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The Northern Ireland electorate heads towards the 5 May with little enthusiasm for the choice being presented, little interest in the institutions, and little understanding of what the Assembly has achieved over its past four years.

No doubt there will be general media attention in the run-up to the election on issues around the budget, perhaps, education, almost certainly, and health.  Why bother? With all the main Parties at the Executive table, and assured a place if not the same seats following the election, the electorate has little alternative but to vote for the same old same old, or not at all.

Constitutional matters are never far away from the discussions and serve all parties well in avoiding having to answer the question of what has actually been achieved for the past four years. Some would say that a full four years was an achievement (ignoring the Sinn Fein six months sulk over the delay in transferring Policing & Justice). With nine years prior practice, it was about time a full term was possible – the Assembly has been in existence since 1998.

It seems that everything remotely positive is claimed by all, whether Unionist, Nationalist or Republican, DUP, UUP, SDLP and Sinn Fein, and even Alliance. Who wouldn’t or couldn’t claim to be responsible for free bus passes and prescriptions, or low household rates and taxes? Just don’t mention or question the cost.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty arises for the UUP and SDLP who will of course wish to claim the specific successes of their Ministers. This inherently also praises the Executive and the institutions, and the two large parties with whom they are in the Executive alongside. This also lauds the huckster’s shop, built with ugly scaffolding. Following Hillsborough 2010 (Section 3) it was the UUP and SDLP leaderships who were charged with bringing forward recommendations on improving the working of the Executive? Not much progress there.

For the DUP and Sinn Fein there is a fine balance to be walked between condemning coalition partners, with whom the success of the past four years must be shared, while claiming that it is they who have held the entire edifice together. Balanced indeed; while seeking the adsorption or marginalisation of their two respective principal rivals.  At the same time the two largest parties must also ensure that they keep the UUP and SDLP on the inside and not drive either or both into opposition outside the Executive, even if an ‘unofficial’ opposition.

In the short term the DUP and Sinn Fein would find an ‘opposition’ easy enough to handle. However, over the next four years the collective ‘blame’ for all the hard decisions (and at this point those decisions are barely being admitted) would be shared alone by the DUP and Sinn Fein together. This will involve implementing fiscal tightening and, as would seem likely, increasing the burden of tax (called rates/charges/levies) on individual householders and businesses.

The most recent outcry over the decision by Michael McGimpsey as Health Minister to postpone the new radiotherapy unit at Altnagelvin is a good example of political rhetoric trumping rational discussion of the issues, and the absurdity of political posturing when all parties are in Government. Was McGimpsey’s decision political? Was the decision by Barbre de Brun to place a new maternity unit at the Royal Victoria in West Belfast, rather than at the City Hospital in South Belfast political? Was Martin McGuinness’s decision to abolish the 11+ within his final days of being Education Minister political? Is the decision to fund the A5 rather than other bottleneck and poor links inside Northern Ireland political?  All of these decisions could be believed, or presented, as playing to ‘core’ constituencies. The fallout from the decision was certainly political. Of course it was, its politics; a politics without purpose or progression. A politics of the past. The politics of blame.

Martin McGuinness’s statement provided a clear demonstration of the dysfunctional nature of the Stormont structures and the consequential ease of placing decisions into a sectarian context: shoring up that ugly scaffolding. Ministers are able in the first instance to make decisions outside the collective of the Executive. There followed a response from Ministerial colleagues that was also outside the collective. A Government that is also it’s own opposition is, at best, confused. This doomed the Major government, ultimately, when the country was presented with an credible alternative. Ministers of the Stormont Executive lack the democratic credentials of being accountable or responsible to anyone, even within their own collective. Where is the credible political alternative in Northern Ireland?

Northern Ireland needs a political opposition. True, it would be fair to say that neither the UUP nor SDLP would be likely to offer much by way of policy alternative to the DUP or SF in the near term – though in the bigger national picture, Ed Milliband does not seem to be doing too badly at present.

The absence of any coherent alternative proposition does not help an opposition in the run-up to an election. David Cameron might not have had to enter coalition politics had he been able to convince the electorate on what he actually believed: many are still unsure, which may be why Ed Milliband does not have to try too hard just now. Lesson learned?

Once the election is over in May it will be at least three years before the next scheduled election (Europe 2014). A lot can happen in politics over the course of three years. There is plenty of time for any Party at Stormont to become a challenging opposition and to provide an entirely valid and valuable ground-breaking democratic function. An opposition holds the potential of bringing accountability to the Executive and to the process of Government.

It is entirely wrong to suggest that there needs to be money to create an opposition at Stormont. It does not. It takes courage, imagination and determination to fulfil an essential function of democratic government.  Hopefully, in time, an opposition party (or parties) could show the electorate that there is an alternative leadership that is worth voting into the Executive to take the top posts, on merit of ideas and policy commitment.

Of course Parties need to get over the idea of a natural place in Government, or that there is some right to be at the Executive table by virtue of being.  Both counts ignore electoral will. The electorate should have the right to choose a Government through the ballot box rather than the dictate of legislative pre-ordination.  But to choose a government there must be a choice. What choice has the electorate in the forthcoming election to the NI Assembly?  Will anyone’s vote be cast with the hope of change?

There is an argument that opposition might tinker with ‘stability’ of the current institutions. Underlying that argument is an attitude that that the electorate should not be trusted with that choice, that it is not mature enough to make a choice, or that the electorate is somehow not ready to make that choice? Is the Northern Ireland electorate less ready than Iraq’s to make that choice?  Is choice in the face of instability not an essential aspect of embedding democracy in any state, divided or not? The streets of North Africa and Middle East are alive with the sound of the people demanding the right to vote for a government of their choice where previously, for example, in the ‘democracies’ of Syria and Egypt a vote returned the same old government time and time again.

Are democratic elections, the right to choose and to change your government, not the universal principle being hailed as fundamental across the world? Are the consequences of Western powers choosing stability over democratic change not being felt by the people of Libya today, or the protesters in Bahrain, or Yemen, or Syria, or China? Hasn’t ‘stability’ been the cause used to justify the suppression of democratic movements in these countries and the acquiescence of the West, left and right?

Stability is much over-rated, and can easily tend towards stagnation and sterility in ideas and innovation, in politics every bit as much as economy. Ultimately this leads to the suppression of any alternative because the elite have nothing to offer but more of the same, lacking the intellectual coherence to justify their status and resorting to a corruption of the process of government to avoid the emergence of any challenge to the status quo.

So the challenge to the UUP and SDLP is whether they will continue to shore up the DUP and SF oligarchy or strike a blow for democracy by making the ‘game-changing’ move into opposition. Are they part of the self -regarding political class, caring for the few, or do they care for the many in Northern Ireland ready and willing to move on to real, meaningful change. Are the UUP and/or SDLP chicken, comfortable with the status quo and unwilling to move on? Or will they provide the egg start of a new beginning, and a positive future politics bringing new life and to a sterile coop?

A new beginning http://www.photoshopnerds.com/index.php

The UK Government’s economic measures to tackle the country’s financial deficit will start to impact on all citizens in 2011. It will be a tough year ahead for everyone. The cost of living is rising, with households already noticing  increased costs creeping through to the weekly shopping. Just as households need to keep their spending under control, the need for good and efficient government at all levels is essential. Northern Ireland is not an exception in this regard.

Northern Ireland media focus in early 2011 seems to be on health inefficiencies and disorganisation, before that water was in chaos; before that, roads; an education department at odds with its schools; an agriculture minister who failed to properly account for the land being used for farming. And so on…

With each Department being largely independent of the Executive, except when requiring collective cover, it is no surprise that initial budget ‘agreement’ failed to indicate anything more than broad allocation of spending across Departments. Subsequent budget negotiation appears to be largely through the media rather than round the Executive table. The budget process is not building confidence. Rather than rethinking and shrinking government, the talk is of expanding revenue – taxing to spend on the same old, same old.

It is difficult to be very positive about politics in Northern Ireland in the months, or years, ahead. In almost every aspect of Government the Stormont Executive is a sorry excuse. Inspiration, ideas and impact are absent. Ideology, intransigence and incompetence seem to be the order of the day, to a greater or lesser degree.

Of course Party leaflets will drop through the letter boxes in the run-up to May’s election outlining the achievements of this government, of which almost every Northern Ireland political Party is now part.  Some of this is already being tested by the DUP and Sinn Fein, to greater or lesser success. Most 2011 election information will be little different to that provided for the Westminster election in 2010 – can anyone remember any of the key election promises from less than a year ago? Fine words bearing little momentum towards, or even capacity to kick start, necessary change.

There is no doubt that Northern Ireland would benefit from an effective opposition.

If ever there were a time for the UUP and SDLP to ditch government and enter ‘opposition’ it would be now. They are largely irrelevant to a Government steered by the DUP and Sinn Fein, serving only to underscore the validity of the system; strengthened in 2010 by the arrival of the Alliance Party to the trough.

Of course there is no ‘money’ available for an official opposition. Naturally, financial consideration comes before principle and doing the right thing.

The failure of a DUP/Sinn Fein led government is no surprise because there is no common cause; no common vision binding together the programme for government. Compulsory or enforced coalition, with a prohibition on voting a party out of government guarantees deadlock and failure.

Far from being “an extraordinary endorsement” of progress in NI, as suggested by Secretary of State Owen Paterson, Martin McGuinness as First Minister would only prove that the deck chairs on the Titanic have once again been moved.

The jobs that seem safe at present are those of the political class, who huddle around any of their number under threat. This represents the most often quoted success of Stormont, that it exists. That seems to be enough for our politicians. In the words of Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness respectively, following on from Hillsborough 2010:

“… there will be no going back to the past.”

“We need to make life better for our children and for our grandchildren.”

Of course we cannot go back in time, but neither should we stagnate without change. With the authority of power comes responsibility to use that power wisely ‘for our children’; and if the electorate believes that power is not being used wisely, that the future being shaped by an administration is not attractive, then surely it should have the democratic choice to vote for change.

The Belfast Agreement is over twelve years old.  It was a creation of its moment. Time to move on.

A government that cannot be fundamentally changed has no democratic mandate. Just ask an Egyptian.

It often seems that the last issue to be considered by the Parades Commission is the particular parade under consideration.

Of course the Parades Commission is operating in a context that is highly politicised; though it is meant to be outside ‘political considerations, that idea was dashed when a parade on the Ormeau Road was denied in deference to the ‘Peace Process’ - which looked like not placing responsibility on republicans not to riot. The ‘political process’ has been elevated to over-write all other considerations and the consequent political interference or indifference with respect to parades has been to the detriment of the Rule of Law. No better example of that is the absolute breakdown in authority evident in violence across Northern Ireland in the week of the 12^th July 2010.  Politics and police just stood there taking the abuse and with little evidence of a longer-term response.

While parading by the Orange Order may have provided a context at the 12th, there was little evidence that the July rioters cared deeply whether the Orange Order paraded or not.  The principal battle for hearts and minds is being played out in the Republican/nationalist communities – violence in Lurgan and Londonderry, and elsewhere, was pure thuggery to demonstrate that Sinn Fein’s support for the devolution of policing means little on the streets. The new Republicans on the block have learned well from those who similarly brought anger to the streets in the past: a progression from one generation to the next.

Meanwhile a review of legislation on parades and protest is on-going. The OFMDFM consultation is now the seventh review of the Parades Commission since its inception.

From the outset the Parades Commission was an unparalleled and unwarranted interference with the peaceful expression of a people’s culture and had significant potential to undermine of the Rule of Law. There is no moral or human rights justification for political and legal interference with cultural expression: quite the contrary.  Trade Unionists claim the limitation within the OFMDFM paper are unique in Europe forget that they failed to raise a voice on the Parades Legislation which was similarly unique and intolerant.

Since the inception of the Parades Commission there has been a clear admission by Republicanism of a planned process to use the issue of parades for political advantage.

Sinn Fein has made no secret of its political activity in raising the parades issue.  In the event the political process has been used as a sledgehammer to demonise, diminish and disrupt the exercise of legal, peaceful and fundamental freedom of cultural expression.  The policy has been one of creating a cultural apartheid where no Protestant is seen, heard, or permitted within a stones throw of a designated, reserved, “sanitised” nationalist space:

There were a number of distinct advantages for Republicans in moving forward on the parades agenda. First it plays to the gallery and maintains a wedge between communities. In the absence of armed conflict it maintains a war of words that retains simmering sectarian tensions on which republicanism relies for purpose. This was a political hammer being used to crack a cultural nut. While leaders of the Orange Order may from time to time make pronouncements on broad political matters, it does not function as a political organisation. It was always poorly suited to a public political argument and certainly not to understand or challenge a political machine.

Political interference has prolonged the parades issue in Northern Ireland.  The Parades Commission was itself a buck-passing exercise by the NIO, supported by the police – a firewall to take the heat off the Secretary of State and Chief Constable.  It was born of political strategy and suckled by the political expediency of politicians who wanted to be seen as leading the fight (both sides), and by the demands of the ‘political process’ that meant not confronting the realities of rights and responsibilities as they should be within a society where the Rule of Law is paramount.

How the placing of the Parades issue into the Office of OFMDFM will not result in political interference/dealing/brokering is outside thedissenter’s ability to imagine.  The present proposals seem to have been predicated on a political deal at Hillsborough.  That the issue of Parades is being discussed in the context of a political deal is itself a weakness and indicative of a fundamental flaw in strategic thinking.  A principled and fair outcome to the resolution of parades issues should be a local matter, having due respect for the Rule of Law, and not reliant on externalities.  If the Review itself depends on a political deal, then how will parades not continue to be politicised and used to modulate tensions and division to the benefit of a few and to the detriment of all?

The process outlined by this most recent consultation process merely transfers the Parades Commission from being a quasi-judicial ‘independent’ body within the orbit of the NIO, to a quasi-judicial office within the orbit of the OFMDFM.  This does not inspire confidence in transparency, accountability or an end to political interference.    A previous ‘Quigley Report’ on parades had positive ideas with respect to an open, accountable and transparent process of addressing parading issues.  There were elements of the mediation aspects of that Report which were woolly, but if offered a strategic view rather than political fix.

The current proposals do not offer significant encouragement to believe that a Shared Future is possible while a process exists in law that can be used to politically delineate and define ‘our streets’, and ‘our territory’. That this process is given legal standing does not remove legislation on parades and protest from the status of base sectarian harassment of folks wishing to be free to express their culture or viewpoints in peace and without fear of threat or violence.

In a normal society, one in which cultural pluralism is the norm and freedom of conscience is cherished, where another’s culture and views are respected, there would be no need for parades regulation by whatever name that body is known.  The Ashdown Interim Consultation Report assumed the premise of a ‘normal’ society.  If OFMDFM believed that Northern Ireland society has the ability to move forward then why consider the regulation of a people’s culture to be at all necessary?  How does legislation that tends towards cultural apartheid and unreasonably and unfairly penalises a particular culture.

The Rule of Law should be sufficient to protect freedoms without regulatory bodies open to political interference. But authority, and the leadership that falls from that place of respect and standing in either politics or policing, seems absent. That we are where we are on parades and protests shows an attitude that all too readily accepts intolerance and exclusion as a norm, and for some is a political necessity.

The 2010 Westminster election is over.  While the poll outcome was inconclusive the upshot is a decisive shift in British Politics where a progressive coalition has burst through the liberal centre/right. In the process, there were no important phone calls to the Northern Ireland parties, who now sit on the Parliamentary margins.

The debates on national television provided an energy to the national election. Locally the election campaign was as lacklustre and uninspiring as the Party leaders on the local TV debates.

On the nationalist side the new leader of the SDLP simply argued a greener case than Sinn Fein, ceding any advantage new leadership might offer in setting the electoral debate and regaining ground in the future. Sinn Fein organised a campaign that seemed more a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections and must be disappointed that they made little inroad into the SDLP vote on polling day.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: comparative strength.

The obvious decline in SDLP votes since 1998 is not to the great benefit of Sinn Fein.  For Westminster 2001, the high point of nationalist turnout, the SDLP had 168,873 and Sinn Fein 175,932; in 2010, 110,970 and 171,942 respectively.  In percentage terms Sinn Fein is clearly outvoting the SDLP, but it has made no gains in number of votes.  The overall Nationalist/Republican vote appears relatively static.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative

Republicans, in particular, have made much of an inroad into defeating Unionism, electorally. While Unionism was once dominant electorally, this was at a time when nationalists probably failed to even register to vote. The heady early 1970s, when unionist voters turned out in great numbers, was not a time of unionist unity. Since then, nationalists and republicans have fully engaged in the electoral process, and around 200,000 have been added to the electoral register.

Electorate and turnout for elections 1969-2010: comparative.

Summarily, the increase in registered voters has been to the benefit of neither nationalists nor unionists. In recent years the electorate, unionist and nationalist, has slowly disengaged from politics. However, ignoring the numbers and entering the percentage game, Sinn Fein has gained as it holds its vote relative to others.  Somehow, despite Sinn Fein’s project seemingly stalling, Unionist Parties are presenting a picture of unionism in crisis.

Much has been made of the apparent failure of leaders (and leadership) within Unionism, and there has been a great deal of debate since the Westminster election on the topic of what the future holds for unionism.

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: comparative strength

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

The numbers suggest that the Ulster Unionist Party is bumping along and has done little to regain the electoral trust that it squandered under David Trimble. Just as the UUP climbed electoral heights in the 1990s, so it has fallen to consistent lows over the past decade.  The decline has been hard for a Party that still gives the impression that it still believes itself to the natural Party of Government. Although the UUP electoral arrangement with the Conservative Party has been derided, on the positive side, at least the Party could had the finance to run a campaign and the vote was probably no worse than if the arrangement hadn’t existed.

A lowly UUP ought to have been good news for the DUP. However, similar to their principal partners in the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP has not been able to take advantage of their rival’s electoral slide. The DUP vote has been remarkably stable over the past decade.  The Party immediately benefited from the mistrust of the Ulster Unionist Party; acting as the standard bearer of opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein. In the decade from 1998, those who became disillusioned or discontented with the UUP either left politics or joined the DUP.  Over this period the unionist electorate could be characterised as either being ‘for’ the UUP or ‘against’.

Unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010 (not including UUP/DUP): combined/cumulative

In the 2007 Assembly election there was still a broad expectation that the DUP would not enter Government with Sinn Fein. When they did, off the back of apparently verified decommissioning by the IRA (which seems to have missed 40% ), it can be no surprise that the DUP would suffer to some extent in the same way as the UUP.  That was certainly the instance in the 2009 European Election, when Jim Allister of the TUV took a signification proportion of the unionist vote.

While the TUV did less well in the Westminster election, drift from the two main parties was nevertheless marked. Trust has gone. Yes, there was an agreed unionist candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone, and the DUP stood aside in North Down. Even so, in an election when the overall unionist vote increased on the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP must be disappointed that it cannot point to any positive electoral gain.

All unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

Nationalism performed less well than unionism in the Westminster election, albeit marginally. Yet the debate post election is on the future of unionism. Inevitably this has centred on the future of the Parties, and in particular the leaderships.

No unionist leader has much to cheer about post-election.  The TUV performed poorly, though it was never likely that the European pr vote could have been replicated in the first-past-the-post Westminster poll. Still, the TUV lacked depth in its candidate selection, and Jim Allister’s political persona was one of anger.  The Unionist electorate is past anger. It wants to trust again. To do that it desires confidence in a leadership can attract talent and articulate a pathway to restoring community, cultural and political confidence. The TUV was not alone in failing to meet that expectation.

Sir Reg Empey lost in South Antrim. Perhaps he has done enough service to David Cameron’s Conservatives to gain a peerage and join David Trimble, in which case his candidature was not entirely in vain.  It was his close association with David Trimble that probably reduced his chances in South Antrim, where not even a hawkish David Burnside had been able to hold the seat. The electorate that punished the UUP then, and sent an unambiguous message on the leadership of David Trimble, was hardly likely to vote now for someone equally at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement.  Adrian Watson, the choice of the local UUP would probably have fared better as a new and local face for Westminster.

Sir Reg also lost on the wider political field. From the outset of the UUP Conservative arrangement he failed to present a convincing narrative to overcome the sense that this was a marriage of convenience: the Conservatives needed a significant electoral base in Northern Ireland and the UUP needed the money.  The UUP message that Stormont was a ‘huckster’s shop’ should have had some traction with a disillusioned electorate. However, Sir Reg’s inability to bring clarity and direction to the UCUNF (UUP/Conservative) arrangement suggested that he equally unable to manage his own neighbourhood store. There was the sluggishness in agreeing candidates. Finally, for thedissenter, Fred Cobain standing as a Conservative & Unionist?

And yet, the UUP vote broadly held up across Northern Ireland. Yes, it now has no seats at Westminster.  But it still has a base on which to build. On the wider national electoral front the politics of the nation has been trust into new territory with the Conservative/Liberal coalition (or is that Liberal Conservative coalition).  There is deep resentment of the central Conservative Party organisation among many local Conservative constituency organisations.  Although talking about decentralising power from Westminster, Cameron has strongly centralised Conservative Party organisation around his own team.  This has not delivered the majority he needed; in many instances this was down to lack of flexibility in addressing local electoral campaigns: Adrian Watson is a case in point.

What became clear on election night was that the country no longer acts uniformly. The great swingometer was made redundant on a night where local electorates seemed to take a local view – resulting in massively varying swings across the country.  It would suggest that future candidates will need to emphasise more local issues and rely less on national coat-tails.

In this respect there is certainly a place for more regionally based politically associations where the central party outlines core principles, but does not dictate local candidate selection and tolerates a degree of policy variance around the country.  If the Conservatives and the UUP can find that balance between regional and national interests then there is a future for the UUP. Otherwise, not.

At times in the run-up to and during the election the argument of the UUP almost seemed to be that the DUP couldn’t be trusted: to which the electorate added the word ‘either’. In the end the only place that this mattered was in East Belfast, where the electorate cast a plague on the UUP and DUP. Of course the rejection of a sitting MP, and in this case the leader of the DUP, was a huge slap to Peter Robinson.  In the rest of the country the DUP held its own and it seats.

The East Belfast seat was not a natural loss, had there been anyone of stature in the East Belfast DUP to have stood as an alternative to Peter Robinson: Strangford, the Westminster seat once held by Iris Robinson was retained by the DUP. The electoral strategy for the East Belfast seat has long been the strength of the Robinsons (Westminster/Assembly/Council) to bring in all others on their coat-tails.  Time for a re-think.

The apparent nature of the internal politics of the DUP suggests that there is little likelihood of Robinson being replaced as leader; for reasons not that dissimilar to the earlier thedissenter piece in the wake of revelations around Iris Robinson earlier in the year. The early DUP was shaped by Ian Paisley. The latter-day DUP has been shaped by Peter Robinson.  There is little obvious alternative to Peter Robinson’s leadership.  Peter Robinson’s East Belfast Assembly seat is relatively secure, as one of many, which assures his leadership position where it matters most to the DUP, at Stormont.

Before bringing together all these points into a broad conclusion it is worth noting the success of Naomi Long. First, by accepting David Ford at the Executive Table, the Alliance Party has been elevated to the position of central and ‘trusted’ player.  Second Naomi Long is local, and hard working. Third, Alliance has always had strength in East Belfast. Finally, she wasn’t Peter Robinson, and whether unionist or not, she isn’t perceived as nationalist.

Electoral ups and downs of principal parties: 1969-2010 *

The Alliance Party has been much stronger in the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s than it has been anytime in the past decade.  It still has a lot of work to do to grow its base, and there are not obviously an army of Long-type candidates to make an impact in 2011 at Stormont (and probably across 26 Local Government areas). In percentage terms it’s vote will look good where any general increase is a gain against an smaller voting public overall, though in pure numbers terms it has a long way to go.  Notions of some kind of renaissance in the political centre ground are premature.

Back to the big debate, within and around Unionism. The focus of that debate is numbers, and focused on whether in the forthcoming 2011 election Sinn Fein might gain a position where it may be able to lay claim to the post of First Minister.

Since the changes following the St Andrews Agreement any party with the votes and seats necessary can lay claim to the post of First Minister.  This provides for more equitable power-sharing in that it does not create a hierarchy of parties – theoretically anyone can be a First Minister. Would it make a great difference for Sinn Fein to be First Minister? If you accept Sinn Fein as a partner in Government then why not?

The most recent political push for unionist unity has arisen principally as a DUP campaign tactic to corner the UUP/Conservative arrangement, pushing at the fact that one of the certainties espoused in this arrangement was that the Conservatives were committed to stand in all 18 seats.  The agreement of a candidate on a unity-style ticket in Fermanagh South Tyrone undermined the determination of the UUP/Conservative pact. Had Rodney Connor won it would have placed even greater pressure on the UUP/Conservative pact that it failed to make a similar arrangement in South Belfast.

That the tactic in Fermanagh South Tyrone failed to deliver its intended outcome still leaves the DUP in a position to argue that it only failed because it was late in the day, the electorate was unconvinced of UUP sincerity, the Conservative link lost vital votes and anything that throws blame around and away to the DUP: this is a criticism of the DUP blame game generally and not that, conversely, the DUP is ‘to blame’.

The focus on the issue of First Minister is a tactical one – a means to give purpose to closer co-operation between the parties (if not merger). Yet the real issue is not one of tactics to meet short-term and tokenistic outcomes. The failure of Sir Reg (lost seat, lost leadership) to stabilise and provide purpose to the UUP, the DUP’s failure to dismiss the TUV altogether and to regain momentum lost in 2009, reflect deeper malaise within unionist parties.

Ironically, the arrival of the TUV brought unionist voters to the polling booths and increased the overall unionist vote would suggest that disunity has its advantages, allowing the fractious and independently minded unionist voter an avenue to express discontent with established parties.

The logic of engagement by all parties in the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement is an acceptance that the Union is safe in the hands of the unionist electorate: that is the principle of consent.  Unionist voters accept this and many seem content not to vote for parties that fail to reflect their concerns and provide competent government.   This is not a problem for unionism alone, nationalism has a similar challenge, though seems content to lose itself in the green romantic mists of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow.  A plague on all their houses?

Addressing unionist unity from a structural perspective is bound to disappoint. Political party realignment is merely mixing decks and dishing out the job cards in a different order.  The electorate is hardly likely to be impressed. Identifying a loss of voter, by class or aspiration, does not address the message sent at the Westminster election: none of the leaders of unionism presented a coherent and inspirational purpose for unionism in the twenty-first century.

A unionist should feel proud to fly the Union flag, and should not feel that it is somewhat diminished when wrapped around those who seek to lead Unionism. It should not be worn in anger, it should not cover embarrassment, and it should not be wrapped around a backroom deal.  Discussion on the Union should be a matter of substance, not tactical number crunching: it is a matter for open discussion, not whispers behind closed doors.

Unionist Parties may be under threat through a loss of relative electoral strength. That does not mean that the Union is under threat: which is not to say that the Union cannot be lost. As elsewhere, this article has been an exercise in looking at the outcomes of the Westminster election and reading the runes. There are a few pointers which may shape consideration of the future for Unionists.

• The overall nationalist vote appears static.
• Nationalist voters appear just as disengaged as unionist voters.
• The UUP might consider its future within a regional/national and liberal conservative context, but is otherwise nothing but a fading reflection of better times.
• The DUP built its presence on becoming biggest: now it is, what next?
• The unionist voter seemed uninspired by any of the unionist Parties’ offers.
• The overall unionist vote benefits from disunity, not unity.
• The SDLP was dominant in 1998. What happened?
• If Sinn Fein is a worthy party for Government, and to hold a post co-equal to the First Minister then why shouldn’t it hold the post of First Minister?
• The issue of a Sinn Fein First Minister is a narrow tactical argument that distracts from the lack of attractive leadership from either the UUP or DUP, or from anywhere elsewhere in unionist circles.
• Short-term tactical considerations will not address the future of unionism as a political cause.
• The Union is safe: at least that rests with the electorate and not the politicians.

The Westminster election changed very little. The points above have been matters for varying degree of consideration for some time. The election has simply brought them to the fore. Much of that discussion has taken place at Open Unionism and in the pages of the press, and probably around the lunch tables of Stormont buildings and meeting places elsewhere.

Tactical considerations of stopping a Sinn Fein First Minister are given an air of immediacy, including an urgency on discussion of political party restructuring. The larger and more important issue of the purpose and sense of Unionist cause is receiving less attention, perhaps because there is no personal or party gain in thinking outside the box?  (It is a lonely place outside the box, and risky.)  How does the discussion move beyond the tactical and party political to a more central discussion on the nature and future expression of Unionism fit for the twenty-first century?

Without a common understanding of the central tenets of Unionism there is little chance of Party political unity among unionists. Unionists must know what the Union is for, holding common purpose; it must not be defined by what it is not, what it is against. The electorate wishes positive, not negative, Unionism. With that central understanding would party political unionism mean anything anyway? Is unionism an ‘ism’ at all? How do we move beyond a position of being in defence of the Union to advancing and deepening the Union? These are the questions to be the subject of Looking Forward: Part 2. Later.

*/** please note that the graphs are indicative. While every effort was made to input the numbers correctly, sometimes interpretation of orginal data was difficult. I may have designated an independent in the unionist circles when it should have been nationalist: the early 1970s was a confusing time. ’Others’ sometimes includes all but the main parties; more than just the odds and sods. Data on registered electorate and turnout was not always available, and sometimes only in percentage terms. Taking all this into account,  all graphs should be viewed as broadly accurate, but mostly illustrative.  If any reader wishes to repeat the exercise and find fault, the source information is found within CAIN and ARK: knock yourself out.

All the ingredients were there: the crisis, the Prime Ministers, the big house, the Belfast Telegraph survey, the Parties doing all night sittings and the press pack.  At the end of all that we have the “Agreement at Hillsborough Castle” as it is officially described.  Not a deal.  Not “The Hillsborough Castle Agreement”.  Nothing definitive, just ‘agreement’ as part of a step process: same process as the “Agreement at St Andrews‘.

Many are of course delighted that there was any sort of agreement at all.  Especially Gordon Brown who would undoubtedly not wish one of New Labour’s great projects to crash just before a Westminster election, and probably David Cameron who will not inherit an immediate crisis should he become Prime Minister after the General Election.  

 The ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ amounts to very little but a process that revolves around progress towards the devolution of Policing & Justice.  The only certainty is that there is a date assigned for the transfer of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly. That date appears to be conditional on a range of other points/matters/actions happening in some sort of sequence.

What are the chances of the agreement working out to a conclusion?  The Agreement is in five parts.

Section One provides a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly.  There are a series of procedural steps which, so long as Gordon Brown does not call an election in the next few weeks should see the formal transfer of powers by 12 April. 

Section Two is Parades. It is hard to see how Sinn Fein will ever accept that people lawfully and peacefully should not be subject to the sectarian harassment of unlawful violent protest, or a planned protest which lacks the discipline to behave in a civilised manner. The pursuit of cultural apartheid through designation of Protestant-free zones seems to underline republican demonisation of the Loyal Orders. Hard to see how Republicans will ever agree to a shared future when they are unable to countenance sharing a stretch of road a few times a year; not that many in the SDLP are more tolerant.

Section Three is a clever device to sideline the UUP and SDLP.  The problems with the functionality of the Executive lie in the institutional arrangements; the Executive seeks to enforce consensus among a disparate group of political parties which, leaving aside their constitutional pre-dispositions, have little in common. Section Three is not likely to amount to much more than the generation of a whinge list, but is disconnected to the issue of the devolution of Policing and Justice, and therefore is of little immediate consequence.

Section Four outlines no more than just an administrative catch-up process.  As with Section Three this is not timetabled and therefore may well be forgotten about unless there is a need to show something of progress – even if it is only seeing the Executive finally get round to doing what it ought to have already done, which if they were able to agree they would have done already.

Section Five is timetabled, and suggests that the Junior Ministers will be exceptionally busy. Not only are they putting a progress and action plan together for outstanding Executive business (Section Four), they will also be doing a report on outstanding issues from the St Andrews Agreement.  The most recent Policing and Justice ‘crisis’ has arisen from a very different determination what is meant by in paragraph 7 of the Agreement at St Andrews : “It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008.” If there is failure to even agree on what was agreed then, what presently constitutes an ‘outstanding matter’ may well be a challenge in itself.

The fanfare for this ‘agreement’ is worthy of a snake oil salesmen’s convention. Agreed, tentatively and with provisos, is a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice.  That is it. The DUP has allowed the issue of ‘community confidence’ to focus on the parades issue, but that is just one area where confidence in the Stormont administration is weak.  Lack of accountability, the chimera of collective responsibility and absent democratic counterbalance of effective opposition are fundamentals that appear not to have been discussed at Hillsborough, yet are underlying factors in the lack of unionist confidence in Stormont generally.

Sectioning parades hides the real fear of devolution of Policing and Justice with respect to that issue: Section One (9), that a future Minister could take a decision by request or otherwise, to step in to ban a parade without recourse to the Executive. Given the history of the generation of parades contention by Sinn Fein, the pattern is set.  With the Justice Minister open to d’Hondt in the next Assembly the ground is set for a heightening of conflict centred on parades, whoever gets the Justice Ministry. 

The quasi-judicial powers of the Justice Minister is the ticking time-bomb on parades. More immediately, the parades fuse is lit on this ‘Agreement’. Ashdown wasn’t even close to a credible alternative to the Parades Commission. Serious questions on the process within that ‘interim’ report remain unanswered; yet that ‘report’ is noted as a start point on which to build.  

The Hillsborough talks have demonstrated that the DUP is as useless as the UUP at negotiation: the lead-up to Hillsborough was promising, but the end result is a big disappointment.  The DUP blinked, and Sinn Fein is now piling on the pressure on parades, upping the ante and making resolution on parades nigh on impossible: the most recent outburst from Martin McGuinness is an example.  More generally, the remarks by Pat Doherty point to a longer term process of attrition; building on the undermining of cultural identity and political confidence within the broad unionist electorate.   

Sinn Fein has its date for devolution of Policing and Justice.  Once in process, how many believe there will be much concluded of Sections Two, Three, Four and Five without another ‘crisis’.

By any measure, unionist community confidence in the ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ is at best low.  The text of the published document was printed in newspapers and is readily available online as a document and subject of comment. The success of the snake oil salesman is in the ignorance and credulity of the buying public.  To presume that somehow the lack of confidence can be solved by wider publication is erroneous. 

Parades may be an obvious point of contention in this ‘Agreement’, but fundamentally the real issue is a lack of confidence in the institutions themselves into which Policing and Justice is to be devolved.  Broadly speaking, the unionist community has little desire for more snake oil from the huckster’s store, no matter how many times the bottle is rebranded ‘new & improved’.

Picture: parliament.uk picture gallery

The opinion polls are erratic, as discussed on thedissenter earlier, and the potential for a tightly hung Parliament is real. A party holding a small number of seats may gain considerable importance.  So the performance of local parties is of national interest: though notional until the counts are complete.

thedissenter will resist entering a seat by seat analysis: that has been undertaken elsewhere, and there is sure to be more before the date of the election is finally announced.  At this point, selection of candidates is far from complete.  There are a number of factors which have the potential to impact on turnout and final count, and this post will look at those rather than enter fanciful prediction as others have done.

Most probably there will be two elections, again, in Northern Ireland – a nationalist one and a unionist one. There may be movements on the margins, but nothing of importance.  The greatest impact on the final count is most likely going to be the polling strength of the TUV and the way in which that Party’s presence, or not, affects the electoral balance in each constituency.

There is little on the horizon that is likely to impact on the Sinn Fein vote. Some might wishfully suggest that the woeful media management around family matters might wound Gerry Adams, and by association, Sinn Fein. Suzanne Breen spelled out the case in the Tribune.  Liam Clarke lays out the questions that linger in the Sunday Times.  Yet morality is hardly an issue for the Sinn Fein voter, happy to support a Party that has ‘yet to renounce its history of violence and terror, makes the vast majority of people here, sick to their stomachs’: that would be a majority of the total population, but it seems not the ‘nationalist’ population.

Of course things might change if there was a credible nationalist alternative to Sinn Fein, but there is not.

Republicans who hold onto their Marxist socialism etc, those who abide by the ‘physical force’ tradition, or those who hold onto both, are too small in number to have an electoral impact at this time.  Even so it seems likely that there will only be a marginal, though inconsequential, shrinkage of support for Sinn Fein, if not on a matter of morals then perhaps on the other issues within the Republican family which rumble along.

The SDLP is going through a prolonged leadership contest. If the contest is not inspiring, it is because the choice holds little promise. One has built a reputation on being hard on Loyalist paramilitaries (albeit without due care to Ministerial responsibilities) and making ignorant remarks about the Loyal Orders.  The other has proved adept at building on political opportunity in retaining his seat and building a strong and respected SDLP presence in South Belfast. Neither has excelled outside their respective constituencies.

Whether a harder nationalist line or greater organizational capacity, rural nationalism or metropolitan social democracy, is chosen by the SDLP, the May (or even March) election will give little time for a new leader to make much of a mark on the political landscape.  Bar opening statements of intent, the leadership contest seems entirely internal and lacking much rigour.

The SDLP will most probably hold its own in the coming election; not least because while it has little to offer by way of alternative to Sinn Fein, Sinn Fein is not in a place where it is able to build on past success and bury the SDLP. For now, the nationalist electorate is offered stale crusty policy from both parties which will result in a stalemate within that electorate.

There is a range of factors that make the election of much greater importance to Unionism.  The Westminster expenses story has exercised the Unionist community to a far greater extent that it has within nationalism. Movies, the “Swish Family Robinson” headline, and a perception that Unionist politicians are more likely to employ family members combined to offend a Unionist sensibility that  politicians are elected to serve their constituents’ interests and not their own self-interest.

To some extent the expenses issue gave the TUV’s Jim Allister his barn storming result at the European election in June 2009 – though DUP arrogance and UUP delusion probably played far a greater part.  Whether or not the residue of this debate continues to undermine current MPs is something to consider, but would be only one factor of many in determining constituency outcomes. Some of the heat of the expenses row will be removed by sitting MPs, such as Iris Robinson, not standing again.

The debate within Unionism of ‘unity’ candidates usefully detracts from the lack of any discernable policy that makes the Conservative/UUP electoral arrangements any great force for change in the forthcoming election.  It is hard to believe that any serious unionist politician would believe that not taking an opportunity to defeat a Sinn Fein candidate (as might present itself in Fermanagh South Tyrone) will play well with the wider unionist electorate.  Realistically it is only in Fermanagh South Tyrone that any agreement has the possibility of returning a Unionist candidate.  However, the Conservative commitment to stand in every constituency in the UK means it has no time for local sensibilities and no strategy or apparent interest in inflicting a loss on Sinn Fein.

In South Belfast there is little UUP constituency infrastructure to conduct a substantial canvas – and the Assembly poll showed little chance of an Ulster Unionist win.  Furthermore the sitting SDLP MP already represents a broadly ‘conservative’ sort of approach, and the Alliance candidate a more PC choice, that undermines any gain the Conservative Party would hope to achieve from the Catholic electorate in the constituency – not that the Conservative/UUP hierarchies would be so calculatingly sectarian in their final selection.

By far the largest impact on the election will the issue of multi-mandates, or double-jobbing as it is more commonly described. Of course the legislation to enforce sole mandates must complete its course through Parliament, but already the principle has had consequences.  Jeffrey Donaldson seems to have chosen Westminster over a Ministerial position in Stormont. Mark Durkan has chosen Westminster and initiated an SDLP Leadership election. Michael McGimpsey has cited commitment to Stormont for not putting his name forward in South Belfast.

More generally, the multi-mandate is more of a challenge for the DUP than the other Parties because it has a more MPs than any other Party.  It will mean new faces entering the political frame.  The DUP has been building profile for a number of their MLAs and Councillors, though perhaps circumstances will now accelerate advancement for a few.  ‘Knowing’ your politician is important. Name recognition makes a big difference at election time.  The DUP has also been hugely effective at building a constituency network. That should stand it in good stead. Its November conference was uplifting and rallied the troops, despite what might be viewed as setbacks in the previous year. The DUP enters the election in an entirely positive frame of mind.

A haphazard constituency presence and aging membership means the Ulster Unionist Party is less than able for this election.  This may be compensated by the Conservative Party’s money and campaigning expertise: though the Conservative Party seems to be overly relying on the newness of its entry into the electoral field to garner excitement around average and fairly unknown personalities. If it were a straight DUP v UUP/Conservative contest then the DUP would race home lengths ahead.

The TUV showing at the European election, with Jim Allister thrusting into the political arena with as good as a third of the unionist vote, fundamentally altered any consideration of future unionist electoral outcomes. Of all the political leaders within Unionism, Jim Allister has the biggest headache.  The has to perform in such a way as to be seen to make an advance on the European success, or make a case for why the performance is comparable.

Maximising the TUV vote would suggest the need to stand in all 18 constituencies. However, 66,000 votes spread across 18 constituencies will not win Westminster seats.  The TUV autumn conference was notable that many of the attendees were stalwart workers who once knocked doors, placed posters, and manned phones for the UUP and DUP in past elections. These are the members with drive and devotion who delivered at the European election, but are best focused rather than spread thinly.

Of course the Ulster Unionist Party and Conservatives are banking on the TUV standing to damage the DUP vote in their favour. But this is not Dromore or the European elections. There will be no transfers available for Westminster.

The TUV has already said it will not stand in Fermanagh South Tyrone or South Belfast, leaving the other parties to look less than able to put unionist interests first and foremost – even suggesting an agreed ‘non-Party’ candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone. The TUV will not stand in North Belfast. Where there is no chance of a Unionist winning the TUV may stand a candidate to hoover additional votes.  The toughest challenges are of course where a Unionist candidate will win, of one Party or another.

Jim Allister himself has declared his candidacy for North Antrim. East Antrim where he once had a strong base, Lagan Valley and Strangford are obvious targets.  Elsewhere he has the luxury of being able to wait to decide on whether it is worth standing a candidate at all. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

In many seats there will not enough difference between the DUP and UUP canidates to matter which Party is elected, but where a TUV candidate will alter the electoral mathematics a judgment must be made as to whether  the TUV could make a positive difference.

The TUV might also be seen as merely spiteful in engaging in constituencies only to place pressure on the DUP’s sitting MP, especially when TUV support comes from across the unionist spectrum. And why give the UUP/Conservative arrangement a lucky pass? The UUP, and in particular the Conservative Party, will do the TUV no favours, and their joint inflexibility is the greatest reason why Fermanagh South Tyrone will most certainly be retained by Sinn Fein.  Why spread the TUV’s limited resources , only to give the UUP/Conservatives the benefit?

The TUV will most certainly be the election story in 2010, but it is too early to say how the Party will impact on the conduct of the campaign or the result. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

So there will be an election (or two) in 2010. A lot can happen before Election Day. Nothing else is certain.

The summer interview with Shami Chakrabarti of Liberty by the Economist (below) will not have been welcome in Republican Nationalist circles.

Around 12 minutes in, Ms Chakrabarti says: “I would say to people of faith, and to people who are not of faith, that the one right that none of us should ever have is the right not to be offended”.   

The debate on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights is in a trough. Unsurprisingly.  Listening to many supporters of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights brings back memories of the old Eastern Bloc Communists listing rights at conferences to show superiority over western capitalist systems. Of course it was a fantasy that the written and legal rights of the Soviet bloc could ever create wealth or well being. The hell was where such ‘rights’ could also be used to enforce exclusion and a narrow sectarian view of the world where those who questioned such rights were marginalised, at worst to the gulag.

Rights proffered by Republicans and Nationalists (and assorted leftists) are not for the benefit of the people, but as a route to power over others. Thus in the recent Sinn Fein publication on a Shared Future there is apparently objective consideration of rights and responsibilities, eg. “the right to live free from sectarian, racist or any other forms of harassment”, and “Peaceful, inclusive and unthreatening expression of culture and cultures.” At the same time there can be no doubt about the subjective interpretation (which we have heard all too often from Republicans and Nationalists) that systematically demonises Loyal Order processions as triumphal and sectarian, and has a clear outcome of the ability (or right) to exclude or dictate to the Orders on their processional routes. 

The Sinn Fein document is considerably shorter than the OFMDFM working draft (you may need to save the pdf as the link from the DUP page is temperamental).  But then Sinn Fein’s agenda is considerably narrower. Perhaps presuming that the route to adoption of its ‘rights’ agenda is unlikely to be through a Northern Irelands Bill of Rights, Sinn Fein has hit on the idea of creating a process whereby there is official sanction of its narrow sectarian parades agenda: creating areas where Sinn Fein is in a place where it is able to decide whether or not a Loyal Order Parade can walk.  A document on a Shared Future seems an inappropriate place to impose the policy for that process.

It is interesting that dialogue on the accommodation of Parades, first around the Ormeau Road, and more recently around Ardoyne, has never succeeded in identifying the cause or nature of the offence taken by Republicans or Nationalists. Those across the table from the Apprentice Boys of Derry and the North & West Belfast Parades Forum have never isolated the specifics of how a five minute walk by some shops can be of such offence that people feel the urge to violently react; hurling missiles at the participants and police.

Republicans have desperately locked themselves into an parades agenda that first demonised, and then demonised some more, and continues to demonise members of another community that, however different and British, express their culture peaceably and in good order. It would be encouraging to think that Republicans and Nationalists might seek a way out of the parades issue that was a win:win for all. Such opportunities in the past, on Ormeau and in North Belfast, have been passed by.  A win is sought at any cost, regardless of the wider consequences for society.

Instead of taking offence, or sensing grievance, Republicans and Nationalists need to work towards building a shared future. That task, for the foreseeable future, is one that means working for all the people of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom as agreed within the Good Friday Agreement.  Republicans and Nationalists can talk to themselves as long as they like about a United Ireland, but unless they can share a street every now and then there will be little respect for their larger ambitions from within the broad unionist community. Republicans cannot complain of lack of respect in Government when they show such disrespect to the ordinary Protestant on the street. Alternatively, meaningful engagement and commitment to working for a shared future will benefit everyone and earn Republicans the respect they crave.

Jonathan Sacks, as Chief Rabbi, summed up the prize for a society that lives with its differences, which has echoes of Shami’s words:  “In a plural society – all the more in a plural world – each of us has to settle for less than we do when we associate with fellow believers…. Yet what we lose is more than compensated for by the fact that together we are co-architects of a society larger than we can construct on our own, one in which our voice is heard and attended to even if it does not carry the day. Just as community is built on the willingness to let the ‘I’ be shaped by the ‘We’, so society is made by the readiness to let the ‘We’ of our community be constrained by the need to make space for the other communities and their deeply held beliefs.” from The Dignity of Difference, a plea by Jonathan Sacks for tolerance in the age of extremism.

The voting percentages show little change for any Party other than the DUP (2004/2009).

Alliance and Greens may be cock-a-hoop at their result, except that closer analysis shows they gained no more than the minor parties altogether in 2004. This takes account of the lower turnout, a drop of around 65,000 votes, to a more ‘normal’ level of voting in the European elections of around 43% – still a way to go with the UK turnout of around 34%, though roughly equal to the European-wide average (though some countries have compulsory voting).

Election details are here.

Even though Barbre DeBrun was elected on the first count, and topped the poll, Sinn Fein worked hard to stand still in this election.  Same for Alban Maginness and the SDLP.  The SDLP at least halted decline and saw the Sinn Fein percentage of the vote drop very marginally (0.3%).  While the story of the election was on the split in the Unionist vote, the nationalist parties are in a rut.  Sinn Fein’s rut is on both sides of the border – they lost their one MEP, and a decent performance in local government elections held on the same day has since been spoiled by resignations.

For Sinn Fein the question must be ‘where next?’.  For all nationalists, it must surely be dawning that a United Ireland is generations away, if ever.  The Republic of Ireland is preoccupied with its economy. Moreover, across Europe voters turned away from the left, on which both main nationalist parties loosely base their political approach: though interesting to see Sinn Fein lose in Dublin to a real socialist suggesting a squeeze for Sinn Fein between left and right.

Sinn Fein’s campaign for a United Ireland (in America) does a lot to help Jim Allister’s proposition that the Belfast Agreement was not a ‘settlement’: another Sinn Fein contradiction; if we cannot go ‘back’ to pre-Belfast Agreement, neither can we go forward to a United Ireland if a ‘settlement’ exists. If  Sinn Fein’s next step is to go off to America and argue for a United Ireland there, as Alex Kane points out in the News Letter, it might as well as no-one in Ireland is listening.

In the time since the election the SDLP hasn’t really done anything much. The post-election shuffle of committee positions in Stormont passed by almost unremarked.

The Unionist vote split broadly three ways: DUP, Diane Dodds, 88,346; UCUNF, Jim Nicholson, 82,893; TUV, Jim Allister, 66,197.

As this was an STV PR election, lets start with Jim Nicholson who topped the Unionist vote at the end of the count.  The decline in voter numbers, though a marginal increase in the percentage share due to the overall decrease in voting, leaves it impossible to know if the new collaboration with the Conservative Party was a benefit or not to the Ulster Unionists.  Either the UUP vote could have been worse, and the Tory link attracted middle class voters who would not have otherwise bothered. Or, the UUP have bottomed and the Tory link has been a convenient financial leg up until fortunes improve.

Of course the Ulster Unionists hope that the split between the DUP and TUV will deliver an extra seat in the upcoming, Westminster elections. Perhaps. Any seat would be a bonus given that it seems likely that North Down will be lost one way or another.

More interesting was the transfer of the majority of Jim Allister’s vote to Jim Nicholson.

It is not entirely correct to view Jim Allister’s TUV as ‘integrationalist’. Integrationalist has long been used as a term of abuse by devolutionists to indicate that this was a lesser Unionism, in some way; mostly to suggest that relying on the ‘untrustworthy’ Westminster establishment was plain foolish as it was in cahoots with the Pan-nationalist front.  Nevertheless it seems logical that if TUV voters are less enamoured with devolution, in principle, then the natural transfer would be to a Party that provides the stronger pan-UK link – a national representation through the UUP/Con collaboration.

Transfers will matter more at the next Assembly election, where those last few seats will be down to how the parties view each other, and where every Conservative as well as UUP vote (at present there is no agreement between the two parties for Assembly elections) will be as important as the TUV’s.  This triumvirate may provide a serious threat to the DUP in the Assembly elections because it would probably mean the final transfers will see Unionists other than the DUP elected.   Moreover, the addition of the TUV to the ballot paper seems, for now, to be shoring up the electoral turnout of the Unionist vote thereby increasing the total non-DUP vote.

The UUP have picked up on one of Jim Allister’s election themes – that the DUP/Sinn Fein led government is inherently unstable. Since the election the UUP have increasingly built up a picture that suggests that government in Northern Ireland is failing.  However, the UUP offers no alternative and no analysis as to why it would be different with an alternative arrangement of the chairs around the Executive table – currently the only possible outcome of an Assembly election.  It has hinted that a Conservative Government would bring change, though exactly what change is not elaborated – event though this doesn’t square with David Camerons endorsement of current arrangements.  To some extent this ambiguity assists the TUV: it reinforces the message that change is possible.

Since the European election the UUP is too gleefully destabilising the very institutional structures on which its future depends – the Assembly is its electoral lifeline. While seeking to undermine the DUP/Sinn Fein axis may be amusing, with some good quips, but where’s the strategy? The reshuffle of the Executive pack following an Assembly election is likely to create a TUV ‘opposition’ in Stormont, and  a Sinn Fein First Minister.  Good for democracy, but something the UUP voter is unlikely to see as attractive, and voting in Northern Ireland can be hugely tactical.  This may undermine part of that gain they would have hoped for by the TUV splitting the DUP vote, as the UUP would see it.

For the DUP the most worrying statistic much be that the overall final vote of 23.6 for the final DUP votes and 27% for the UUP/Con takes the vote split back to the electoral shares of the 2001 Westminster poll (22%/27%) or further back to the 1985 local elections (24%/29%) – 5% of Jim Allister’s vote did not transfer to anyone. This places perspective in the challenge to the DUP following the European election.

In many ways the electoral performance of Diane Dodds has left the DUP with a conundrum. In one election the DUP has lost an electorate vote that took years to build.  Where does it go to rebuild that electorate?

On the one hand it is clear that the votes borrowed from the Ulster Unionists and other liberal/integrationalist unionists have now left the DUP, and are unlikely to return. On the other hand, there is a deeply dissatisfied DUP vote that has found the confidence to vote TUV. As the DUP know from vote-building 2001-2008 the first task is to make the voter comfortable in being prepared to vote differently to their norm, and then to capture and build on that vote.  For the DUP, the Jim Allister vote represents both the loss of the votes from natural Ulster Unionists and, more worryingly from natural DUP voters.

If the Ministerial shuffle of this past month is meant to impress, then the DUP is failing to understand the challenge ahead.  What is the message of the reshuffle? Double jobbing is going? Mostly: good; but Peter Robinson has been at pains to stress that this had been planned anyway.

The DUP lacks a narrative that will either mollify those who are attracted to the TUV because of its clarity or, because it fears the TUV vote more than UCUNF, attract those who might be supportive of their success in managing the current power-sharing arrangements. So while the appointment of Nelson McCausland may be a sop to the ‘hard-core’ voter and perhaps make a start on attracting back some of those who voted TUV, it will equally annoy the very UUP/Con type voter the DUP needs to perchance attract.

So what then of the TUV?  The conditions for Jim Allister to gain his European vote has been rumbling for some time – like a volcano, it rumbles before it blows. All parties try to paint the TUV as variously a ‘one man show’, integrationalist (as if relying on Westminster was worse than sharing power with Sinn Fein), ‘intent on taking us back to the bad old days’ or ‘extreme’.

Unionists would look on the last two points and point out that Jim Allister’s dissent from the ‘new order’ is not the same as ‘dissent’ within republicanism.  He has no guns.  Both the ‘integrationalist’ tag and the ‘bad old days’ warning are based on a presumption that the current Belfast Agreement arrangements are perfectly acceptable. But neither the DUP, nor the UUP, believes that they are. The DUP agreed with the outline of Jim Allister’s critique of the arrangements before they returned from St.Andrews. The UUP hints that change will happen.

Party depth is probably the most difficult challenge ahead for Jim Allister.  For intelligence and integrity (even if you don’t agree with him) he stands heads above most of the rest of the political characters peddling their political wares in the ‘huckster’s shop’ as described by Sir Reg Empey (and watch here).  Except, of course, Jim Allister is not in the Assembly. Nor does he have any DUP defectors in the Assembly. He does have a handful of Councillors; in more way than one, a handful.

Any successful Party must have discipline – something the DUP still has, and the UUP seems to have gained some along with Conservative Party finance.  It must also have some depth, with an ability to promote its messages on a range of fronts.  To do that, it is necessary to have a group of competent advocates who are able to widen the commentary, particularly in target constituencies. Competency means staying on message, building positive profile and moving the Party agenda forward (even if only slightly, a bit at a time as the DUP did 1985-2001, and then with vigour and depth 2001-2008).

The DUP has responded quickly to the European Election result, but without any clear direction or purpose. At least the DUP have realised there is a shift in the Unionist mood, and that the TUV fight is with them in the first instance. The UUP are too busy talking up their ‘success’ to realise that they are still standing on sinking electoral sands.

Jim Allister has no more need to outline details of his future framework for political institutions in Northern Ireland than David Cameron does to detail his economic/tax plans for the nation so far from an election.  Allister’s core demand for change is shared by both the DUP and the UUP.  That change is possible is confirmed by Sinn Fein. The Alliance Party could benefit in this atmosphere if it wasn’t so busy chasing the potential of the Policing and Justice Ministry.

There is an electorate out there that is either disengaged or angry enough to vote anyone but ‘the consensus’. There are more votes out there for the TUV; mostly DUP, though plenty of others seeking a positive alternative that is credible and intellectually respectable.

The size of Jim Allister’s vote in the European Election was a shock to the political parties at Stormont because it showed a deep crack in ‘the consensus’ on which the political structures arising from the Belfast Agreement rely.

In the aftershock of the election all the focus is on the DUP’s response; though that is not to say the reaction to the vote by other parties is of no consequence.  Pretending that is not the case is delusional. For Jim Allister, small snipes seem to be enough for not to keep his quarry unsettled.  The UUP is doing half his job for him by arguing the instability and paralysis in the power-sharing arrangements. Sinn Fein, and certain SDLP representatives, continue to demonise the Loyal Orders in such a way as to show the lack of tolerance or acceptance from nationalism of a shared future – so why vote for Unionists who believe in one?

Jim Allister may well need to create a more positive narrative that has a principled core around which more Unionists, from its many shades, feel comfortable to coalesce. He may need to add depth to the TUV. However, the behaviour of main Parties at Stormont since the European Election is only helping to confirm those who voted for Jim Allister that their’s was the right choice.  At least in the short term, if Jim Allister does nothing much over the summer, things will continue to rumble along to his advantage.