist parties would be in a much stronger position with no pre-agreement with the Conservative Party. Obligations generated prior to the election severely restrain the capacity for the unionist parties to play their best hand.

It is hard to see how strategists within the DUP would not have anticipated these scenarios, or that the UUP could be so detached as to not even think about them.

Which is why any notion of talks at Hatfield being on ‘unity’ needs to be treated with caution. There can be no doubt that the Conservatives as a Party would have been fishing for DUP ideas on the future and specifically for indicators on what would happen in the event of a hung Parliament. The DUP would be similarly probing the Conservatives. The only thing on the Conservative leadership’s mind at the moment is ‘seats’. This gives the unionist parties a strong position prior to the election, or it would if the UUP was not already tied to the Conservatives.

All this speculation centres on considerations of electoral mathematics that only the timings/outcomes of the elections will prove. If a Westminster election is first, and if the Conservatives gain a majority of anything over 30 then both unionist parties will be largely irrelevant, and Northern Ireland as far down the agenda as events will allow. Which means short-term interest may be Westminster, but for Unionism there must be greater focus on Stormont.

That brings us to wider speculation of other talks and fevered speculation on any perceived signals that build on this story. Within the context of all of the above, a merger of the UUP and DUP is by far the more likely and electorally sensible in terms of unionist ‘unity’, particularly in respect of the Assembly elections.  The same sort of issues arise. This would have to be a merger and not a pact, because it is about Party and not political designation in d’Hondt. It is the largest Party that takes the First Minister role.  Something less would be enough to extract maximum value from a hung Parliament, where ten to twelve Unionist seats represent the difference. Timing will be everything.

There is a definite sense that something is stirring among unionists in Northern Ireland. It may be an interesting political Spring. Will it be a new Spring for Unionism?

Picture: parliament.uk picture gallery

The opinion polls are erratic, as discussed on thedissenter earlier, and the potential for a tightly hung Parliament is real. A party holding a small number of seats may gain considerable importance.  So the performance of local parties is of national interest: though notional until the counts are complete.

thedissenter will resist entering a seat by seat analysis: that has been undertaken elsewhere, and there is sure to be more before the date of the election is finally announced.  At this point, selection of candidates is far from complete.  There are a number of factors which have the potential to impact on turnout and final count, and this post will look at those rather than enter fanciful prediction as others have done.

Most probably there will be two elections, again, in Northern Ireland – a nationalist one and a unionist one. There may be movements on the margins, but nothing of importance.  The greatest impact on the final count is most likely going to be the polling strength of the TUV and the way in which that Party’s presence, or not, affects the electoral balance in each constituency.

There is little on the horizon that is likely to impact on the Sinn Fein vote. Some might wishfully suggest that the woeful media management around family matters might wound Gerry Adams, and by association, Sinn Fein. Suzanne Breen spelled out the case in the Tribune.  Liam Clarke lays out the questions that linger in the Sunday Times.  Yet morality is hardly an issue for the Sinn Fein voter, happy to support a Party that has ‘yet to renounce its history of violence and terror, makes the vast majority of people here, sick to their stomachs’: that would be a majority of the total population, but it seems not the ‘nationalist’ population.

Of course things might change if there was a credible nationalist alternative to Sinn Fein, but there is not.

Republicans who hold onto their Marxist socialism etc, those who abide by the ‘physical force’ tradition, or those who hold onto both, are too small in number to have an electoral impact at this time.  Even so it seems likely that there will only be a marginal, though inconsequential, shrinkage of support for Sinn Fein, if not on a matter of morals then perhaps on the other issues within the Republican family which rumble along.

The SDLP is going through a prolonged leadership contest. If the contest is not inspiring, it is because the choice holds little promise. One has built a reputation on being hard on Loyalist paramilitaries (albeit without due care to Ministerial responsibilities) and making ignorant remarks about the Loyal Orders.  The other has proved adept at building on political opportunity in retaining his seat and building a strong and respected SDLP presence in South Belfast. Neither has excelled outside their respective constituencies.

Whether a harder nationalist line or greater organizational capacity, rural nationalism or metropolitan social democracy, is chosen by the SDLP, the May (or even March) election will give little time for a new leader to make much of a mark on the political landscape.  Bar opening statements of intent, the leadership contest seems entirely internal and lacking much rigour.

The SDLP will most probably hold its own in the coming election; not least because while it has little to offer by way of alternative to Sinn Fein, Sinn Fein is not in a place where it is able to build on past success and bury the SDLP. For now, the nationalist electorate is offered stale crusty policy from both parties which will result in a stalemate within that electorate.

There is a range of factors that make the election of much greater importance to Unionism.  The Westminster expenses story has exercised the Unionist community to a far greater extent that it has within nationalism. Movies, the “Swish Family Robinson” headline, and a perception that Unionist politicians are more likely to employ family members combined to offend a Unionist sensibility that  politicians are elected to serve their constituents’ interests and not their own self-interest.

To some extent the expenses issue gave the TUV’s Jim Allister his barn storming result at the European election in June 2009 – though DUP arrogance and UUP delusion probably played far a greater part.  Whether or not the residue of this debate continues to undermine current MPs is something to consider, but would be only one factor of many in determining constituency outcomes. Some of the heat of the expenses row will be removed by sitting MPs, such as Iris Robinson, not standing again.

The debate within Unionism of ‘unity’ candidates usefully detracts from the lack of any discernable policy that makes the Conservative/UUP electoral arrangements any great force for change in the forthcoming election.  It is hard to believe that any serious unionist politician would believe that not taking an opportunity to defeat a Sinn Fein candidate (as might present itself in Fermanagh South Tyrone) will play well with the wider unionist electorate.  Realistically it is only in Fermanagh South Tyrone that any agreement has the possibility of returning a Unionist candidate.  However, the Conservative commitment to stand in every constituency in the UK means it has no time for local sensibilities and no strategy or apparent interest in inflicting a loss on Sinn Fein.

In South Belfast there is little UUP constituency infrastructure to conduct a substantial canvas – and the Assembly poll showed little chance of an Ulster Unionist win.  Furthermore the sitting SDLP MP already represents a broadly ‘conservative’ sort of approach, and the Alliance candidate a more PC choice, that undermines any gain the Conservative Party would hope to achieve from the Catholic electorate in the constituency – not that the Conservative/UUP hierarchies would be so calculatingly sectarian in their final selection.

By far the largest impact on the election will the issue of multi-mandates, or double-jobbing as it is more commonly described. Of course the legislation to enforce sole mandates must complete its course through Parliament, but already the principle has had consequences.  Jeffrey Donaldson seems to have chosen Westminster over a Ministerial position in Stormont. Mark Durkan has chosen Westminster and initiated an SDLP Leadership election. Michael McGimpsey has cited commitment to Stormont for not putting his name forward in South Belfast.

More generally, the multi-mandate is more of a challenge for the DUP than the other Parties because it has a more MPs than any other Party.  It will mean new faces entering the political frame.  The DUP has been building profile for a number of their MLAs and Councillors, though perhaps circumstances will now accelerate advancement for a few.  ‘Knowing’ your politician is important. Name recognition makes a big difference at election time.  The DUP has also been hugely effective at building a constituency network. That should stand it in good stead. Its November conference was uplifting and rallied the troops, despite what might be viewed as setbacks in the previous year. The DUP enters the election in an entirely positive frame of mind.

A haphazard constituency presence and aging membership means the Ulster Unionist Party is less than able for this election.  This may be compensated by the Conservative Party’s money and campaigning expertise: though the Conservative Party seems to be overly relying on the newness of its entry into the electoral field to garner excitement around average and fairly unknown personalities. If it were a straight DUP v UUP/Conservative contest then the DUP would race home lengths ahead.

The TUV showing at the European election, with Jim Allister thrusting into the political arena with as good as a third of the unionist vote, fundamentally altered any consideration of future unionist electoral outcomes. Of all the political leaders within Unionism, Jim Allister has the biggest headache.  The has to perform in such a way as to be seen to make an advance on the European success, or make a case for why the performance is comparable.

Maximising the TUV vote would suggest the need to stand in all 18 constituencies. However, 66,000 votes spread across 18 constituencies will not win Westminster seats.  The TUV autumn conference was notable that many of the attendees were stalwart workers who once knocked doors, placed posters, and manned phones for the UUP and DUP in past elections. These are the members with drive and devotion who delivered at the European election, but are best focused rather than spread thinly.

Of course the Ulster Unionist Party and Conservatives are banking on the TUV standing to damage the DUP vote in their favour. But this is not Dromore or the European elections. There will be no transfers available for Westminster.

The TUV has already said it will not stand in Fermanagh South Tyrone or South Belfast, leaving the other parties to look less than able to put unionist interests first and foremost – even suggesting an agreed ‘non-Party’ candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone. The TUV will not stand in North Belfast. Where there is no chance of a Unionist winning the TUV may stand a candidate to hoover additional votes.  The toughest challenges are of course where a Unionist candidate will win, of one Party or another.

Jim Allister himself has declared his candidacy for North Antrim. East Antrim where he once had a strong base, Lagan Valley and Strangford are obvious targets.  Elsewhere he has the luxury of being able to wait to decide on whether it is worth standing a candidate at all. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

In many seats there will not enough difference between the DUP and UUP canidates to matter which Party is elected, but where a TUV candidate will alter the electoral mathematics a judgment must be made as to whether  the TUV could make a positive difference.

The TUV might also be seen as merely spiteful in engaging in constituencies only to place pressure on the DUP’s sitting MP, especially when TUV support comes from across the unionist spectrum. And why give the UUP/Conservative arrangement a lucky pass? The UUP, and in particular the Conservative Party, will do the TUV no favours, and their joint inflexibility is the greatest reason why Fermanagh South Tyrone will most certainly be retained by Sinn Fein.  Why spread the TUV’s limited resources , only to give the UUP/Conservatives the benefit?

The TUV will most certainly be the election story in 2010, but it is too early to say how the Party will impact on the conduct of the campaign or the result. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

So there will be an election (or two) in 2010. A lot can happen before Election Day. Nothing else is certain.