While it is hard to imagine the idea of an Official Opposition in the Northern Ireland Assembly as an alternative Government in waiting, presently, the value of an alternative voice is essential to any functioning democracy. No doubt.

What currently counts as opposition, by smaller parties and even the most gifted of individuals, is too easily dismissed and ignored. For now, admiration for those who might be keeping the big boys on their toes seems unlikely to translate into a significant electoral gain anytime soon.

John McCallister’s recent resignation from the Ulster Unionist Party follows on from his defeat as a leadership candidate, largely campaigning that the UUP should go into immediate opposition. Mike Nesbitt won that battle. However, Nesbitt’s unwillingness to consider going into opposition without the necessary legislative framework to make that ‘Official’ is not necessarily the best of politics. By not arguing strongly that the option should at least exist, and putting forward the case for the legislation to even enable the possibility of an ‘official’ opposition emerging at some point, he binds himself to a failing Executive, closes an option, and loses a valuable bargaining stance. More importantly, he also fails democracy in Northern Ireland: not that he alone carries that fault.

The previous Secretary of State Owen Patterson, and the current SoS Theresa Villiers, both seem to believe opposition might be a nice idea, but there is no urgency to make provision for an ‘Official’ opposition.  Opposition is not a matter for consultation, it a matter of urgency and essential for democracy to flourish. Legislation is essential to enable even the possibility of stronger democratic discourse emerging to better serve the people of Northern Ireland.

It is not that there is no case for the possibility of an ‘Official’ opposition, just that there seems to be no champion for the idea. Perhaps the Secretary of State ought to chat to one of her Cabinet colleagues. In 2000 Michael Gove wrote a pamphlet for the Centre for Policy Studies entitled ‘The Price of Peace’.  Simply and incisively, Michael Gove stated:

“The health of any democracy depends, pre-eminently, not on a single method of election, nor any specific doctrine of the separation of powers but on the freedom to oppose.”

It is hard to see how this argument could be challenged. Gove goes on to say of the structure of NI Government:

“The automatic inclusion of all major parties in power means there is no, can be no, alternative Government to vote into power if things go wrong. It is the threat of eviction from office which acts as a goad to efficiency in government and a guard against corruption. Take it away and you create an immovable oligarchy unresponsive to public anger or sentiment.”

Quite.

Interest has been particularly excited when those active in politics, police or security services have made broad statements relating to the context of the period. Unsurprisingly.

The Tribunal is looking specifically at the murder of two RUC Officers, Chief Supt Harry Breen and Supt Bob Buchanan, on their return journey to Northern Ireland from a meeting with Garda in Dundalk in 1989; to establish whether or not their deaths were in some part the consequence of information supplied to the IRA by member or members of An Garda Síochána.

The term ‘collusion’ has been politically and emotionally charged by republicans to create a sense of casual collaboration between the State and paramilitaries in criminal acts. Often this is based on conspiracist speculation, projecting paranoia and a political mindset willing to see a securocrat and dark forces at work: where more often than not, happenstance and confusion is the more likely explanation.

There was no more systemic co-operation between the Garda and the IRA than there was with loyalist paramilitiaries and the RUC or the Crown Forces. Were there instances where such collaboration/co-operation/collusion happened, where individuals decided to support ‘the cause’? Probably. The acts of a small number of individuals should never be allowed to undermine the unwavering efforts, and bravery, of Garda and RUC in the face of terrorism.

The Smithwick Tribunal will provide an insight on whether or not the ‘collusion’ happened in this one particular instance. It may also throw up other incidents that allude to similar times when those meant to be upholding the law became witting or unwitting partners to violent criminals seeking to undermine the authority of State. The period of history was one of upheaval, and no doubt some indivuduals carried divided and confused loyalties.

No surprise then that the Smithwick Tribunal is taking place, or that it is throwing up information that is emotionally charged. In time the Smithwick Tribunal will report, and the purpose of this note is not to prejudge or predict what the Tribunal might ultimately say. What is striking of some of the evidence that is being presented is the projection of present circumstances to shape contextual consideration of past times.

1989 was a very different time. The onslaught of violence of the 1970s had ground itself into a long and vacuous conflict, lacking purpose or exit: an exasperated and exhausted British state facing off violent sectarian criminals wrapped in flags of convenience and self-determined national self-righteousness.

The emotional charge of ‘collusion’ is of course exacerbated where there is a sense that co-operation on investigation or intelligence is not being properly shared by one side or the other.  The suggestion raised during the Smithwick Tribunal that senior members of the Irish State might have emphasised with the IRA would hardly be a new one. It would also be expected that the denials would been equally emphatic.

Whether anything was actually said, or some believed what they wanted to hear may only be a matter of comment in respect of the specific Smithwick brief. The question as to whether Dublin’s attitude to border security around this period might have cost lives may or may not be answered in time.

Certainly, the belief persists that the Irish Republic was less than co-operative in the most recent IRA campaign. This has been occasionally articulated beyond rhetoric, and in this small booklet most ably by Edgar Graham. While specifically on extradition, once again recently a news point, it points to an institutional state that allowed terrorists to believe they might have tacit approval of their actions – while also noting the frustration of Garda members on this state of affairs.

It was for publications such as this, his forensic legal mind, and leadership potential among Unionists of all hues, that Edgar Graham was murdered by the IRA.

The challenge for the Ulster Unionist Party AGM is threefold:

1. That there must be a leadership capable of uniting the Party;
2. That there must be a leadership capable of regaining the confidence and trust of the Unionist community;
3. That there must be a leadership capable of providing professional and effective management of Party resources.

David Trimble’s leadership ended badly.  While each of the two successive leaders offered promise in addressing the fortunes of the UUP, each has failed in his own way. Under the continuity Trimble leadership of Reg Empey, the Ulster Unionist Party became even less of a broad church, and even more of a golf club committee that talked nostalgically of fish and chips, red telephone boxes and Mini Coopers.

While Tom Elliott probably better connected with the ordinary Party member and, possibly, the ordinary Unionist voter, the obvious disorder among the senior Party ranks undermined any electoral gain that may have, in time, been possible.

Added to which, the only consistent aspect of the Party over the past ten years has been an inept and amateurish approach to media and communication.  That said, ‘poor communication’ is all too often a management excuse for a failed strategy and a team ill-suited to the task. Worse, ‘poor communication’ is often because the strategy is wrong, and the team simply does not understand the business: the electorate is the market, the arbiter of what product is attractive or not.

Who from within the Assembly Party, or the wider Party, has a political antenna to tune into the people (voters) and build a realistic, positive and credible narrative to move the Party forward? Where is the product?  The UUP lost touch with the electorate and recent opinion has suggested the Party has lost relevance. It seems too to have lost its sense of purpose – it sometimes gives the impression it still believes itself to be the ’natural Party of Government’: it is not, and there never was such a thing except among a certain class for whom it suited an inherited sense of self-value.

Like ‘poor communication’ Party rules are often blamed where it is the fundamental of politics that has been forgotten. The nature of Party rules and internal organisation is unlikely to be something the electorate cares much about, but can absorb massive amounts of time and energy. Substantial changes to Party rules were initiated under David Trimble to reduce the impact of the UUC (remember) and centralise authority.

It is instructive that rule changes have largely, then and since, increased the authority of the centre, but have achieved little by way of  improving electoral prospects. The Party hierarchy seems to have been all too willing to externalise all blame for the Party’s electoral misfortune, despite de facto becoming more and more responsible for the decisions that have left the Party in such a perilous state.

This self-regarding attitude was certainly a factor in circumstances leading to the loss of David McClarty. The bumbling use of disciplinary procedures has most certainly exacerbated the situation with regards to David McNarry. In this regard, the UUP Officer team should take responsibility – though no doubt will be re-elected at the March AGM.

The Party needs a common view of where it stands at this point in time.

Strategies and plans must adapt to meet changed and changing circumstances.  The DUP has been adept in this regard, while, electorally, the UUP has been punished for clinging on to hope and optimism when the realities beg to differ.  The Party is now in the shadow of the DUP and at best stagnating in the polls, at worst on a loser’s run.

The UUP is viewed as being ill-disciplined, inconsistent and not having a clear view of where it is going.  The way ahead is too often presented in terms of past achievement, not future goals.  While it may well point to ‘success’ in Government roles, the nature of the Northern Ireland Government is such that success may be shared by everyone equally, and therefore achievement is unlikely to be credited to the Ulster Unionist Party alone – just look at the election literature at the past election.

The Ulster Unionist Party has a long overdue date with reality.

The Party has lost credibility, confidence and trust with the wider electorate. The Party base is ill at ease and unsteadied by the relentless negativity around the Party in the press, and disarrangement on the Hill.

A new leader, and leadership, must begin the task of real and credible change: reversing decline and determining what it takes to shape future reality.  The start point is to acknowledge mistakes of the past, and explain why the future will be different.

Reversing a trend is a big challenge, and particularly where inertia and decline underscore that trend. The UUP needs a leader who has a clear vision to address the three points above, and is able to embrace and demonstrate an understanding of the three characteristics below:

1. To lead from the front is laudable. But to lead so far ahead as to lose touch with your natural constituency is fatal.  In politics no vacuum is left unfilled for very long – the UUP knows this to its cost.  A Unionist leader who can’t win the hearts and minds of the greater number of Unionist voters is of little value.  A good communicator is essential, but so too is someone who is able to communicate in such a way as to engage the trust and confidence of the electorate. That requires being able to demonstrate a track record of credible delivery. People want substance, not sound-bite. Words may be  sound, but actions add volume.
2. Credibility is earned. It is earned from having a simple consistent message that you are able to deliver time after time without contradiction – inconvertible truth, a clear purpose and intent. It is not about fancy words or labels. It is about offering a path forward on which people have a sense that the UUP will be sure footed and capable to leading to a welcoming destination. This helps build trust.
3. Trust is easily lost and very hard to regain.  The responsibility for losing the trust of the people, whether consumer, shareholder, stakeholder or electorate, rests with the person the top.  To regain trust, there must be a clear step change away from the place where that trust was lost. Accepting that trust was breached, how and why, is a vital first step. Then, being someone trusted not to make the same mistake again becomes essential. For each of the contenders, who stands in the background and what does that support represent?  What is new, or will it be same old, same old?

What should the candidates, and the UUP membership, be uniting around at this critical point in the Party’s history? Strategy, and common purpose, should be built on the broad values on which the UUP might regard itself as having once had, but seems to have lost along the way. Ulster Unionists need to be able to coalesce around a unity of respect, decency and integrity towards others – towards each other in the first instance. There must be a generosity of spirit, despite a steel determination in pursuing its purpose.

In policy it should focus on a small number of themes and work on taking a lead on the issues: improving fundamental education, creating a society where work and enterprise is encouraged, the vulnerable are supported, and the public sector reduced.

It has not been UUP core values that the electorate has rejected, it is a UUP that seems unable to articulate its values, create coherent policy propositions, and show self-belief in their relevance today. The new UUP leader must build on core values upon which so much trust was once placed, but in a way relevant to 2012 and beyond.

Whatever the outcome of the UUP leadership election the only certainty is that the Party cannot afford continued division, drift and decline. The new leader will need to enter the race with a team that he can trust, and that will engender trust from within the Party, that it will deliver to and for the electorate.

The new Ulster Unionist Party leader has a date with reality, perhaps a last chance to reignite it’s relationship with the voter.  At stake is the risk that prolonged separation from the electorate may well end in divorce.

The Northern Ireland Executive announced a Programme for Government 2012-2015, eventually, towards the end of 2011. Plenty to do. In fact, it reads as a massive ‘to do’ list.

Headline measurement will no doubt be against the more practical elements. All Housing Executive homes will be doubled glazed over three years, or they won’t; either brucellosis will be eradicated by March 2014, or it won’t; either there will be no additional water charges, or or there won’t.

Elsewhere, the Executive has committed to spending money with broad outcomes. Once again money will be spent, or it will not.

Then there are the more open points added to the list about producing strategies and plans: developing; implementing; monitoring; evaluating.

There are lots of words used by way of framing the announcement of the Programme for Government – rebuild, rebalance, reform; lots of ‘promote’, ‘develop’, ‘improve’.

Much of the ‘to do’ list reflects the mundane nature of administering against a fixed income – the block grant – with a bit extra from the rates. What the Programme for Government tells us it that Stormont has not risen much above basic administration: the equivalent of an English County Council under ‘no overall control’; no Party able to take on the mantle of leadership alone. A deal here, a compromise there, lack of major decision making, and very often a significant (if unobtrusive) role for the public servants in the absence of clear coherent direction.

Frankly, why it took so long to produce this Programme for Government (PfG) is a bit of a curiosity. There is nothing that is startlingly innovative. Mostly off the Departmental shelf. Nothing in the PfG that could not be achieved, and most could be done to at least some extent if not in the entirety within the timeframe - unlike last term?

Of course there are one or two items, perhaps more, that would hardly cause a crisis if they were not to be completed on time or at all.  Is a plastic bag tax really necessary; what will be the impact on small retailers? £7.2 million on an Obesity Prevention Framework seems a bit of budget largesse, when the finance belt should be capable of being tightened down a notch.

The success of the construction of this PfG is that to pick on one aspect seems churlish, and to challenge it as a whole would be to demand the baby is thrown out with the bath water. The choreography of the announcement made it a big positive occasion of the hard-working united Executive, all in it together.

And yet? thedissenter finds it hard to be enthusiastic. For all the words, it is not clear how, overall, this is a PfG that will rebuild, rebalance or reform Northern Ireland to become an open competitive  economy that is driven by the innovation and enterprise of a wealth creating private sector: not that that was a stated purpose of the PfG. To do that the public sector would need to be smaller, more efficient, and more effective. Yes that will mean fewer jobs among those employed directly and those employed indirectly through the voluntary and community sector which with few exceptions isn’t.

Reducing the public sector is not even an agenda point within the Programme for Government: that would require far more than the sort of rearranging our public sector is so adept at managing.

Reforming the public sector in Northern Ireland to make it smaller, leaner and more effective is a huge topic. It starts with thinking that the unthinkable is possible, and that the debate would be better starting sooner rather than later.

So let’s start with health.

While PfG talks about transforming Health & Social Care, even though the budget essentially ringfences the Health part (accounting for a full 30% of the entire public spend).  This hardly provides an indication of the intention to transform. The Compton Report which was released following the announcement of the PfG was very worthy. It recommended a reduction in major hospitals to between 5 and 7. Probably 4 major hospitals are enough, supplemented by local “cottage” hospitals, services provided via GPs and truly preventative social care. To ensure hospital services are strategically managed, abolish the five Health Boards and place Hospital Services into one Authority, allowing hospitals to become independent as ‘Trust’ or even ‘private sector’, to include all major and ‘local/cottage” delivery. Integrate this with a distinct Community Health Services commissioning body within that Authority, to cover home care and GP services.

There is no reason why Health resources and Social Services (non-health/benefits) could be managed directly, Departmentally. Make the Health & Social Care Minister directly accountable for the two main services that matter to the public – effectively Chairman of the Boards – and charge the Assembly Committee with an enhanced oversight role.  This increases accountability, hugely reduces management infrastructure, and opens the possibility to build effective partnerships with private sector providers and make optimum use of social finance.

It can cost around £500 per week for an elderly person to stay in a nursing home when good quality home care would allow a proportion of them to stay at home for longer for £100 week. On average a week in hospital costs £2,000: if demand could be cut by 10% though better home care and support for chronic conditions by GPs and their practice nurses, the saving is huge. Better for the patient, and better use of scarce resources.  There are private investors who are interested in this sort of change.

The fact that £ millions may have been magically found for the Education budget over the next so many years distracts from the fact that we have too many schools and too many teachers because there are too many empty desks.  Perhaps the new ESA will start to look at this, though the educationalists who lurk around the idea of a single authority are obsessed with selection, which again distracts that there are too many young people arriving at second level education unable to read or write.

There needs to be a much more coherent approach to commissioning at all levels of education provision – and this must include a significant role for the private sector. Schools should be allowed to make a profit to be reinvested in the school -  as is permitted in Sweden.  This is not an ideological point. If there is a belief in the need to move away from over-reliance on public sector jobs we need the private sector engaged and informing curricula at all levels – primary through to post-grad.  That might be particularly relevant to vocational courses at Further Education Colleges, which again need only have a single oversight board: do we really need the separate institutions, with their own administrative infrastructures?

Eleven or fifteen Councils’ is not even a question.  Increased powers to Council would logically mean decreased powers and purpose for Ministries at Stormont. So there are two realistic options: 1) let Stormont do it all; 2) elect no more than five Councils to provide a consultative and representative role in planning, tourism and delivery of local services commissioned by the centre, and to provide members for the now regional bodies for health, education, and central services.

It would be easy enough to create five Councils from existing council boundaries or by using the parliamentary constituencies as building blocks (3 contituencies per Council). Apart from the obvious economies of scale this much smaller number of Councils rebalances the ‘Belfast and then everyone else’ nature of a larger number of Councils. All support services could be pooled, such as finance, ICT, human resources. A single waste management authority could be tasked with assuring competitive services in waste management, while taking a wider view of collection through to disposal – where services are contracted by Councils entirely to the private sector.

The Northern Ireland Housing Executive has had its day. Retain commissioning responsibility by the Minister, with the close involvement of the Councils. Open the management of the existing NIHE housing stock to the big Housing Associations from the mainland: for one to take the entire stock would be to create a cosy monopoly, so the stock should be split into three, and not necessarily within specific geographical areas.  This opens the possibility of better management of public finance, and introducing private developers as part of a consortium approach to new development.

We are well and truly quangoed. Look at the list. Ask, seriously, what does such or such a body do for the money it spends? All ‘rights’ Commissions could be put into one. With a minimum wage, why do we have an Agricultural Wages Board? Why is there a River Agencies Board in DARD and not with Environment?  Why do we need a Strategic Waste Board?  Why do we need a Strategic Waste Board and a Waste Management Board within the one department, neither of which have the capacity to provide the services of the Waste Programme Steering Group?  Why have a separate ESA and Library authority? We only need one Health/Social Care commissioning body. Let the hospitals become Foundation Trusts or similar, with private sector partners if they wish, and let them run some community services if that is a natural extension of their role and successfully compete for those commissions from the Community Health budget. Make the GPs take more responsibility and move them away from the prescription and “sign-off” culture.

To move forward on economic development there needs to be a close audit of Invest NI and the NITB.  A smaller ‘commissioning’ body could take responsibility for developing the overall strategy and then contracting with others to provide development services in sectors. NITB should be a subset of a new INI – tourism development is a driver for economic growth not just a nice way to run expensive marketing campaigns.  Step forward the Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Small Businesses, NI Retail Trade Association for growth strategy partnerships. Fewer local Councils could play a much more effective role in delivering services at a local level, particularly on local business engagement and support. Perhaps the big consultancies such as PWC, Deloitte, or more specialist investment consultancies could be commissioned to support and grow specific talent pools or business clusters. Less public sector bureaucracy and more private sector engagement, and so say all of us.

Finally, for now, and presuming that the rebuilding, rebalancing and reforming energy translates in to a reshaped and reimagined Stomont, reduce the Departments at Stormont down to six at most. There will still be a need for bodies like a Health Commissioning Agency, ESA, INI but these allocated to specific departments for accountability and review by Assembly Committees. The six could be:

• OFMDFM, but fewer people and including Regional Development as this includes strategic thinking on planning and infrastructure.
• Health, Social Care and Public Safety
• Education & Skills: including DCAL
• Finance & Economy
• Justice & Community Engagement
• Environment & Rural Affairs

Yes, of course, the points above are broad and there are gaps and presumptions that someone will contest as being ‘too simplistic’ or ‘not serious’: fine, so what other ideas are out there? So far all we have heard are statements of intent in respect of reform and restructuring of an administration for Northern Ireland towards something that is fit for purpose.  We are told we must rebuild, rebalance and seek fundamental reform for a better future. Where is the PfG vision that will get us there? Reshaping and re-imagining is a fundamental to rebuilding, rebalancing and reforming.

If this article is talked about at all, if it engenders any debate at all, it has at least made a start where others have covered their heads under the public sector comfort blanket that is the present Northern Ireland administration.

The News Letter is attempting to stimulate debate around what legislation might be usefully presented at Stormont, with a series of articles entitled ‘Laws We Need’.

By way of background, there has been some debate recently about the fact that months after the Assembly election there is still no agreed programme for government at Stormont; which would set out what the Executive would be focussing on over the next four years. Nor is there any sign of a definitive and substantial plan for Cohesion, Integration & Sharing; which would in itself go some way to shaping future Government programmes.

By contrast, the Scottish Executive has set out proposals for 16 pieces of legislation – everything from creating a single Scottish police force to a law tackling sectarianism, introducing minimum pricing for alcohol and an attempt to breathe new life into farming. A programme 2011-2012: just ONE YEAR!

Stormont is a ‘legislative assembly’. With devolution it was envisaged that the Executive would be able to address local issues through legislation. Yet week after week the assembly spends the bulk of its time either debating non-binding private members’ motions (bit like the local Councils) or the often scripted ministers’ question time slots (Jim Allister notwithstanding).

The News Letter series is intended to provide a platform space for individuals to set out one or two, proposals on which Stormont should legislate. In the first couple of weeks or so, although the series is barely into its swing, some contributors seem to be at a loss on the nature and role of legislation: though for clarity they probably shouldn’t ask an MLA.

thedissenter’s contribution is not an original idea, but in that respect is entirely possible.

This following appeared in the Belfast News Letter on Monday 17 October 2011, with minor amends.

One Rights body for all.

In the current economic environment there is intense pressure on Government at all levels to assure public finances are used efficiently and effectively, and to avoid duplication or gold-plating.

At Westminster, the 2007 merger of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) and the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) into the new, single, Equality and Human Rights Commission was given muscle by the Equality Act 2010 which brought together over 116 separate pieces of legislation into one single Act, merging nine main pieces of legislation (1970-2007).  The Act underscored the Commission’s statutory remit to promote, protect, enforce and promote equality across the nine “protected” grounds – age, disability, gender, race, religion and belief, pregnancy and maternity, marriage and civil partnership, sexual orientation and gender reassignment; and to promote and monitor human rights (the Human Rights Act).

In Northern Ireland we have only recently had yet another ‘Commission’  added to a line up that includes an Equality Commission, Commission for Victims & Survivors, Commission for Children and Young People, and Human Rights Commission. The most recent addition is a Commissioner for Older People for Northern Ireland.

These Commissions seem only to serve the lobby group interests, dressed up to suggest that there is a representative voice for your particular interest/rights. The Human Rights Commission review of a Bill of Rights showed how ‘group’ rights are so embedded in the culture of the political classes in Northern Ireland.

While it is too early for the Older People Commissioner to make a massive impression on public discourse, the record of the rest would suggest we shouldn’t be holding our breath. If you believe this viewpoint to be unfair, then please use the letters page of the News Letter to bring to our attention the outstanding successes of any of the above.

It would of course have been a waste of legislative time on the Commissioner for Older People had there been other more pressing matters to fill our MLA’s Assembly schedule. That this is one of few items the Assembly  has to show for its existence leaves nothing much to add by way of comment. Other than providing comfortable Commissioner jobs for ever-so worthy individuals, with nice offices, it is hard to see the justification for so many offices and commissioners when a single body would do, and a template is already there. Equal citizens, equal rights.

More government is an easy solution where there is only a vague question. More Government is rarely, if ever, conducive to good Government. Forget the Bill of Rights. Better use of legislative time would be to bring forward legislation creating one definitive and focused Equality and Human Rights Commission for Northern Ireland, abolishing the rest.

It was hard enough to achieve Conservative Party organisation in Northern Ireland in the first instance, back in the 1980s. Central office was hostile, and much of the Party leadership at best reluctant to become involved in the region. On the ground it might have seemed mad to set up Conservative branches in Northern Ireland at the end of 10 years of Thatcher Government and in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. There was also an Ulster Unionist Party which was dominant within the unionist electorate and, despite the recent history, remained on friendly terms with Conservatives generally at senior levels and in Parliament.

Despite the turmoil, naysayers, hostility and challenges, the determination of those early pioneers of the Conservative Party in Northern Ireland gained Council seats and had a reasonable stab at the North Down Westminster seat.

Fast forward thirty years and we find a Central Office bending over backwards to be helpful, a Party leader (now Prime Minister) who visits, espouses unionism, and encourages the local Party to be local and relevant to Northern Ireland.

Some local Conservatives, however, think the Conservative brand is bad and that is why they ended with nothing, zip, nadda after three consecutive elections – don’t think they see Jim Nicholson as ‘one of us’ – though some might point to other reasons for the Northern Ireland Conservatives to gain electoral traction.

thedissenter has not  been convinced of any principled or particularly practical or positive thinking  around the revamping, relaunching and repackaging of the Northern Ireland  Conservatives under David Cameron: electoral positioning always seemed to dominate his relationship to Northern Ireland; though not the only area that seems calculated and poorly considered.  But support from the central Party, including finance, is real and appears genuine.

Since the Northern Ireland Assembly elections there has been a bubbling undercurrent seeking to change the name of  the Northern Ireland Conservatives to something else. This was flagged up by Alex Kane in the News Letter. This resulted in a response from the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Conservatives Irwin Armstrong to which Alex responded in his weekly column.

Unfortunately for Irwin Armstong and the Northern Ireland Conservatives, those bubbles keep on rising to the top.

No doubt well-meaning, the thinking of those seeking change in the Conservative name are naively missing the point. There is a deep lack of political capacity within the Northern Ireland Conservatives, mostly being freshmen to politics, and inevitably there are those who would seem to be imposing an agenda on a relatively weak body politic. This is reflected in the arguments being made to underscore the case for changing the Conservative Party name in Northern Ireland.

Discussion around the  positioning for a newly titled Party is presented as being one where “centrist, moderate, pro-UK politics, can be delivered, in a way that engages people of all classes, genders, religious persuasions and ethnicities.” Fine. At the same time it is also suggested that there is great reservoir of support for a moderate centrist grouping among those disillusioned with the direction of the so-called ‘centre-ground’ as it presently exists. This does beg the question that if a centrist moderate proposition is not in the so-called centre ground, where is it?

The centrist moderate proposition seems to be revolve around everything that is ‘non-sectarian’; excluding the Alliance Party which is apparently a usurper in the centre, being in fact a product of sectarianism: thedissenter understands how the Alliance could be described as itself a product of sectarianism, but that does not make it sectarian. Defining something by what you are ‘non-of’ does not define what you are, it merely narrows the parameters to a greater or lesser extent.

Where is the centre of politics in Northern Ireland?  thedissenter is asking because this impacts on what might be the name of any new centrist-rightish Party that is not in the so-called centre ground. This question seems to be a preoccupation of those who are seeking to re-style the Northern Ireland Conservatives. Can it be described with terms such as ‘Right’  which suggests ideology?  Can it be described as ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’, which have their difficulties for positioning your politics not least among the unionist electorate. Being truly liberal is certainly not being in the centre, and is positively radical rather than perceptively moderate in respect of policy development.

Then there is image and moving forward. If there is to be a break and repositioning away from the ‘Conservative Party’ brand then there needs to be a distinct local identity. Those taking the lead would need  to be local. That would also mean creating some distance with the central Conservative Party. Being a local cheerleader for David Cameron is a non-starter. Any plan to bring in big Conservative names as speakers would seem counter-intuitive.

Tie your funding, timetable and proposition to the Conservative Central Office and leading names of the Conservative Party and people will see that as being Conservative: if it looks Conservative, talks Conservative and walks alongside the Conservatives, then it is a Conservative Party. If you act and work as Conservative in all but name, why not be Conservative in name?

So let us presume the new Party proposition and new name is sorted. Where would the new ‘not-the-Conservative-Party’ voters be found? Yes there are many people who do not vote in elections. The argument goes that once a proposition that will be attractive to the ‘disillusioned’ is found, hey presto you can create a new space in Northern Ireland politics. Perhaps. Only if you understand who isn’t voting, and the sort of proposition that might capture their attention.  There has been a great deal of discussion about the BMW & BBQ group, with little convincing evidence that this is where elusive voters are to be found.

In the run-up to the 2011 Assembly elections the Belfast Telegraph launched ‘True Colours’ which was a chance for readers to see which Party they might support: a questionnaire based on manifesto points. Not only did the result provide the Party for which you are most likely to vote, it also provided percentages on how close you were to other parties. Manifesto positions were not generally presented in forthright, black and white, like it or reject it terms – plenty of wriggle room. So change an answer here or there, and you could easily change your ‘Party preference’ outcome.

What was most striking about the True Colours exercise was how little it took to change Party, and how much of each Party (in percentage terms) with which you agreed (according to the exercise).  In summary, there wasn’t much between the Northern Ireland Parties’ manifestos on the left/right index: take away the ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’ labels and they are all much of a muchness: middle-class, middle of the road; and effectively aimed at the BMW & BBQ set.

If you are looking for a disillusioned and non-voting public in Northern Ireland, by far the largest fertile territory would be the large sprawling estates in areas across Northern Ireland, but particularly in the larger towns and cities. Anecdotally, as few as twenty-percent of the electorate might turn out to vote from these areas. The UUP, which once held sway here, lost that vote a long time ago to the DUP, mostly. The DUP has more recently lost the trust and confidence among the estates as it moved into the UUP’s urban middle-class vote. Neither the DUP or UUP appear to have any strategy to win votes back.

A presumption that this electorate is alien to a Conservative message is wrong. Certainly it would be a challenge to win over.

Northern Ireland needs the sort of radical restructuring in economic and political outlook of the Thatcher years, updated, of course. More of the same will not deliver. What is absent from the discussion among Conservatives in Northern Ireland is what would make them stand out in respect of policy and principle that relates and connects with a broad base of unionist opinion.  In respect of available vote,  however, that will need to be wider and deeper than the existing parties to succeed.

Thatcher years saw Conservative policy standing up to entrenched interests which resisted change: policy that empowered the individual over the State, breaking monopolies of economic and political patronage. It championed the small businessman. It championed meritocracy and freedom: individual rights against the overbearing State.

No doubt the Conservatives would see the vast ‘loyalist’ (or ‘nationalist’) estates beyond their reach. That is not necessarily so. Thatcher built a policy agenda that addressed the economy and reform which appealed to that very constituency;  building an electoral base that carried the Conservative Party to successive election victories for well over a decade.

Putting principle at the core of policy development, Margaret Thatcher communicated a populist policy agenda that re-engaged the aspirant classes to the Conservative Party – much to the horror of the paternalist One Nation grandees, and to the Left.

There seems to be a similar debate in Scotland , though in truth the Scottish Conservative Party has elected representatives at all levels on which to build.

While there was little difference in votes at the 2010 Westminster election between the SNP, Liberals and Conservatives behind Labour, the Tory vote is spread too thinly to gain seats. The Conservatives rose to third largest Party at the Holyrood election, even through the electoral gap between the Parties was more marked. Then there are the obvious reasons not to change the Conservative Party name in Scotland which have been articulated elsewhere.

While history has been unkind, that latent base in Scotland may make it difficult to claim ‘we were Tory, but we are not any more, so forget about all that, we are all new and improved’.

Although very different in demography and politics, for the Conservative Party the discussion over names in Scotland and Northern Ireland has coincided. The same issues ought to be at the core of consideration.

• If a constituent part of the Conservative family in the UK includes formal association with Conservative Central Office and Party structures, then what benefit would realistically accrue with distance from the name ‘Conservative’?
• Where do you find an electorate that is not already bombarded with political offers that are at least as attractive on the broad centre ground, but for whom a new ’distinctive’ message may be attractive?
• How distinctively right-wing (philosophically, politically, economically) will you be to create a substantive real difference between you and other Parties? There is presently only technocratic differences; no matter what the roots, constitutions, or rhetoric of those Parties might present to the contrary.How do you find a local non-nationalist message that creates a distinctively regional voice that is not incompatible with your national unionist position.
• The largest disengaged, disillusioned voting group is among the aspirant working people in urban estates across the country. How do you re-engage the aspirant working people that you have abandoned or ignored?
• What if the largest disengaged, disillusioned voting group wants to have confidence in a Party that offers a more strident populist unionism that would potentially upset that huge vote you don’t have and have little hope of achieving because the element of the electorate to which you are most sensitive (to the exclusion of those who might conceivably vote for you) is overwhelmingly a) nationalist b) traditionally left of centre and c) hates Tories of any colour (or name).

There is absolutely nothing wrong with a debate among Conservatives about the need to re-imagine the Party or restore its appeal to the electorate.  First things first. What electorate is it that you are challenging to reconsider voting  for a conservative Party, and what is the proposition that will convince them to give Conservatism a chance?

The electorate is not stupid and will look for substance over presentation, a unity of purpose in moving forward and a principle and policy that is coherent, credible and meaningful to them by values (usually historical/familial), present circumstances and future aspiration for themselves and their family. The first thing they will not think about is the name of the Party they are voting for, it will be an affinity and confidence in the values, policy and vision of a real alternative in which they can believe.

If we move away from politics and into the business of branding, of which name and visual image is a small part, we remember the successful Accenture or British Gas, while forgetting the failures such as Consignia or the visual disaster of British Airways World designs. We also neglect the most successful longevity of identity of companies such as Shell, or the ever changing IBM which still manages to remain true to its core purpose of making useful technology for businesses.  Evolution, not revolution. At the heart of any successful company is a certainty in its purpose and the determination, ideas and aptitude to deliver in such a way that exudes confidence to customers that the product or service is right for them.

The Conservative Party in Scotland and Northern Ireland needs to forget about changing name until they work out what they exist to do, and have a clear vision for Scotland or Northern Ireland and a clear idea (policy framework) of how to get there. Otherwise the Party may well invest in a big rebranding only to find that the electorate looks past that branding to see little to make Conservatism, by any name, any more attractive than it ever was.

The six killer apps are:

1.   Competition

2.   The Scientific Revolution

3.   Property Rights

4.   Modern Medicine

5.  The Consumer Society

6.  The Work Ethic.

Plenty to think about.

The idea of the Big Society has certainly grabbed attention and excited a great deal of comment and debate; not always flattering though not exclusively negative.

It is hard to imagine where the idea of the Big Society might lead when the root of the idea is so unclear. Tim Montgomerie at ConservativeHome, while making every effort to be supportive, manages to only draw attention to the fluffy nature of the thinking around what is presented as David Cameron’s big idea.

There is the sense of things not being quite right when a speech on the subject is heralded in the press as the fourth ‘re-launch’.  Once a product fails in the market, the product needs reinvention, not just the message.

Just as Cameron’s project in advance of the 2010 election was evidenced more by photo opportunity than any coherent or constructed big idea within which his Conservatism could be identified, so too the Big Society struggles to find a convincing narrative based on substance.

In an effort to detox the perception of the Conservative brand as ‘nasty’ and ‘right-wing’, Cameron sought to project a Conservatism that was compassionate, modern, progressive (was it one, or all or an amalgam of parts) and he has used words to convey the idea of the Big Society similarly: voluntary, local, empowering, community.

To re-make, or realign, the Conservative Party, Cameron created a narrative for his type of conservatism without actually defining it. This allowed others to project on the Conservative Party a set of values that might suit a majority of the electorate.  It was a New Labour style remake, but without the combination of easy charm and quiet ruthlessness contained within the Labour troika of Blair, Mandelson and Brown.

The result of the 2010 Parliamentary elections showed that the Cameron project failed to convince enough that there was a serious and coherent alternative to a Labour Government that was hugely disliked; even in the context of a harsh economic recession. Perhaps this could be put down to the fact that hugging a hoodie or harnessing a huskie were images that by the time of 2010 seemed irrelevant in the midst of fiscal meltdown and burgeoning deficit.  The addition of the idea of the Big Society into the final stages of the Cameron project had little impact on the broader political discourse.

That Cameron failed to win the 2010 election has left a nagging doubt, both within the Conservative Party and the wider country. The uncertainty around the narrative of the Conservative agenda going into the election has extended into coalition Government and a lurking question on what it stands for generally, domestically: though most evidently in defence / foreign affairs. The Conservative’s policy uncertainty is the tender underbelly of the coalition, and this lies at David Cameron’s door.

From wherever the idea of the Big Society emerged, there has been little chance for the Conservatives, and especially David Cameron, to embed it into or across Government. The same lack of definition and clarity, and agreed or known agenda, at the outset in respect of the Big Society seems to be bugging every other aspect of Government policy. So ill-defined is the Big Society, however, it has the potential to become the metaphor for David Cameron’s term as Prime Minister – well-meaning, but largely without substance.

Big Society harks back to a more civil or civic Britain. There is nothing wrong with that.  The problem seems to be that the idea has come before the thinking as to how the elements and structural components of a more civic-minded society might be resurrected where necessary and strengthened where present.

The Big Society lacks the substantial intellectual or practical base on which to build a bigger idea.  From what has been said about the Big Society, so far, there are two questions that need answered before the idea can gather some momentum.

The first and most important question is to ask what the State should be funding, directly or indirectly, in the first instance and what would be better left to others: that may be described as the private sector, but more locally this might be community or local service delivery if desired.

Here we have the first key debate that has simply been avoided by those promoting the Big Society. Society cannot be responsible without being free to deliver local services, with perhaps the minimal indulgence from the public sector where appropriate. Guido best outlines the political challenge of the Big Society: that it is possible only with a smaller State. He sums the case up neatly:

“A charity that relies in the main part on taxes is no more a charity than a prostitute is your girlfriend.”

Others see it not as a zero sum game, but lost in it’s own ambiguity:

“We are told that the choice is between Cameron’s Big Society or the Big State. Right now the big problem is that we are getting both, when we surely would be better off with neither.”

Second, if there is a desire to reduce the role of the public sector, is there any reason to believe that the voluntary/charitable sector, can be more efficient or accountable at a local level.  Are big charities more accountable than local government? The only obvious potential benefit from large charitable enterprises taking over from local or central government is the potential for a change in ways of working that also brings greater efficiency and productivity while also delivering an improved service.

How is service delivery to be measured?  If it is targeted performance on cost or unit addressed, how different is this in respect of Labour target setting?  How do you, in the social field, measure service?  There would be a case to be made for broad outcomes being set and alternative presentations being made as to how those outcomes might be met. But who in Government would be prepared to take the risk?  The process of change would be slow and, like windpower, would probably require some level of fall-back cover. Would there need to be an OfSoc?

Proof perhaps that the potential of the Big Society may be slow in coming. Small acorns? What will be needed is a huge amount of willingness and willing support from local government in particular. The biggest issue at the local level is that while many will have good ideas, or willingness to provide a service to the community and willing to put the effort into fund-raising and leading volunteers, some will fail. This is inevitable. There is no use demanding paperwork, that makes the effort a burden, or quoting regulations and presenting costs that in effect create barriers.  For the Big Society to work it has to have the support of Ken Norman – a happy ending in due course, but why the battle in the first place?

The most worrying encounter with Government was recently attending a conference organised by DEFRA where the principal of a conservation body speaking to the participants, in the presence of the relevant Minister, talked about the DEFRA ‘family’. Who’s the daddy? The Nanny State replaced by that paternalist One Nation Big Daddy?

There is the rub for the Conservative ‘Big Society’. Presented by David Cameron it has the smack of the big house, paternal shire Tory. The notion of Big Society is that the locals can organise a fete in the garden once a year and every now and then there is a party hosted inside. Of course worthy causes have extended from the church restoration fund and Poppy collection.

Translating paternalistic tendencies into a realisable policy for rebalancing society would be a tall order at any time. But launching an idea such as Big Society without any definition has shunted to one side the real debate that is needed – shrinking government or encouraging alternative delivery of services through open competition for ideas and alternative providers.

With only the outline of an idea, and even then mostly words and inflection towards purpose, an encouragement to embrace Big Society has allowed the appropriation of the terminology by many in Government and the ‘social sector’ in a way which specifically undermines the notion of local and voluntary engagement.

In Northern Ireland, the community and voluntary sector is the second larger employer, with the public sector as No1. Actually, there is little difference. The community and voluntary sector has become, in effect, an extension of the public sector: with contracts being awarded for many community/social services. But there is little voluntarism. The only cost saving is the absence of pension liability and lower wages on short-term contract.  That is not in itself a bad thing if cost-cutting is the only objective, but having to adopt all the policy and procedures of the public sector there is little or no innovation and therefore little room for improvement in service delivery process. On the contrary it squeezes the small, nimble and innovative providing fresh and better focused (often narrow and specialist) service.

Northern Ireland is no example of Big Society, just big cumbersome Government. Better that Cameron does a pause on Big Society, do an audit of what is practicably and more immediately available within Government to be hived off, and launch with a bit more focus on how the idea might just work in the real world. People would welcome a Big Society, so long as it does not replace Nanny with Daddy.

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The Northern Ireland electorate heads towards the 5 May with little enthusiasm for the choice being presented, little interest in the institutions, and little understanding of what the Assembly has achieved over its past four years.

No doubt there will be general media attention in the run-up to the election on issues around the budget, perhaps, education, almost certainly, and health.  Why bother? With all the main Parties at the Executive table, and assured a place if not the same seats following the election, the electorate has little alternative but to vote for the same old same old, or not at all.

Constitutional matters are never far away from the discussions and serve all parties well in avoiding having to answer the question of what has actually been achieved for the past four years. Some would say that a full four years was an achievement (ignoring the Sinn Fein six months sulk over the delay in transferring Policing & Justice). With nine years prior practice, it was about time a full term was possible – the Assembly has been in existence since 1998.

It seems that everything remotely positive is claimed by all, whether Unionist, Nationalist or Republican, DUP, UUP, SDLP and Sinn Fein, and even Alliance. Who wouldn’t or couldn’t claim to be responsible for free bus passes and prescriptions, or low household rates and taxes? Just don’t mention or question the cost.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty arises for the UUP and SDLP who will of course wish to claim the specific successes of their Ministers. This inherently also praises the Executive and the institutions, and the two large parties with whom they are in the Executive alongside. This also lauds the huckster’s shop, built with ugly scaffolding. Following Hillsborough 2010 (Section 3) it was the UUP and SDLP leaderships who were charged with bringing forward recommendations on improving the working of the Executive? Not much progress there.

For the DUP and Sinn Fein there is a fine balance to be walked between condemning coalition partners, with whom the success of the past four years must be shared, while claiming that it is they who have held the entire edifice together. Balanced indeed; while seeking the adsorption or marginalisation of their two respective principal rivals.  At the same time the two largest parties must also ensure that they keep the UUP and SDLP on the inside and not drive either or both into opposition outside the Executive, even if an ‘unofficial’ opposition.

In the short term the DUP and Sinn Fein would find an ‘opposition’ easy enough to handle. However, over the next four years the collective ‘blame’ for all the hard decisions (and at this point those decisions are barely being admitted) would be shared alone by the DUP and Sinn Fein together. This will involve implementing fiscal tightening and, as would seem likely, increasing the burden of tax (called rates/charges/levies) on individual householders and businesses.

The most recent outcry over the decision by Michael McGimpsey as Health Minister to postpone the new radiotherapy unit at Altnagelvin is a good example of political rhetoric trumping rational discussion of the issues, and the absurdity of political posturing when all parties are in Government. Was McGimpsey’s decision political? Was the decision by Barbre de Brun to place a new maternity unit at the Royal Victoria in West Belfast, rather than at the City Hospital in South Belfast political? Was Martin McGuinness’s decision to abolish the 11+ within his final days of being Education Minister political? Is the decision to fund the A5 rather than other bottleneck and poor links inside Northern Ireland political?  All of these decisions could be believed, or presented, as playing to ‘core’ constituencies. The fallout from the decision was certainly political. Of course it was, its politics; a politics without purpose or progression. A politics of the past. The politics of blame.

Martin McGuinness’s statement provided a clear demonstration of the dysfunctional nature of the Stormont structures and the consequential ease of placing decisions into a sectarian context: shoring up that ugly scaffolding. Ministers are able in the first instance to make decisions outside the collective of the Executive. There followed a response from Ministerial colleagues that was also outside the collective. A Government that is also it’s own opposition is, at best, confused. This doomed the Major government, ultimately, when the country was presented with an credible alternative. Ministers of the Stormont Executive lack the democratic credentials of being accountable or responsible to anyone, even within their own collective. Where is the credible political alternative in Northern Ireland?

Northern Ireland needs a political opposition. True, it would be fair to say that neither the UUP nor SDLP would be likely to offer much by way of policy alternative to the DUP or SF in the near term – though in the bigger national picture, Ed Milliband does not seem to be doing too badly at present.

The absence of any coherent alternative proposition does not help an opposition in the run-up to an election. David Cameron might not have had to enter coalition politics had he been able to convince the electorate on what he actually believed: many are still unsure, which may be why Ed Milliband does not have to try too hard just now. Lesson learned?

Once the election is over in May it will be at least three years before the next scheduled election (Europe 2014). A lot can happen in politics over the course of three years. There is plenty of time for any Party at Stormont to become a challenging opposition and to provide an entirely valid and valuable ground-breaking democratic function. An opposition holds the potential of bringing accountability to the Executive and to the process of Government.

It is entirely wrong to suggest that there needs to be money to create an opposition at Stormont. It does not. It takes courage, imagination and determination to fulfil an essential function of democratic government.  Hopefully, in time, an opposition party (or parties) could show the electorate that there is an alternative leadership that is worth voting into the Executive to take the top posts, on merit of ideas and policy commitment.

Of course Parties need to get over the idea of a natural place in Government, or that there is some right to be at the Executive table by virtue of being.  Both counts ignore electoral will. The electorate should have the right to choose a Government through the ballot box rather than the dictate of legislative pre-ordination.  But to choose a government there must be a choice. What choice has the electorate in the forthcoming election to the NI Assembly?  Will anyone’s vote be cast with the hope of change?

There is an argument that opposition might tinker with ‘stability’ of the current institutions. Underlying that argument is an attitude that that the electorate should not be trusted with that choice, that it is not mature enough to make a choice, or that the electorate is somehow not ready to make that choice? Is the Northern Ireland electorate less ready than Iraq’s to make that choice?  Is choice in the face of instability not an essential aspect of embedding democracy in any state, divided or not? The streets of North Africa and Middle East are alive with the sound of the people demanding the right to vote for a government of their choice where previously, for example, in the ‘democracies’ of Syria and Egypt a vote returned the same old government time and time again.

Are democratic elections, the right to choose and to change your government, not the universal principle being hailed as fundamental across the world? Are the consequences of Western powers choosing stability over democratic change not being felt by the people of Libya today, or the protesters in Bahrain, or Yemen, or Syria, or China? Hasn’t ‘stability’ been the cause used to justify the suppression of democratic movements in these countries and the acquiescence of the West, left and right?

Stability is much over-rated, and can easily tend towards stagnation and sterility in ideas and innovation, in politics every bit as much as economy. Ultimately this leads to the suppression of any alternative because the elite have nothing to offer but more of the same, lacking the intellectual coherence to justify their status and resorting to a corruption of the process of government to avoid the emergence of any challenge to the status quo.

So the challenge to the UUP and SDLP is whether they will continue to shore up the DUP and SF oligarchy or strike a blow for democracy by making the ‘game-changing’ move into opposition. Are they part of the self -regarding political class, caring for the few, or do they care for the many in Northern Ireland ready and willing to move on to real, meaningful change. Are the UUP and/or SDLP chicken, comfortable with the status quo and unwilling to move on? Or will they provide the egg start of a new beginning, and a positive future politics bringing new life and to a sterile coop?

A new beginning http://www.photoshopnerds.com/index.php

In Northern Ireland there are many who loosely use the term ‘liberal’ to flatter themselves. Mostly, they haven’t a Liberal ideal or principle in their head. They use the term ‘liberal’ in the same way as they talk of ‘rights’: a vague sense of moral superiority wrapped in rhetorical cliché.

What too often defines ‘liberal’ politics in Northern Ireland, is an interest in the preservation of the vast and overbearing public sector. There is no thought of the individual in this consideration, only of the big ‘public’: no room for the one, except when embraced into a singular collective for the pursuit of the extension of ‘public interest’. Of course it is in the public’s interest, because the liberal knows best.

Northern Ireland liberals seem most comfortable with keeping a cosy status quo and not doing anything that might upset the (gravy) train. Witness the roll back on the association between the Alliance Party and the Liberal Democrats. Fine to have Charles Kennedy support Anna Lo’s Assembly campaign in South Belfast in 2007 (and previously in 2003); but not for Naomi Long to support the Liberal Democrats in Government in Westminster. Here was the chance for the Alliance Party to be part of a real Government: instead they chose not to risk prospects at the parish pump with such a brave and game-changing move on the national stage. ‘Liberal’, just not Liberal.

Of course, the fated UCUNF was projected as ‘liberal’ project, yet it was mostly defined by what is was not: not the UUP, not sectarian; not anything much on their website since May 2010.

Time to stop being liberal about being a liberal. True champions of liberalism in Northern Ireland are required. That should mean the adoption and promotion of positive principles and practical principled policies that might fundamentally change the nature of Northern Ireland’s political discourse above and beyond the current presentation of tired sound-bites and petty vacant politics.

Having viewed the following, if it is not possible to sign up to these simple ten principles then please understand why it may be considered the nature of Northern Ireland politics continues to lack a credible liberal champion.

About the Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation

About the Institute for Humane Studies and George Mason University.

The UK Government’s economic measures to tackle the country’s financial deficit will start to impact on all citizens in 2011. It will be a tough year ahead for everyone. The cost of living is rising, with households already noticing  increased costs creeping through to the weekly shopping. Just as households need to keep their spending under control, the need for good and efficient government at all levels is essential. Northern Ireland is not an exception in this regard.

Northern Ireland media focus in early 2011 seems to be on health inefficiencies and disorganisation, before that water was in chaos; before that, roads; an education department at odds with its schools; an agriculture minister who failed to properly account for the land being used for farming. And so on…

With each Department being largely independent of the Executive, except when requiring collective cover, it is no surprise that initial budget ‘agreement’ failed to indicate anything more than broad allocation of spending across Departments. Subsequent budget negotiation appears to be largely through the media rather than round the Executive table. The budget process is not building confidence. Rather than rethinking and shrinking government, the talk is of expanding revenue – taxing to spend on the same old, same old.

It is difficult to be very positive about politics in Northern Ireland in the months, or years, ahead. In almost every aspect of Government the Stormont Executive is a sorry excuse. Inspiration, ideas and impact are absent. Ideology, intransigence and incompetence seem to be the order of the day, to a greater or lesser degree.

Of course Party leaflets will drop through the letter boxes in the run-up to May’s election outlining the achievements of this government, of which almost every Northern Ireland political Party is now part.  Some of this is already being tested by the DUP and Sinn Fein, to greater or lesser success. Most 2011 election information will be little different to that provided for the Westminster election in 2010 – can anyone remember any of the key election promises from less than a year ago? Fine words bearing little momentum towards, or even capacity to kick start, necessary change.

There is no doubt that Northern Ireland would benefit from an effective opposition.

If ever there were a time for the UUP and SDLP to ditch government and enter ‘opposition’ it would be now. They are largely irrelevant to a Government steered by the DUP and Sinn Fein, serving only to underscore the validity of the system; strengthened in 2010 by the arrival of the Alliance Party to the trough.

Of course there is no ‘money’ available for an official opposition. Naturally, financial consideration comes before principle and doing the right thing.

The failure of a DUP/Sinn Fein led government is no surprise because there is no common cause; no common vision binding together the programme for government. Compulsory or enforced coalition, with a prohibition on voting a party out of government guarantees deadlock and failure.

Far from being “an extraordinary endorsement” of progress in NI, as suggested by Secretary of State Owen Paterson, Martin McGuinness as First Minister would only prove that the deck chairs on the Titanic have once again been moved.

The jobs that seem safe at present are those of the political class, who huddle around any of their number under threat. This represents the most often quoted success of Stormont, that it exists. That seems to be enough for our politicians. In the words of Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness respectively, following on from Hillsborough 2010:

“… there will be no going back to the past.”

“We need to make life better for our children and for our grandchildren.”

Of course we cannot go back in time, but neither should we stagnate without change. With the authority of power comes responsibility to use that power wisely ‘for our children’; and if the electorate believes that power is not being used wisely, that the future being shaped by an administration is not attractive, then surely it should have the democratic choice to vote for change.

The Belfast Agreement is over twelve years old.  It was a creation of its moment. Time to move on.

A government that cannot be fundamentally changed has no democratic mandate. Just ask an Egyptian.

Commentators seemed to view the overwhelming victory of Tom Elliott in the Ulster Unionist Party leadership contest as the Party taking a ‘traditional’ and safe option, rather than the more media savvy and ‘liberal’ option of Basil McCrea.  There is something about that analysis that seems too simple to thedissenter.

The result would suggest that ‘liberal’ unionism is now a marginalised group of around 30% of the Party.  If this group is passionate about change and maximised its vote, in fact it is only 15% of the Party; as the 1000 or so attending the election meeting amounts to around half the membership. What this actually represents is a decreasing element in the Ulster Unionist Party, which broadly reflects a wider disillusionment and disaffection with liberal Unionism that has been building for some time, the outcome of which is electoral decline.

Most would agree with the notion that while David Trimble may have been elected as a ‘hardliner’ he ended up a ‘liberal’. Trimble’s successor was not a hardliner. The battle for the leadership in 2005 was hardly one which reflected a strengthening of the ‘hard line’ within the Party: quite the opposite. David Trimble’s right-hand and supporter of UUP acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement won in 2005, defeating Alan McFarland (who would not be described as a champion of ‘traditional’ unionism). David McNarry, who also ran in the three-way race, gained only 8% of the votes, while McFarland gained 43% and Sir Reg Empey won when McNarry’s vote transferred to the least worst alternative of Sir Reg who had gained 48% in the first round of voting.

In that context the vote for Basil McCrea of around 30% was a surprise and represented either a sharp decline in liberal unionism or a woefully bad liberal champion.

Why did Basil lose?

First Basil. Basil McCrea is intelligent and articulate. He has been described as modern and media savvy. It is certainly the case that Basil is a crowd pleaser, not least the media crowd. He has the eye for a media or photo opportunity. He uses what is to hand and uses it well. Yet, there is another side to this. It is exemplified by two points in his campaign.

One: the post from Jeff Peel which pointed to Basil’s previous dalliance with the Northern Ireland Conservatives; in response to which Basil wisely stayed silent. Two: was his campaign launch speech.  His speech was well received, as being current and addressing the ‘now’: any analysis shows it exactly ticked a range of current themes. That is what Basil seems to do best. He is a man for the moment, as with his interest at a point in time with the Conservative Party. This does not lead to consistency, and nor does it indicate deep commitment to policy or principle in pursuit of political advantage.

Second, what of liberal unionism? This is not a fixed or settled idea. Bob McCartney might be considered a ‘hard line’ unionist, but he is undoubtedly a liberal in broad political outlook.  Alex Kane presents the case for being uncompromising as a unionist, but a hardliner?

There are many who describe themselves as ‘liberal unionist’, not least in the blogosphere. There has been questioning over what has happened over the past year with UCUNF and moving forward. However, some of those who comment or blog from this personally considered perspective too often seem to be embarrassed by party political unionism in any form; sometimes suggesting that liberal unionists should in fact be ‘neutral’ on the union (surely a contradiction). These tend to have a quintessential negative view on political Unionism – that it fails to be positive, progressive, fair, inclusive, non-sectarian.  This leaves others to presume that political unionism is therefore negative, reactionary, partisan, narrow and sectarian; though sometimes little is left to presume.

Yet, the present champions of liberal unionism lack a distinctive narrative that does not belittle other Unionists or offer a coherent policy agenda as an alternative.  Liberal unionists may retort, ‘an alternative to what?’; perhaps, but that does not amount to a cast iron liberal case.

Nor have the emergent political champions of liberal unionism acted in such a way that evidences a mature political personality. Basil McCrea wanders around with barely concealed resentment at having lost, Trevor Ringland petulantly struts out of the Party, and Paula Bradshaw snipes from her blog. Coming together around a broad ‘2010 Group’, perhaps being joined by Alan McFarland (?), they might well have a useful forum to consider why it was they lost rather than the UUP.

Besides a lack of narrative, and poor leadership, liberal unionism is not of this political moment. Sullied by the collapse of electorate trust in the UUP under David Trimble’s leadership, compounded by the hapless political ineptitude of Sir Reg Empey, ‘liberal unionism’ has been to the fore of Ulster Unionism for more than a decade and seems to have left, literally, the Party in a state of near terminal decline. To that extent, the election of Tom Elliott is more properly viewed as evidence of the membership’s determination to stop the ‘liberal’ rot.

This reflects widespread unease among the unionist population about the political future. While the Union 2021 series in the News Letter has evidenced remarkable confidence in the Union, that does not alleviate unease at the unrelenting obstruction of Sinn Fein to making Northern Ireland work – not least in respect of education – and a perceived inability of Unionist politicians (not unique to the UUP) to present a framework for moving forward that out-politics Sinn Fein.

Although Basil McCrea lost the leadership contest in the Ulster Unionist Party, the margin by which Tom took the leadership is flattering.  Neither candidate presented much by way of a vision for either the Party or Northern Ireland through the leadership campaign. Both placed undue focus on Party structural issues of little interest to the electorate, or generated rhetorical disputes on hypothetical scenarios. Neither showed an ability to rise above well-worn propositions.

Tom was not Basil. Still, there were factors Tom Elliott’s favour, and it would be wrong to suggest that his vote was largely undeserved. Perhaps not an exceptional speaker, but at least what he says is consistent and thoughtful – even if not always articulate; the GAA/Gay Pride kerfuffle was the result of clumsiness rather than any malicious prejudice.  On balance what may be regarded as personality or presentational weaknesses in Tom Elliott are capable of being corrected in time, whereas Basil is just Basil.

The strength of numbers turning out to vote for Tom from his local constituency Association shows strength in organisation and loyalty, which is mutual.  The Ulster Unionist Party was once a formidable machine. 40 years of conflict took its toll on Unionist Party organisation; as communities disintegrated, the middle classes first fled to surburbia, eschewed political affiliation and preferred to keep their heads down. Even so, when David Trimble became leader of the UUP there was a strong quotient of younger politicos, and a decent constituency worker network. When trust broke down internally and with the wider Ulster Unionist electorate, the Party lost its youth, many of its best election workers, and depth in membership (yes that includes the break with the Orange Order). The Party lost what remained of its innate ability to connect across the wide range of ‘constituencies’ that make up the Unionist electorate. Fermanagh is an exception. The rest of the Party wants some of what Fermanagh has managed to retain, and a leader who knows what that might be.

The Ulster Unionist Party which Tom Elliott inherits is very much smaller than it was a decade ago: though not necessarily smaller than the DUP at organisational or Constituency level. It may not have the workers it once had, but then the TUV Annual Conference is populated with UUP and DUP election workers. However, a smaller party means that local cliques, personal fiefs and sometimes family allegiances have a disproportionate say in candidate selection and a wholly negative impact on recruitment.

Tom Elliott needs to focus on building the organisation but this is hampered by the state in which he finds the Party – aging, clique-ridden and drifting. Thrust into this mix is the selection process, which complicates Tom’s capacity to build party unity as a first step in strengthening the UUP’s core and building membership to extend reach and gain electoral impact. A look around the process, so far, of selecting candidates for next year’s Assembly elections presents the scale of the challenge and the complexity created by the two/three tier selection process: originally planned under Trimble’s leadership to help quell/suppress dissenting candidates.

It is viewed by the liberal wing of the UUP that the lack of female representation is to the detriment of the Party’s electoral fortunes, though it didn’t seem to do the DUP any harm in 2010. Following the failure of the most prominent female candidate in the 2010 Westminster election, Paula Bradshaw, to gain Assembly selection at the first hurdle in South Belfast, the issue of female candidates has once again come to the fore. It should be noted that in pure mathematic and electoral considerations the spread of the three candidates recommended from the initial South Belfast Constituency selection meeting made sense, taking a start point that Michael McGimpsey, the current Minister for Health, was a shoe-in. Paula Bradshaw has since left the Party.

Although David McClarty gained over half the votes of those gathered for the East Londonderry Constituency selection meeting, the second stage constituency/HQ election meeting selected the two candidates are supported by less than half of the constituency in the first instance. But David McClarty cannot now be selected on appeal to the Party Executive without the second most popular candidate being selected.  The problem? That would mean candidates would both be men. On the other hand, there is a risk of alienating or demoralising a substantial proportion of the constituency association.

The Party’s Women’s Development Officer Sandra Overend was selected as one of two being put forward to the second stage of selection in Mid Ulster.  However, her margin of victory was less than the number of family members at the meeting (she is daughter of Billy Armstrong, the sitting MLA). Oddly, the other candidate, a more experienced election campaigner, has since withdrawn from the selection process before the second stage: now no-one will able to suggest that Sandra Overend was selected on the basis of family connections or because she is a woman. She will probably join Jo-Anne Dobson  from Upper Bann, to whom she presented the UUP Woman of the Year Award early in 2010,  as one of two female candidates on the Party ticket for the 2011 Assembly elections. Jo-Anne was second, undoubtedly by merit, in a field of six seeking selection in Upper Bann.

Tom Elliott has a considerable challenge to present a credible Assembly candidate team, with a credible policy agenda (not being the DUP is TUV territory now) and a sense that the Ulster Unionist Party is worth voting for.  Many blame poor public relations or lack of media sense, or lack of Party discipline as the reason for the UUP failure to connect with the electorate. Perhaps. More likely it has been a central vacuum in leadership and organisation, an absense of firm sense of purpose and apalling people management that is hampering the Party from moving out of the doldrums and onto improved electoral success.  If there is a selection process which is endeavouring to politically engineer success (women √, youth √ loyal to leader√ etc √) it will inevitably fail where it lacks a direction as to what the Party is trying to build; focusing on the Party rather than the electorate or driven by personality rather than political sense.

The greatest challenge for the UUP (shared by all unionist Parties) is moving out of ‘peace process’ narrative that is deeply resented and mistrusted by the broad unionist electorate and to abandon any hint of ‘constructive ambiguity’ which is viewed as corrupting.  Tom Elliott needs to be both liberal in the ‘live and live’ sense while having the strength of being honest and direct to the electorate (and political opponents) even if at times that could be challenged as ‘hardline’.

Given the strength of the Fermanagh organisation the Ulster Unionist Party membership may believe that Tom Elliott is the man to bring all the pieces together, in every sense, and to define a purposeful UUP with a distinct and positive outlook on moving Northern Ireland forward. This is essential to his most urgent task to reverse the UUP’s electoral flat-lining.

Basil lost the UUP leadership election. Tom Elliott has a great deal of work to do to prove that the 70% of the evening’s Party voters made the right choice, and he only has six months in which to at least start to make a difference.  There is no doubt that Basil McCrea is ready and willing to be first to resume the challenge should Tom fail to make that start.

In the rent-seeking economy of Northern Ireland, it is deemed politic to blame others for the withdrawal of funding across the economy.  It is also an indictment of both the poverty of aspiration and lack of imagination among the political class.

Much of  Northern Ireland government spending is decided in Whitehall, for example social security spend, or Europe, the bulk of DARD’s money pot. Much of the discussion will be placed on efficiency of Departmental administration of those funds.  The range and scope of much of health expenditure is also directed from Whitehall, though there is a great deal of scope to review how that money is managed and spent.  Similarly, education could be reviewed in the context of building and deepening academic excellence at all levels rather than political polemic. More importantly, as the political class seems increasing remote for the electorate, perhaps it is time to think how government could be devolved back to the individual. Northern Ireland government requires a total rethink.

The thinking has to start somewhere. thedissenter asked Eamonn Butler, Director of the Adam Smith Institute for some basic pointers our politicians might take on board when considering ‘cuts’ in a wider dimension. Five questions in almost as many minutes. Eamonn is keynote speaker at the Agenda NI seminar Rethinking Government on 26th October at the Grosvenor House Conference Centre, Belfast. It will be interesting to hear how the politicians, social sector and business community respond to his thinking.

It is not time to cut government in Northern Ireland: it is time to take the opportunity to reinvent government in Northern Ireland.

Eamonn Bulter is Director and co-founder of Britain’s leading free-market policy think tank, the Adam Smith Institute, and a leading author and broadcaster on economics and social issues. Westminster insiders look forward each week to his wry online commentary on politics and politicians.

Eamonn is author of books on a wide range of subjects, from economics through psychology to politics. These include easy-read introductions to the economists Milton Friedman, F A Hayek and Adam Smith, and a short explanation of how markets work, called (modestly) The Best Book on the Market, which he wrote to be “so simple that even politicians can understand it.”

The ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE is one of the world’s leading think tanks. Through its research, education programmes and media appearances, it promotes free markets, limited government, and an open society. It also has a regular blog.

Today, these timeless ideas are more important than ever. Government spending is near 50 percent of GDP, the budget deficit has reached historic levels, and the state intrudes into almost every area of our lives. Businesses are tied up in red tape, and families struggle under a growing tax burden.

The Adam Smith Institute does not aim to think about policy for its own sake, but to change events. It works with politicians from all sides, and engineers policies which are not just economically sound, but calibrated to be politically deliverable too.

The Institute has an enviable record of success. Throughout its history, it has been at the forefront of moves to reduce taxes, inject choice and competition into public services, and create a more free and prosperous society.

But the Institute’s work is about more than simply affecting policy; it also aims to educate young people. With its easy-to-read beginners’ guides, its student conferences and seminars, and its school and university visits, the Institute aims to reach and inspire the next generation.

Having looked at the News Letter’s list of questions thedissenter has reversed the order to start with consideration of what challenges 2011 might hold for Unionists. There is every indication that Sinn Fein is gearing up for another crisis and more talks within the next twelve months – chip, chip, chip. The big question is then ‘how prepared is Unionism for the road ahead to 2021 and beyond?’, including the challenge of starting to prepare for that journey now.

This is a slightly longer version than appears in the News Letter, free from the paper’s 600 word limit.

Don't worry about what is round the corner, just consider the light at the end of the tunnel.

Moving Forward Part 2

It is not about whether or not a Sinn Fein First Minster is acceptable. The current political structures, into which both the DUP and UUP have bought, mean that this is a possibility though far from a certainty.

In his recent News Letter article Alex Kane rightly outlines the challenge for Unionists should Sinn Fein be the largest party at the next election.  While electoral pacts have been discussed widely, alternative strategies have been absent in public discussion.

There is a widespread acceptance that we have a great deal less than good Government at Stormont.  Following on from Hillsborough, we are still waiting for Ritchie and Empey to get back to the Executive on improving process to make Government work. It is most likely that the failure is fundamentally within the structures.  In which case, likely solutions are only possible with a complete rethink.

Stoic acceptance of the institutions as they are is down to a failure of Unionism at the outset to have had a clear agenda for Government – devolution seems to have been an end in itself. If neither main Unionist Party leader is willing to serve as Deputy First Minister then are they prepared to bring the house down?

Being ‘prepared’ would mean having an alternative pathway, and working hard on preparing the ground for such a scenario.  Regardless of this scenario playing out in the event of Sinn Fein being the largest party, the growing logjam and catalogue of failure to deliver, may mean a time-out is demanded from the public. Hillsborough showed how hopelessly unprepared Unionism is in planning for the future, too willing to deal with the minutiae (badly) and seemingly unable to challenge a tired and empty Republican narrative – St Andrews before, Belfast before that, and before then….

All very well, but what would that prepared pathway be? A plan for Government by voluntary coalition that would provide accountability, stability and mature democratic checks and balances?  Fewer Executive Departments for sure, and far fewer than 26 local Councils: unnecessary for a small geographic area of under 2 million people – 3 Councils perhaps, or none at all?

At a bigger level what would that Government be about?  The recent Centre for Social Justice Report, Breakthrough Northern Ireland,  has shown the challenge in rebuilding society – all the billions of EU Peace funding shows that money is not the solution.  Are our areas of deprivation worse than the worst in Manchester, Liverpool or even parts of London? Are we that special? Troubles aside, economic and social breakdown is a story familiar too elsewhere in the UK with identical themes.

The corollary of social breakdown is even greater challenge in respect of education, where the selection debate has overshadowed the failings at primary level. If there is social reform, there must also be economic reform.

The time for the end of the Invest NI life-support machine is coming – the business sector is as much grounded in a dependency culture as the social sector. Nationalists cannot complain about a significant reduction in Northern Ireland’s public sector. If there is to be an all-Islands economy (one of the largest in the world of which we are already an integrated part) then the public sector engagement in the economy has to be reduced to the UK level (even at its current high of 50%) . Perhaps we should aim to be close to Irish Republic’s smaller public sector, otherwise a reduction in corporation tax is pointless and should not even be under consideration.

Those who are creating wealth in society must be encouraged at the expense of those who profit from public subsidy. Far from NI Water returning to the Department of Regional Development it must be prepared for the private sector.

It is not necessary for Unionist parties to unite structurally to agree common points on a future for good government.  The Unionist electorate is not a single monolithic body. It does not lack choice in Party, rather in leadership and ideas on moving forward. No matter the number of parties, Unionism is currently failed by a lack of strategic and purposeful leadership.  There would be a collective electorate groan at the thought of the present Unionist leaderships entering more talks on the future of Northern Ireland given their abject failure to date.

What is required to 2021 and beyond is coherent vision and a policy driven agenda that sets out what is necessary for a small, open, free and intelligence-led economy making a positive social, cultural and political contribution within the UK. This, far far more than (and probably in spite of) political manoeuvering or structural machinations, will build and strengthen the Union.

The News Letter’s Union 2021 Series asks 5 questions from contributors:

1. What do you think Northern Ireland’s Union with Great Britain will look like in 2021?
2.  What would you like it to look like?
3. Is unionist unity essential for the achievement of your vision?
4. If so, what does that mean?
5. Could you accept a Sinn Fein first minister?

It often seems that the last issue to be considered by the Parades Commission is the particular parade under consideration.

Of course the Parades Commission is operating in a context that is highly politicised; though it is meant to be outside ‘political considerations, that idea was dashed when a parade on the Ormeau Road was denied in deference to the ‘Peace Process’ - which looked like not placing responsibility on republicans not to riot. The ‘political process’ has been elevated to over-write all other considerations and the consequent political interference or indifference with respect to parades has been to the detriment of the Rule of Law. No better example of that is the absolute breakdown in authority evident in violence across Northern Ireland in the week of the 12^th July 2010.  Politics and police just stood there taking the abuse and with little evidence of a longer-term response.

While parading by the Orange Order may have provided a context at the 12th, there was little evidence that the July rioters cared deeply whether the Orange Order paraded or not.  The principal battle for hearts and minds is being played out in the Republican/nationalist communities – violence in Lurgan and Londonderry, and elsewhere, was pure thuggery to demonstrate that Sinn Fein’s support for the devolution of policing means little on the streets. The new Republicans on the block have learned well from those who similarly brought anger to the streets in the past: a progression from one generation to the next.

Meanwhile a review of legislation on parades and protest is on-going. The OFMDFM consultation is now the seventh review of the Parades Commission since its inception.

From the outset the Parades Commission was an unparalleled and unwarranted interference with the peaceful expression of a people’s culture and had significant potential to undermine of the Rule of Law. There is no moral or human rights justification for political and legal interference with cultural expression: quite the contrary.  Trade Unionists claim the limitation within the OFMDFM paper are unique in Europe forget that they failed to raise a voice on the Parades Legislation which was similarly unique and intolerant.

Since the inception of the Parades Commission there has been a clear admission by Republicanism of a planned process to use the issue of parades for political advantage.

Sinn Fein has made no secret of its political activity in raising the parades issue.  In the event the political process has been used as a sledgehammer to demonise, diminish and disrupt the exercise of legal, peaceful and fundamental freedom of cultural expression.  The policy has been one of creating a cultural apartheid where no Protestant is seen, heard, or permitted within a stones throw of a designated, reserved, “sanitised” nationalist space:

There were a number of distinct advantages for Republicans in moving forward on the parades agenda. First it plays to the gallery and maintains a wedge between communities. In the absence of armed conflict it maintains a war of words that retains simmering sectarian tensions on which republicanism relies for purpose. This was a political hammer being used to crack a cultural nut. While leaders of the Orange Order may from time to time make pronouncements on broad political matters, it does not function as a political organisation. It was always poorly suited to a public political argument and certainly not to understand or challenge a political machine.

Political interference has prolonged the parades issue in Northern Ireland.  The Parades Commission was itself a buck-passing exercise by the NIO, supported by the police – a firewall to take the heat off the Secretary of State and Chief Constable.  It was born of political strategy and suckled by the political expediency of politicians who wanted to be seen as leading the fight (both sides), and by the demands of the ‘political process’ that meant not confronting the realities of rights and responsibilities as they should be within a society where the Rule of Law is paramount.

How the placing of the Parades issue into the Office of OFMDFM will not result in political interference/dealing/brokering is outside thedissenter’s ability to imagine.  The present proposals seem to have been predicated on a political deal at Hillsborough.  That the issue of Parades is being discussed in the context of a political deal is itself a weakness and indicative of a fundamental flaw in strategic thinking.  A principled and fair outcome to the resolution of parades issues should be a local matter, having due respect for the Rule of Law, and not reliant on externalities.  If the Review itself depends on a political deal, then how will parades not continue to be politicised and used to modulate tensions and division to the benefit of a few and to the detriment of all?

The process outlined by this most recent consultation process merely transfers the Parades Commission from being a quasi-judicial ‘independent’ body within the orbit of the NIO, to a quasi-judicial office within the orbit of the OFMDFM.  This does not inspire confidence in transparency, accountability or an end to political interference.    A previous ‘Quigley Report’ on parades had positive ideas with respect to an open, accountable and transparent process of addressing parading issues.  There were elements of the mediation aspects of that Report which were woolly, but if offered a strategic view rather than political fix.

The current proposals do not offer significant encouragement to believe that a Shared Future is possible while a process exists in law that can be used to politically delineate and define ‘our streets’, and ‘our territory’. That this process is given legal standing does not remove legislation on parades and protest from the status of base sectarian harassment of folks wishing to be free to express their culture or viewpoints in peace and without fear of threat or violence.

In a normal society, one in which cultural pluralism is the norm and freedom of conscience is cherished, where another’s culture and views are respected, there would be no need for parades regulation by whatever name that body is known.  The Ashdown Interim Consultation Report assumed the premise of a ‘normal’ society.  If OFMDFM believed that Northern Ireland society has the ability to move forward then why consider the regulation of a people’s culture to be at all necessary?  How does legislation that tends towards cultural apartheid and unreasonably and unfairly penalises a particular culture.

The Rule of Law should be sufficient to protect freedoms without regulatory bodies open to political interference. But authority, and the leadership that falls from that place of respect and standing in either politics or policing, seems absent. That we are where we are on parades and protests shows an attitude that all too readily accepts intolerance and exclusion as a norm, and for some is a political necessity.

The 2010 Westminster election is over.  While the poll outcome was inconclusive the upshot is a decisive shift in British Politics where a progressive coalition has burst through the liberal centre/right. In the process, there were no important phone calls to the Northern Ireland parties, who now sit on the Parliamentary margins.

The debates on national television provided an energy to the national election. Locally the election campaign was as lacklustre and uninspiring as the Party leaders on the local TV debates.

On the nationalist side the new leader of the SDLP simply argued a greener case than Sinn Fein, ceding any advantage new leadership might offer in setting the electoral debate and regaining ground in the future. Sinn Fein organised a campaign that seemed more a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections and must be disappointed that they made little inroad into the SDLP vote on polling day.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: comparative strength.

The obvious decline in SDLP votes since 1998 is not to the great benefit of Sinn Fein.  For Westminster 2001, the high point of nationalist turnout, the SDLP had 168,873 and Sinn Fein 175,932; in 2010, 110,970 and 171,942 respectively.  In percentage terms Sinn Fein is clearly outvoting the SDLP, but it has made no gains in number of votes.  The overall Nationalist/Republican vote appears relatively static.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative

Republicans, in particular, have made much of an inroad into defeating Unionism, electorally. While Unionism was once dominant electorally, this was at a time when nationalists probably failed to even register to vote. The heady early 1970s, when unionist voters turned out in great numbers, was not a time of unionist unity. Since then, nationalists and republicans have fully engaged in the electoral process, and around 200,000 have been added to the electoral register.

Electorate and turnout for elections 1969-2010: comparative.

Summarily, the increase in registered voters has been to the benefit of neither nationalists nor unionists. In recent years the electorate, unionist and nationalist, has slowly disengaged from politics. However, ignoring the numbers and entering the percentage game, Sinn Fein has gained as it holds its vote relative to others.  Somehow, despite Sinn Fein’s project seemingly stalling, Unionist Parties are presenting a picture of unionism in crisis.

Much has been made of the apparent failure of leaders (and leadership) within Unionism, and there has been a great deal of debate since the Westminster election on the topic of what the future holds for unionism.

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: comparative strength

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

The numbers suggest that the Ulster Unionist Party is bumping along and has done little to regain the electoral trust that it squandered under David Trimble. Just as the UUP climbed electoral heights in the 1990s, so it has fallen to consistent lows over the past decade.  The decline has been hard for a Party that still gives the impression that it still believes itself to the natural Party of Government. Although the UUP electoral arrangement with the Conservative Party has been derided, on the positive side, at least the Party could had the finance to run a campaign and the vote was probably no worse than if the arrangement hadn’t existed.

A lowly UUP ought to have been good news for the DUP. However, similar to their principal partners in the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP has not been able to take advantage of their rival’s electoral slide. The DUP vote has been remarkably stable over the past decade.  The Party immediately benefited from the mistrust of the Ulster Unionist Party; acting as the standard bearer of opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein. In the decade from 1998, those who became disillusioned or discontented with the UUP either left politics or joined the DUP.  Over this period the unionist electorate could be characterised as either being ‘for’ the UUP or ‘against’.

Unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010 (not including UUP/DUP): combined/cumulative

In the 2007 Assembly election there was still a broad expectation that the DUP would not enter Government with Sinn Fein. When they did, off the back of apparently verified decommissioning by the IRA (which seems to have missed 40% ), it can be no surprise that the DUP would suffer to some extent in the same way as the UUP.  That was certainly the instance in the 2009 European Election, when Jim Allister of the TUV took a signification proportion of the unionist vote.

While the TUV did less well in the Westminster election, drift from the two main parties was nevertheless marked. Trust has gone. Yes, there was an agreed unionist candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone, and the DUP stood aside in North Down. Even so, in an election when the overall unionist vote increased on the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP must be disappointed that it cannot point to any positive electoral gain.

All unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

Nationalism performed less well than unionism in the Westminster election, albeit marginally. Yet the debate post election is on the future of unionism. Inevitably this has centred on the future of the Parties, and in particular the leaderships.

No unionist leader has much to cheer about post-election.  The TUV performed poorly, though it was never likely that the European pr vote could have been replicated in the first-past-the-post Westminster poll. Still, the TUV lacked depth in its candidate selection, and Jim Allister’s political persona was one of anger.  The Unionist electorate is past anger. It wants to trust again. To do that it desires confidence in a leadership can attract talent and articulate a pathway to restoring community, cultural and political confidence. The TUV was not alone in failing to meet that expectation.

Sir Reg Empey lost in South Antrim. Perhaps he has done enough service to David Cameron’s Conservatives to gain a peerage and join David Trimble, in which case his candidature was not entirely in vain.  It was his close association with David Trimble that probably reduced his chances in South Antrim, where not even a hawkish David Burnside had been able to hold the seat. The electorate that punished the UUP then, and sent an unambiguous message on the leadership of David Trimble, was hardly likely to vote now for someone equally at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement.  Adrian Watson, the choice of the local UUP would probably have fared better as a new and local face for Westminster.

Sir Reg also lost on the wider political field. From the outset of the UUP Conservative arrangement he failed to present a convincing narrative to overcome the sense that this was a marriage of convenience: the Conservatives needed a significant electoral base in Northern Ireland and the UUP needed the money.  The UUP message that Stormont was a ‘huckster’s shop’ should have had some traction with a disillusioned electorate. However, Sir Reg’s inability to bring clarity and direction to the UCUNF (UUP/Conservative) arrangement suggested that he equally unable to manage his own neighbourhood store. There was the sluggishness in agreeing candidates. Finally, for thedissenter, Fred Cobain standing as a Conservative & Unionist?

And yet, the UUP vote broadly held up across Northern Ireland. Yes, it now has no seats at Westminster.  But it still has a base on which to build. On the wider national electoral front the politics of the nation has been trust into new territory with the Conservative/Liberal coalition (or is that Liberal Conservative coalition).  There is deep resentment of the central Conservative Party organisation among many local Conservative constituency organisations.  Although talking about decentralising power from Westminster, Cameron has strongly centralised Conservative Party organisation around his own team.  This has not delivered the majority he needed; in many instances this was down to lack of flexibility in addressing local electoral campaigns: Adrian Watson is a case in point.

What became clear on election night was that the country no longer acts uniformly. The great swingometer was made redundant on a night where local electorates seemed to take a local view – resulting in massively varying swings across the country.  It would suggest that future candidates will need to emphasise more local issues and rely less on national coat-tails.

In this respect there is certainly a place for more regionally based politically associations where the central party outlines core principles, but does not dictate local candidate selection and tolerates a degree of policy variance around the country.  If the Conservatives and the UUP can find that balance between regional and national interests then there is a future for the UUP. Otherwise, not.

At times in the run-up to and during the election the argument of the UUP almost seemed to be that the DUP couldn’t be trusted: to which the electorate added the word ‘either’. In the end the only place that this mattered was in East Belfast, where the electorate cast a plague on the UUP and DUP. Of course the rejection of a sitting MP, and in this case the leader of the DUP, was a huge slap to Peter Robinson.  In the rest of the country the DUP held its own and it seats.

The East Belfast seat was not a natural loss, had there been anyone of stature in the East Belfast DUP to have stood as an alternative to Peter Robinson: Strangford, the Westminster seat once held by Iris Robinson was retained by the DUP. The electoral strategy for the East Belfast seat has long been the strength of the Robinsons (Westminster/Assembly/Council) to bring in all others on their coat-tails.  Time for a re-think.

The apparent nature of the internal politics of the DUP suggests that there is little likelihood of Robinson being replaced as leader; for reasons not that dissimilar to the earlier thedissenter piece in the wake of revelations around Iris Robinson earlier in the year. The early DUP was shaped by Ian Paisley. The latter-day DUP has been shaped by Peter Robinson.  There is little obvious alternative to Peter Robinson’s leadership.  Peter Robinson’s East Belfast Assembly seat is relatively secure, as one of many, which assures his leadership position where it matters most to the DUP, at Stormont.

Before bringing together all these points into a broad conclusion it is worth noting the success of Naomi Long. First, by accepting David Ford at the Executive Table, the Alliance Party has been elevated to the position of central and ‘trusted’ player.  Second Naomi Long is local, and hard working. Third, Alliance has always had strength in East Belfast. Finally, she wasn’t Peter Robinson, and whether unionist or not, she isn’t perceived as nationalist.

Electoral ups and downs of principal parties: 1969-2010 *

The Alliance Party has been much stronger in the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s than it has been anytime in the past decade.  It still has a lot of work to do to grow its base, and there are not obviously an army of Long-type candidates to make an impact in 2011 at Stormont (and probably across 26 Local Government areas). In percentage terms it’s vote will look good where any general increase is a gain against an smaller voting public overall, though in pure numbers terms it has a long way to go.  Notions of some kind of renaissance in the political centre ground are premature.

Back to the big debate, within and around Unionism. The focus of that debate is numbers, and focused on whether in the forthcoming 2011 election Sinn Fein might gain a position where it may be able to lay claim to the post of First Minister.

Since the changes following the St Andrews Agreement any party with the votes and seats necessary can lay claim to the post of First Minister.  This provides for more equitable power-sharing in that it does not create a hierarchy of parties – theoretically anyone can be a First Minister. Would it make a great difference for Sinn Fein to be First Minister? If you accept Sinn Fein as a partner in Government then why not?

The most recent political push for unionist unity has arisen principally as a DUP campaign tactic to corner the UUP/Conservative arrangement, pushing at the fact that one of the certainties espoused in this arrangement was that the Conservatives were committed to stand in all 18 seats.  The agreement of a candidate on a unity-style ticket in Fermanagh South Tyrone undermined the determination of the UUP/Conservative pact. Had Rodney Connor won it would have placed even greater pressure on the UUP/Conservative pact that it failed to make a similar arrangement in South Belfast.

That the tactic in Fermanagh South Tyrone failed to deliver its intended outcome still leaves the DUP in a position to argue that it only failed because it was late in the day, the electorate was unconvinced of UUP sincerity, the Conservative link lost vital votes and anything that throws blame around and away to the DUP: this is a criticism of the DUP blame game generally and not that, conversely, the DUP is ‘to blame’.

The focus on the issue of First Minister is a tactical one – a means to give purpose to closer co-operation between the parties (if not merger). Yet the real issue is not one of tactics to meet short-term and tokenistic outcomes. The failure of Sir Reg (lost seat, lost leadership) to stabilise and provide purpose to the UUP, the DUP’s failure to dismiss the TUV altogether and to regain momentum lost in 2009, reflect deeper malaise within unionist parties.

Ironically, the arrival of the TUV brought unionist voters to the polling booths and increased the overall unionist vote would suggest that disunity has its advantages, allowing the fractious and independently minded unionist voter an avenue to express discontent with established parties.

The logic of engagement by all parties in the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement is an acceptance that the Union is safe in the hands of the unionist electorate: that is the principle of consent.  Unionist voters accept this and many seem content not to vote for parties that fail to reflect their concerns and provide competent government.   This is not a problem for unionism alone, nationalism has a similar challenge, though seems content to lose itself in the green romantic mists of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow.  A plague on all their houses?

Addressing unionist unity from a structural perspective is bound to disappoint. Political party realignment is merely mixing decks and dishing out the job cards in a different order.  The electorate is hardly likely to be impressed. Identifying a loss of voter, by class or aspiration, does not address the message sent at the Westminster election: none of the leaders of unionism presented a coherent and inspirational purpose for unionism in the twenty-first century.

A unionist should feel proud to fly the Union flag, and should not feel that it is somewhat diminished when wrapped around those who seek to lead Unionism. It should not be worn in anger, it should not cover embarrassment, and it should not be wrapped around a backroom deal.  Discussion on the Union should be a matter of substance, not tactical number crunching: it is a matter for open discussion, not whispers behind closed doors.

Unionist Parties may be under threat through a loss of relative electoral strength. That does not mean that the Union is under threat: which is not to say that the Union cannot be lost. As elsewhere, this article has been an exercise in looking at the outcomes of the Westminster election and reading the runes. There are a few pointers which may shape consideration of the future for Unionists.

• The overall nationalist vote appears static.
• Nationalist voters appear just as disengaged as unionist voters.
• The UUP might consider its future within a regional/national and liberal conservative context, but is otherwise nothing but a fading reflection of better times.
• The DUP built its presence on becoming biggest: now it is, what next?
• The unionist voter seemed uninspired by any of the unionist Parties’ offers.
• The overall unionist vote benefits from disunity, not unity.
• The SDLP was dominant in 1998. What happened?
• If Sinn Fein is a worthy party for Government, and to hold a post co-equal to the First Minister then why shouldn’t it hold the post of First Minister?
• The issue of a Sinn Fein First Minister is a narrow tactical argument that distracts from the lack of attractive leadership from either the UUP or DUP, or from anywhere elsewhere in unionist circles.
• Short-term tactical considerations will not address the future of unionism as a political cause.
• The Union is safe: at least that rests with the electorate and not the politicians.

The Westminster election changed very little. The points above have been matters for varying degree of consideration for some time. The election has simply brought them to the fore. Much of that discussion has taken place at Open Unionism and in the pages of the press, and probably around the lunch tables of Stormont buildings and meeting places elsewhere.

Tactical considerations of stopping a Sinn Fein First Minister are given an air of immediacy, including an urgency on discussion of political party restructuring. The larger and more important issue of the purpose and sense of Unionist cause is receiving less attention, perhaps because there is no personal or party gain in thinking outside the box?  (It is a lonely place outside the box, and risky.)  How does the discussion move beyond the tactical and party political to a more central discussion on the nature and future expression of Unionism fit for the twenty-first century?

Without a common understanding of the central tenets of Unionism there is little chance of Party political unity among unionists. Unionists must know what the Union is for, holding common purpose; it must not be defined by what it is not, what it is against. The electorate wishes positive, not negative, Unionism. With that central understanding would party political unionism mean anything anyway? Is unionism an ‘ism’ at all? How do we move beyond a position of being in defence of the Union to advancing and deepening the Union? These are the questions to be the subject of Looking Forward: Part 2. Later.

*/** please note that the graphs are indicative. While every effort was made to input the numbers correctly, sometimes interpretation of orginal data was difficult. I may have designated an independent in the unionist circles when it should have been nationalist: the early 1970s was a confusing time. ’Others’ sometimes includes all but the main parties; more than just the odds and sods. Data on registered electorate and turnout was not always available, and sometimes only in percentage terms. Taking all this into account,  all graphs should be viewed as broadly accurate, but mostly illustrative.  If any reader wishes to repeat the exercise and find fault, the source information is found within CAIN and ARK: knock yourself out.

So in retrospect and to bring thedissenter up to date…

Campaigning for the Westminster election in Northern Ireland had an air of reluctance, or nervousness; perhaps born out of uncertainty as to how the election would impact on the local Parties. Politics in Northern Ireland seems to have descended into a tactical contest, where any greater purpose to gaining power has been lost in the pursuit of power itself (or clinging on to the certainty of what is already held). The Westminster campaigns in Northern Ireland seemed more of a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections than one of national consequence.

The SDLP had a new leader trying to hold its vote and not lose ground to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein ran the same old faces, and hoped to gain ground on the SDLP.  Both nationalist parties begged the same votes for the same romantic notion of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow when all would be well and good – earlier, Brian Cowan had set out the real politic and focusing on bigger issues on St Patrick’s Day.  Other than for tactical considersations of the least worst option, neither nationalist Party appealed to the electorate that matters to their ultimate aspiration (again, see Brian Cowan’s words).

Peter Robinson gave himself a bad press on the eve of the election, which didn’t seem to impact on the Party as a whole. The UUP/Conservative grouping gave the appearance of being as disorganised as the huckster’s shop in which it continues to hold two Executive seats. The newcomers, the Traditional Unionist Voice, were the great unknown factor and a first-past-the-post Westminster election was the worst outing a fledgling party could face.

The Alliance Party and Naomi Long? Bless.

The 2009 European election showed, at least on the Unionist side, that the electorate no longer swallowed the warnings of the doomsayers, nor feared the Sinn Fein bogeymen on which many election strategies were based. A large proportion voted and damn the consequences.  For 2010 Westminster the unionist electorate was largely more circumspect, but hardly enthusiastic: evidenced in Fermanagh South Tyrone. Unionism is past anger; frustrated and petulant, but not angry. The simple interpretion on the electoral fortunes of the three unionist Party leaders is: ‘ a plague on all your houses’.

Unionism is in flux, and May 6th has not provided any clarity on the questions that should be asked let alone provide any answers. That debate will continue and is to be welcomed. 

Northern Ireland’s 18 Westminster seats were always going to be filled, even if choice in voting preference was diminished by the available options being well and truly woeful.  In general, commentary and analysis on the election results has been mostly inward rather than outward. The now marginal status of all local parties at Westminster may tend to exacerbate that focus. Yet change is always a time of opportunuity. The new consensus in Government at Westminster, for as long as it can last, offers such opportunity if grasped.

If this post seems to ramble a little it is because thedissenter is in a process of thinking, reassessing fundamentals, throwing the bricks in the air and rebuilding ideas. That may take some time. Absence has not brought any conclusions. In the meantime regular commentary will resume once the electoral dust has settled.

All the ingredients were there: the crisis, the Prime Ministers, the big house, the Belfast Telegraph survey, the Parties doing all night sittings and the press pack.  At the end of all that we have the “Agreement at Hillsborough Castle” as it is officially described.  Not a deal.  Not “The Hillsborough Castle Agreement”.  Nothing definitive, just ‘agreement’ as part of a step process: same process as the “Agreement at St Andrews‘.

Many are of course delighted that there was any sort of agreement at all.  Especially Gordon Brown who would undoubtedly not wish one of New Labour’s great projects to crash just before a Westminster election, and probably David Cameron who will not inherit an immediate crisis should he become Prime Minister after the General Election.  

 The ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ amounts to very little but a process that revolves around progress towards the devolution of Policing & Justice.  The only certainty is that there is a date assigned for the transfer of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly. That date appears to be conditional on a range of other points/matters/actions happening in some sort of sequence.

What are the chances of the agreement working out to a conclusion?  The Agreement is in five parts.

Section One provides a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly.  There are a series of procedural steps which, so long as Gordon Brown does not call an election in the next few weeks should see the formal transfer of powers by 12 April. 

Section Two is Parades. It is hard to see how Sinn Fein will ever accept that people lawfully and peacefully should not be subject to the sectarian harassment of unlawful violent protest, or a planned protest which lacks the discipline to behave in a civilised manner. The pursuit of cultural apartheid through designation of Protestant-free zones seems to underline republican demonisation of the Loyal Orders. Hard to see how Republicans will ever agree to a shared future when they are unable to countenance sharing a stretch of road a few times a year; not that many in the SDLP are more tolerant.

Section Three is a clever device to sideline the UUP and SDLP.  The problems with the functionality of the Executive lie in the institutional arrangements; the Executive seeks to enforce consensus among a disparate group of political parties which, leaving aside their constitutional pre-dispositions, have little in common. Section Three is not likely to amount to much more than the generation of a whinge list, but is disconnected to the issue of the devolution of Policing and Justice, and therefore is of little immediate consequence.

Section Four outlines no more than just an administrative catch-up process.  As with Section Three this is not timetabled and therefore may well be forgotten about unless there is a need to show something of progress – even if it is only seeing the Executive finally get round to doing what it ought to have already done, which if they were able to agree they would have done already.

Section Five is timetabled, and suggests that the Junior Ministers will be exceptionally busy. Not only are they putting a progress and action plan together for outstanding Executive business (Section Four), they will also be doing a report on outstanding issues from the St Andrews Agreement.  The most recent Policing and Justice ‘crisis’ has arisen from a very different determination what is meant by in paragraph 7 of the Agreement at St Andrews : “It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008.” If there is failure to even agree on what was agreed then, what presently constitutes an ‘outstanding matter’ may well be a challenge in itself.

The fanfare for this ‘agreement’ is worthy of a snake oil salesmen’s convention. Agreed, tentatively and with provisos, is a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice.  That is it. The DUP has allowed the issue of ‘community confidence’ to focus on the parades issue, but that is just one area where confidence in the Stormont administration is weak.  Lack of accountability, the chimera of collective responsibility and absent democratic counterbalance of effective opposition are fundamentals that appear not to have been discussed at Hillsborough, yet are underlying factors in the lack of unionist confidence in Stormont generally.

Sectioning parades hides the real fear of devolution of Policing and Justice with respect to that issue: Section One (9), that a future Minister could take a decision by request or otherwise, to step in to ban a parade without recourse to the Executive. Given the history of the generation of parades contention by Sinn Fein, the pattern is set.  With the Justice Minister open to d’Hondt in the next Assembly the ground is set for a heightening of conflict centred on parades, whoever gets the Justice Ministry. 

The quasi-judicial powers of the Justice Minister is the ticking time-bomb on parades. More immediately, the parades fuse is lit on this ‘Agreement’. Ashdown wasn’t even close to a credible alternative to the Parades Commission. Serious questions on the process within that ‘interim’ report remain unanswered; yet that ‘report’ is noted as a start point on which to build.  

The Hillsborough talks have demonstrated that the DUP is as useless as the UUP at negotiation: the lead-up to Hillsborough was promising, but the end result is a big disappointment.  The DUP blinked, and Sinn Fein is now piling on the pressure on parades, upping the ante and making resolution on parades nigh on impossible: the most recent outburst from Martin McGuinness is an example.  More generally, the remarks by Pat Doherty point to a longer term process of attrition; building on the undermining of cultural identity and political confidence within the broad unionist electorate.   

Sinn Fein has its date for devolution of Policing and Justice.  Once in process, how many believe there will be much concluded of Sections Two, Three, Four and Five without another ‘crisis’.

By any measure, unionist community confidence in the ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ is at best low.  The text of the published document was printed in newspapers and is readily available online as a document and subject of comment. The success of the snake oil salesman is in the ignorance and credulity of the buying public.  To presume that somehow the lack of confidence can be solved by wider publication is erroneous. 

Parades may be an obvious point of contention in this ‘Agreement’, but fundamentally the real issue is a lack of confidence in the institutions themselves into which Policing and Justice is to be devolved.  Broadly speaking, the unionist community has little desire for more snake oil from the huckster’s store, no matter how many times the bottle is rebranded ‘new & improved’.

For broad analysis on the state of the individual unionist parties by far the best has been that of the blogger Turgon on SluggerOToole.  The recent meeting at Hatfield House between the Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Patterson, and leading representatives of the DUP and UUP has created a great deal of debate on the nirvana of ‘unionist unity’. We are told the Hatfield House talks were about the UUP and DUP, and Conservatives, gaining some greater understanding in respect of future elections. Generally, however, the impact of the host party (the Conservatives) on elections is not discussed in detail. Perhaps this is because the Conservatives and the UUP are treated as one: that is a mistake; they remain two parties. Such a perspective misses the electoral questions arising from the Conservative and UUP non-merger.

Should an Assembly election to be held before Westminster elections there would be four Unionist parties in the fray as there is no agreement for Assembly elections between the UUP and Conservatives.  This would probably kill any prospect of the UUP being the largest Unionist party: the two are separate parties as we are constantly told, so they will be two separate Assembly Parties.

So too may the Conservatives. Without an arrangement with the UUP for Assembly elections the local party would rightly expect to stand, and win a few seats. But the strength of the Conservative offer is that it brings so much more to local politics than money to a party (the UUP) whose financial fortunes are much diminished. Conservative electoral strength would be exposed before the benefit of the ‘win’ at Westminster (and even one seat other than North Down will be a win, so the bar is low). The Conservatives would lose momentum.

Conversely of course the arrangement for the General Election will mean that the Conservatives who might get elected in Northern Ireland will be fully taking the Conservative whip as part of that Party, while the UUP will be taking the whip by agreement. So if, and only by example, the UUP/Con arrangement delivers four seats and two of those are Conservative it means the UUP has in effect only two seats at Westminster. Influence with the Conservative Party is thus diminished, and independence constrained by taking the Conservative Whip. Added to which the UUP has provided an electoral base for the Conservatives to make further gains in the next elections on the calendar (Assembly), and in much better shape to eat into the UUP vote than if it had no Westmnister seats in Northern Ireland. This further dmininishes UUP ambitions of regaining ground to the DUP as the largest Assembly Party.

If Westminster elections are first, in the context of a hung Parliament the two main unionist parties would be in a much stronger position with no pre-agreement with the Conservative Party. Obligations generated prior to the election severely restrain the capacity for the unionist parties to play their best hand.

It is hard to see how strategists within the DUP would not have anticipated these scenarios, or that the UUP could be so detached as to not even think about them.

Which is why any notion of talks at Hatfield being on ‘unity’ needs to be treated with caution. There can be no doubt that the Conservatives as a Party would have been fishing for DUP ideas on the future and specifically for indicators on what would happen in the event of a hung Parliament. The DUP would be similarly probing the Conservatives. The only thing on the Conservative leadership’s mind at the moment is ‘seats’. This gives the unionist parties a strong position prior to the election, or it would if the UUP was not already tied to the Conservatives.

All this speculation centres on considerations of electoral mathematics that only the timings/outcomes of the elections will prove. If a Westminster election is first, and if the Conservatives gain a majority of anything over 30 then both unionist parties will be largely irrelevant, and Northern Ireland as far down the agenda as events will allow. Which means short-term interest may be Westminster, but for Unionism there must be greater focus on Stormont.

That brings us to wider speculation of other talks and fevered speculation on any perceived signals that build on this story. Within the context of all of the above, a merger of the UUP and DUP is by far the more likely and electorally sensible in terms of unionist ‘unity’, particularly in respect of the Assembly elections.  The same sort of issues arise. This would have to be a merger and not a pact, because it is about Party and not political designation in d’Hondt. It is the largest Party that takes the First Minister role.  Something less would be enough to extract maximum value from a hung Parliament, where ten to twelve Unionist seats represent the difference. Timing will be everything.

There is a definite sense that something is stirring among unionists in Northern Ireland. It may be an interesting political Spring. Will it be a new Spring for Unionism?

Does anyone seriously suggest that Iris Robinson would have told Peter Robinson all the details about her £5,000 kick-back, or her intention at some point to keep substantially more. The meetings, the go-between, the texts? Dishonesty underlies this story at every level.

Peter Robinson would not be the first husband who wanted to believe and protect his wife, or chose what to believe at face value because it offered a pathway to quiet resolution of the issues at hand: especially when the wife has a history of depression.

Any investigation may well find Peter Robinson clear of wrong-doing; unless there are more revelations to come. The only person who might be able to tell the whole story is Iris Robinson, and we have learned enough to imagine that not even she may not be he most reliable source of information on the facts.

The big question is now political: can Peter Robinson survive as First Minister?

If the answer was based on known facts alone, then more than likely yes.

However, leadership demands that any showing of emotional vulnerability must be balanced with strength and resolution in the face of adversity. Leaders must be first in control of themselves to be in control of events, and to be able to respond appropriately and proportionally.

While emotional vulnerability may elicit some public sympathy, alone it promotes context not answers. A managed interview that is not accompanied with a detailed Q&A for the press which addresses wider issues that a short statement and the immediacy of a ‘surprise’ statement does not permit, questions will always remain. Each subsequent interview with Peter Robinson offers a snippet more that leaves a sense that there is more to the story even though not a great deal more is revealed.

Talk of the ‘Robinson brand’ in the media seems to be centred on the relative power of the Robinson family; relating that family’s political position in the context of the Paisley family, and discussion of dynasties.  There may be a common idea of how the Robinsons regarded themselves, and there is no doubt that many in the DUP have huge respect for Robinson’s political antenna and drive. But out there, among the public, is there anything that has happened over the past year, from expenses to more recent revelations, that doesn’t confirm a reserved and quietly negative view of the Robinsons?  Was there really broad public acceptance of the presentation of the happy family, the dedication to public service alone, the righteousness of evangelical faith?

There has never been a great deal of goodwill or natural empathy towards Peter Robinson the person, outside his core supporters. Politically he stood in the shadow of Ian Paisley for so long that he had no particular personality: the succession to leadership was easily interpreted as a powerplay within the DUP. That was true without the recent scandal.

Politics is never black or white. Even if Peter Robinson were a weakened leader, he is the only option for the DUP at this point in time. The DUP needs Peter Robinson because he has the political experience and tactical expertise to make them do better at the polls in Westminster and the next Assembly and elections than they would without him. He keeps the lid on the tensions between the fundamentalist core DUP and those who would fundamentally seek to appeal to a wider voting base. For a Party that promotes itself on success, changing a leader so soon after Ian Paisley’s retirement could only question the direction and political sense of the DUP.  What vision? What values? What next?

Yes, recent events may mean bleeding a few more votes, but poor results could still be even worse without rigourous political management from now to election day. Yes, expenses and the more recent scandal has hurt the DUP. Yet, if a week is long time in politics Peter Robinson has plenty of time to reorganise, re-energise and rebound.

If there were more scandal, from elsewhere within the DUP, then the challenge for the DUP would be greater, and Peter Robinson’s return even more certain. For now though, it’s his decision; one man’s call, and the man doesn’t look as if he is going anywhere far from the First Minister’s office.