The 2010 Westminster election is over.  While the poll outcome was inconclusive the upshot is a decisive shift in British Politics where a progressive coalition has burst through the liberal centre/right. In the process, there were no important phone calls to the Northern Ireland parties, who now sit on the Parliamentary margins.

The debates on national television provided an energy to the national election. Locally the election campaign was as lacklustre and uninspiring as the Party leaders on the local TV debates.

On the nationalist side the new leader of the SDLP simply argued a greener case than Sinn Fein, ceding any advantage new leadership might offer in setting the electoral debate and regaining ground in the future. Sinn Fein organised a campaign that seemed more a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections and must be disappointed that they made little inroad into the SDLP vote on polling day.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: comparative strength.

The obvious decline in SDLP votes since 1998 is not to the great benefit of Sinn Fein.  For Westminster 2001, the high point of nationalist turnout, the SDLP had 168,873 and Sinn Fein 175,932; in 2010, 110,970 and 171,942 respectively.  In percentage terms Sinn Fein is clearly outvoting the SDLP, but it has made no gains in number of votes.  The overall Nationalist/Republican vote appears relatively static.

Nationalist & Republican voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative

Republicans, in particular, have made much of an inroad into defeating Unionism, electorally. While Unionism was once dominant electorally, this was at a time when nationalists probably failed to even register to vote. The heady early 1970s, when unionist voters turned out in great numbers, was not a time of unionist unity. Since then, nationalists and republicans have fully engaged in the electoral process, and around 200,000 have been added to the electoral register.

Electorate and turnout for elections 1969-2010: comparative.

Summarily, the increase in registered voters has been to the benefit of neither nationalists nor unionists. In recent years the electorate, unionist and nationalist, has slowly disengaged from politics. However, ignoring the numbers and entering the percentage game, Sinn Fein has gained as it holds its vote relative to others.  Somehow, despite Sinn Fein’s project seemingly stalling, Unionist Parties are presenting a picture of unionism in crisis.

Much has been made of the apparent failure of leaders (and leadership) within Unionism, and there has been a great deal of debate since the Westminster election on the topic of what the future holds for unionism.

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: comparative strength

UUP & DUP voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

The numbers suggest that the Ulster Unionist Party is bumping along and has done little to regain the electoral trust that it squandered under David Trimble. Just as the UUP climbed electoral heights in the 1990s, so it has fallen to consistent lows over the past decade.  The decline has been hard for a Party that still gives the impression that it still believes itself to the natural Party of Government. Although the UUP electoral arrangement with the Conservative Party has been derided, on the positive side, at least the Party could had the finance to run a campaign and the vote was probably no worse than if the arrangement hadn’t existed.

A lowly UUP ought to have been good news for the DUP. However, similar to their principal partners in the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP has not been able to take advantage of their rival’s electoral slide. The DUP vote has been remarkably stable over the past decade.  The Party immediately benefited from the mistrust of the Ulster Unionist Party; acting as the standard bearer of opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein. In the decade from 1998, those who became disillusioned or discontented with the UUP either left politics or joined the DUP.  Over this period the unionist electorate could be characterised as either being ‘for’ the UUP or ‘against’.

Unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010 (not including UUP/DUP): combined/cumulative

In the 2007 Assembly election there was still a broad expectation that the DUP would not enter Government with Sinn Fein. When they did, off the back of apparently verified decommissioning by the IRA (which seems to have missed 40% ), it can be no surprise that the DUP would suffer to some extent in the same way as the UUP.  That was certainly the instance in the 2009 European Election, when Jim Allister of the TUV took a signification proportion of the unionist vote.

While the TUV did less well in the Westminster election, drift from the two main parties was nevertheless marked. Trust has gone. Yes, there was an agreed unionist candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone, and the DUP stood aside in North Down. Even so, in an election when the overall unionist vote increased on the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP must be disappointed that it cannot point to any positive electoral gain.

All unionist/loyalist voting 1969-2010: combined/cumulative.

Nationalism performed less well than unionism in the Westminster election, albeit marginally. Yet the debate post election is on the future of unionism. Inevitably this has centred on the future of the Parties, and in particular the leaderships.

No unionist leader has much to cheer about post-election.  The TUV performed poorly, though it was never likely that the European pr vote could have been replicated in the first-past-the-post Westminster poll. Still, the TUV lacked depth in its candidate selection, and Jim Allister’s political persona was one of anger.  The Unionist electorate is past anger. It wants to trust again. To do that it desires confidence in a leadership can attract talent and articulate a pathway to restoring community, cultural and political confidence. The TUV was not alone in failing to meet that expectation.

Sir Reg Empey lost in South Antrim. Perhaps he has done enough service to David Cameron’s Conservatives to gain a peerage and join David Trimble, in which case his candidature was not entirely in vain.  It was his close association with David Trimble that probably reduced his chances in South Antrim, where not even a hawkish David Burnside had been able to hold the seat. The electorate that punished the UUP then, and sent an unambiguous message on the leadership of David Trimble, was hardly likely to vote now for someone equally at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement.  Adrian Watson, the choice of the local UUP would probably have fared better as a new and local face for Westminster.

Sir Reg also lost on the wider political field. From the outset of the UUP Conservative arrangement he failed to present a convincing narrative to overcome the sense that this was a marriage of convenience: the Conservatives needed a significant electoral base in Northern Ireland and the UUP needed the money.  The UUP message that Stormont was a ‘huckster’s shop’ should have had some traction with a disillusioned electorate. However, Sir Reg’s inability to bring clarity and direction to the UCUNF (UUP/Conservative) arrangement suggested that he equally unable to manage his own neighbourhood store. There was the sluggishness in agreeing candidates. Finally, for thedissenter, Fred Cobain standing as a Conservative & Unionist?

And yet, the UUP vote broadly held up across Northern Ireland. Yes, it now has no seats at Westminster.  But it still has a base on which to build. On the wider national electoral front the politics of the nation has been trust into new territory with the Conservative/Liberal coalition (or is that Liberal Conservative coalition).  There is deep resentment of the central Conservative Party organisation among many local Conservative constituency organisations.  Although talking about decentralising power from Westminster, Cameron has strongly centralised Conservative Party organisation around his own team.  This has not delivered the majority he needed; in many instances this was down to lack of flexibility in addressing local electoral campaigns: Adrian Watson is a case in point.

What became clear on election night was that the country no longer acts uniformly. The great swingometer was made redundant on a night where local electorates seemed to take a local view – resulting in massively varying swings across the country.  It would suggest that future candidates will need to emphasise more local issues and rely less on national coat-tails.

In this respect there is certainly a place for more regionally based politically associations where the central party outlines core principles, but does not dictate local candidate selection and tolerates a degree of policy variance around the country.  If the Conservatives and the UUP can find that balance between regional and national interests then there is a future for the UUP. Otherwise, not.

At times in the run-up to and during the election the argument of the UUP almost seemed to be that the DUP couldn’t be trusted: to which the electorate added the word ‘either’. In the end the only place that this mattered was in East Belfast, where the electorate cast a plague on the UUP and DUP. Of course the rejection of a sitting MP, and in this case the leader of the DUP, was a huge slap to Peter Robinson.  In the rest of the country the DUP held its own and it seats.

The East Belfast seat was not a natural loss, had there been anyone of stature in the East Belfast DUP to have stood as an alternative to Peter Robinson: Strangford, the Westminster seat once held by Iris Robinson was retained by the DUP. The electoral strategy for the East Belfast seat has long been the strength of the Robinsons (Westminster/Assembly/Council) to bring in all others on their coat-tails.  Time for a re-think.

The apparent nature of the internal politics of the DUP suggests that there is little likelihood of Robinson being replaced as leader; for reasons not that dissimilar to the earlier thedissenter piece in the wake of revelations around Iris Robinson earlier in the year. The early DUP was shaped by Ian Paisley. The latter-day DUP has been shaped by Peter Robinson.  There is little obvious alternative to Peter Robinson’s leadership.  Peter Robinson’s East Belfast Assembly seat is relatively secure, as one of many, which assures his leadership position where it matters most to the DUP, at Stormont.

Before bringing together all these points into a broad conclusion it is worth noting the success of Naomi Long. First, by accepting David Ford at the Executive Table, the Alliance Party has been elevated to the position of central and ‘trusted’ player.  Second Naomi Long is local, and hard working. Third, Alliance has always had strength in East Belfast. Finally, she wasn’t Peter Robinson, and whether unionist or not, she isn’t perceived as nationalist.

Electoral ups and downs of principal parties: 1969-2010 *

The Alliance Party has been much stronger in the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s than it has been anytime in the past decade.  It still has a lot of work to do to grow its base, and there are not obviously an army of Long-type candidates to make an impact in 2011 at Stormont (and probably across 26 Local Government areas). In percentage terms it’s vote will look good where any general increase is a gain against an smaller voting public overall, though in pure numbers terms it has a long way to go.  Notions of some kind of renaissance in the political centre ground are premature.

Back to the big debate, within and around Unionism. The focus of that debate is numbers, and focused on whether in the forthcoming 2011 election Sinn Fein might gain a position where it may be able to lay claim to the post of First Minister.

Since the changes following the St Andrews Agreement any party with the votes and seats necessary can lay claim to the post of First Minister.  This provides for more equitable power-sharing in that it does not create a hierarchy of parties – theoretically anyone can be a First Minister. Would it make a great difference for Sinn Fein to be First Minister? If you accept Sinn Fein as a partner in Government then why not?

The most recent political push for unionist unity has arisen principally as a DUP campaign tactic to corner the UUP/Conservative arrangement, pushing at the fact that one of the certainties espoused in this arrangement was that the Conservatives were committed to stand in all 18 seats.  The agreement of a candidate on a unity-style ticket in Fermanagh South Tyrone undermined the determination of the UUP/Conservative pact. Had Rodney Connor won it would have placed even greater pressure on the UUP/Conservative pact that it failed to make a similar arrangement in South Belfast.

That the tactic in Fermanagh South Tyrone failed to deliver its intended outcome still leaves the DUP in a position to argue that it only failed because it was late in the day, the electorate was unconvinced of UUP sincerity, the Conservative link lost vital votes and anything that throws blame around and away to the DUP: this is a criticism of the DUP blame game generally and not that, conversely, the DUP is ‘to blame’.

The focus on the issue of First Minister is a tactical one – a means to give purpose to closer co-operation between the parties (if not merger). Yet the real issue is not one of tactics to meet short-term and tokenistic outcomes. The failure of Sir Reg (lost seat, lost leadership) to stabilise and provide purpose to the UUP, the DUP’s failure to dismiss the TUV altogether and to regain momentum lost in 2009, reflect deeper malaise within unionist parties.

Ironically, the arrival of the TUV brought unionist voters to the polling booths and increased the overall unionist vote would suggest that disunity has its advantages, allowing the fractious and independently minded unionist voter an avenue to express discontent with established parties.

The logic of engagement by all parties in the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement is an acceptance that the Union is safe in the hands of the unionist electorate: that is the principle of consent.  Unionist voters accept this and many seem content not to vote for parties that fail to reflect their concerns and provide competent government.   This is not a problem for unionism alone, nationalism has a similar challenge, though seems content to lose itself in the green romantic mists of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow.  A plague on all their houses?

Addressing unionist unity from a structural perspective is bound to disappoint. Political party realignment is merely mixing decks and dishing out the job cards in a different order.  The electorate is hardly likely to be impressed. Identifying a loss of voter, by class or aspiration, does not address the message sent at the Westminster election: none of the leaders of unionism presented a coherent and inspirational purpose for unionism in the twenty-first century.

A unionist should feel proud to fly the Union flag, and should not feel that it is somewhat diminished when wrapped around those who seek to lead Unionism. It should not be worn in anger, it should not cover embarrassment, and it should not be wrapped around a backroom deal.  Discussion on the Union should be a matter of substance, not tactical number crunching: it is a matter for open discussion, not whispers behind closed doors.

Unionist Parties may be under threat through a loss of relative electoral strength. That does not mean that the Union is under threat: which is not to say that the Union cannot be lost. As elsewhere, this article has been an exercise in looking at the outcomes of the Westminster election and reading the runes. There are a few pointers which may shape consideration of the future for Unionists.

• The overall nationalist vote appears static.
• Nationalist voters appear just as disengaged as unionist voters.
• The UUP might consider its future within a regional/national and liberal conservative context, but is otherwise nothing but a fading reflection of better times.
• The DUP built its presence on becoming biggest: now it is, what next?
• The unionist voter seemed uninspired by any of the unionist Parties’ offers.
• The overall unionist vote benefits from disunity, not unity.
• The SDLP was dominant in 1998. What happened?
• If Sinn Fein is a worthy party for Government, and to hold a post co-equal to the First Minister then why shouldn’t it hold the post of First Minister?
• The issue of a Sinn Fein First Minister is a narrow tactical argument that distracts from the lack of attractive leadership from either the UUP or DUP, or from anywhere elsewhere in unionist circles.
• Short-term tactical considerations will not address the future of unionism as a political cause.
• The Union is safe: at least that rests with the electorate and not the politicians.

The Westminster election changed very little. The points above have been matters for varying degree of consideration for some time. The election has simply brought them to the fore. Much of that discussion has taken place at Open Unionism and in the pages of the press, and probably around the lunch tables of Stormont buildings and meeting places elsewhere.

Tactical considerations of stopping a Sinn Fein First Minister are given an air of immediacy, including an urgency on discussion of political party restructuring. The larger and more important issue of the purpose and sense of Unionist cause is receiving less attention, perhaps because there is no personal or party gain in thinking outside the box?  (It is a lonely place outside the box, and risky.)  How does the discussion move beyond the tactical and party political to a more central discussion on the nature and future expression of Unionism fit for the twenty-first century?

Without a common understanding of the central tenets of Unionism there is little chance of Party political unity among unionists. Unionists must know what the Union is for, holding common purpose; it must not be defined by what it is not, what it is against. The electorate wishes positive, not negative, Unionism. With that central understanding would party political unionism mean anything anyway? Is unionism an ‘ism’ at all? How do we move beyond a position of being in defence of the Union to advancing and deepening the Union? These are the questions to be the subject of Looking Forward: Part 2. Later.

*/** please note that the graphs are indicative. While every effort was made to input the numbers correctly, sometimes interpretation of orginal data was difficult. I may have designated an independent in the unionist circles when it should have been nationalist: the early 1970s was a confusing time. ’Others’ sometimes includes all but the main parties; more than just the odds and sods. Data on registered electorate and turnout was not always available, and sometimes only in percentage terms. Taking all this into account,  all graphs should be viewed as broadly accurate, but mostly illustrative.  If any reader wishes to repeat the exercise and find fault, the source information is found within CAIN and ARK: knock yourself out.

All the ingredients were there: the crisis, the Prime Ministers, the big house, the Belfast Telegraph survey, the Parties doing all night sittings and the press pack.  At the end of all that we have the “Agreement at Hillsborough Castle” as it is officially described.  Not a deal.  Not “The Hillsborough Castle Agreement”.  Nothing definitive, just ‘agreement’ as part of a step process: same process as the “Agreement at St Andrews‘.

Many are of course delighted that there was any sort of agreement at all.  Especially Gordon Brown who would undoubtedly not wish one of New Labour’s great projects to crash just before a Westminster election, and probably David Cameron who will not inherit an immediate crisis should he become Prime Minister after the General Election.  

 The ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ amounts to very little but a process that revolves around progress towards the devolution of Policing & Justice.  The only certainty is that there is a date assigned for the transfer of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly. That date appears to be conditional on a range of other points/matters/actions happening in some sort of sequence.

What are the chances of the agreement working out to a conclusion?  The Agreement is in five parts.

Section One provides a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly.  There are a series of procedural steps which, so long as Gordon Brown does not call an election in the next few weeks should see the formal transfer of powers by 12 April. 

Section Two is Parades. It is hard to see how Sinn Fein will ever accept that people lawfully and peacefully should not be subject to the sectarian harassment of unlawful violent protest, or a planned protest which lacks the discipline to behave in a civilised manner. The pursuit of cultural apartheid through designation of Protestant-free zones seems to underline republican demonisation of the Loyal Orders. Hard to see how Republicans will ever agree to a shared future when they are unable to countenance sharing a stretch of road a few times a year; not that many in the SDLP are more tolerant.

Section Three is a clever device to sideline the UUP and SDLP.  The problems with the functionality of the Executive lie in the institutional arrangements; the Executive seeks to enforce consensus among a disparate group of political parties which, leaving aside their constitutional pre-dispositions, have little in common. Section Three is not likely to amount to much more than the generation of a whinge list, but is disconnected to the issue of the devolution of Policing and Justice, and therefore is of little immediate consequence.

Section Four outlines no more than just an administrative catch-up process.  As with Section Three this is not timetabled and therefore may well be forgotten about unless there is a need to show something of progress – even if it is only seeing the Executive finally get round to doing what it ought to have already done, which if they were able to agree they would have done already.

Section Five is timetabled, and suggests that the Junior Ministers will be exceptionally busy. Not only are they putting a progress and action plan together for outstanding Executive business (Section Four), they will also be doing a report on outstanding issues from the St Andrews Agreement.  The most recent Policing and Justice ‘crisis’ has arisen from a very different determination what is meant by in paragraph 7 of the Agreement at St Andrews : “It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008.” If there is failure to even agree on what was agreed then, what presently constitutes an ‘outstanding matter’ may well be a challenge in itself.

The fanfare for this ‘agreement’ is worthy of a snake oil salesmen’s convention. Agreed, tentatively and with provisos, is a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice.  That is it. The DUP has allowed the issue of ‘community confidence’ to focus on the parades issue, but that is just one area where confidence in the Stormont administration is weak.  Lack of accountability, the chimera of collective responsibility and absent democratic counterbalance of effective opposition are fundamentals that appear not to have been discussed at Hillsborough, yet are underlying factors in the lack of unionist confidence in Stormont generally.

Sectioning parades hides the real fear of devolution of Policing and Justice with respect to that issue: Section One (9), that a future Minister could take a decision by request or otherwise, to step in to ban a parade without recourse to the Executive. Given the history of the generation of parades contention by Sinn Fein, the pattern is set.  With the Justice Minister open to d’Hondt in the next Assembly the ground is set for a heightening of conflict centred on parades, whoever gets the Justice Ministry. 

The quasi-judicial powers of the Justice Minister is the ticking time-bomb on parades. More immediately, the parades fuse is lit on this ‘Agreement’. Ashdown wasn’t even close to a credible alternative to the Parades Commission. Serious questions on the process within that ‘interim’ report remain unanswered; yet that ‘report’ is noted as a start point on which to build.  

The Hillsborough talks have demonstrated that the DUP is as useless as the UUP at negotiation: the lead-up to Hillsborough was promising, but the end result is a big disappointment.  The DUP blinked, and Sinn Fein is now piling on the pressure on parades, upping the ante and making resolution on parades nigh on impossible: the most recent outburst from Martin McGuinness is an example.  More generally, the remarks by Pat Doherty point to a longer term process of attrition; building on the undermining of cultural identity and political confidence within the broad unionist electorate.   

Sinn Fein has its date for devolution of Policing and Justice.  Once in process, how many believe there will be much concluded of Sections Two, Three, Four and Five without another ‘crisis’.

By any measure, unionist community confidence in the ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ is at best low.  The text of the published document was printed in newspapers and is readily available online as a document and subject of comment. The success of the snake oil salesman is in the ignorance and credulity of the buying public.  To presume that somehow the lack of confidence can be solved by wider publication is erroneous. 

Parades may be an obvious point of contention in this ‘Agreement’, but fundamentally the real issue is a lack of confidence in the institutions themselves into which Policing and Justice is to be devolved.  Broadly speaking, the unionist community has little desire for more snake oil from the huckster’s store, no matter how many times the bottle is rebranded ‘new & improved’.

For broad analysis on the state of the individual unionist parties by far the best has been that of the blogger Turgon on SluggerOToole.  The recent meeting at Hatfield House between the Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Patterson, and leading representatives of the DUP and UUP has created a great deal of debate on the nirvana of ‘unionist unity’. We are told the Hatfield House talks were about the UUP and DUP, and Conservatives, gaining some greater understanding in respect of future elections. Generally, however, the impact of the host party (the Conservatives) on elections is not discussed in detail. Perhaps this is because the Conservatives and the UUP are treated as one: that is a mistake; they remain two parties. Such a perspective misses the electoral questions arising from the Conservative and UUP non-merger.

Should an Assembly election to be held before Westminster elections there would be four Unionist parties in the fray as there is no agreement for Assembly elections between the UUP and Conservatives.  This would probably kill any prospect of the UUP being the largest Unionist party: the two are separate parties as we are constantly told, so they will be two separate Assembly Parties.

So too may the Conservatives. Without an arrangement with the UUP for Assembly elections the local party would rightly expect to stand, and win a few seats. But the strength of the Conservative offer is that it brings so much more to local politics than money to a party (the UUP) whose financial fortunes are much diminished. Conservative electoral strength would be exposed before the benefit of the ‘win’ at Westminster (and even one seat other than North Down will be a win, so the bar is low). The Conservatives would lose momentum.

Conversely of course the arrangement for the General Election will mean that the Conservatives who might get elected in Northern Ireland will be fully taking the Conservative whip as part of that Party, while the UUP will be taking the whip by agreement. So if, and only by example, the UUP/Con arrangement delivers four seats and two of those are Conservative it means the UUP has in effect only two seats at Westminster. Influence with the Conservative Party is thus diminished, and independence constrained by taking the Conservative Whip. Added to which the UUP has provided an electoral base for the Conservatives to make further gains in the next elections on the calendar (Assembly), and in much better shape to eat into the UUP vote than if it had no Westmnister seats in Northern Ireland. This further dmininishes UUP ambitions of regaining ground to the DUP as the largest Assembly Party.

If Westminster elections are first, in the context of a hung Parliament the two main unionist parties would be in a much stronger position with no pre-agreement with the Conservative Party. Obligations generated prior to the election severely restrain the capacity for the unionist parties to play their best hand.

It is hard to see how strategists within the DUP would not have anticipated these scenarios, or that the UUP could be so detached as to not even think about them.

Which is why any notion of talks at Hatfield being on ‘unity’ needs to be treated with caution. There can be no doubt that the Conservatives as a Party would have been fishing for DUP ideas on the future and specifically for indicators on what would happen in the event of a hung Parliament. The DUP would be similarly probing the Conservatives. The only thing on the Conservative leadership’s mind at the moment is ‘seats’. This gives the unionist parties a strong position prior to the election, or it would if the UUP was not already tied to the Conservatives.

All this speculation centres on considerations of electoral mathematics that only the timings/outcomes of the elections will prove. If a Westminster election is first, and if the Conservatives gain a majority of anything over 30 then both unionist parties will be largely irrelevant, and Northern Ireland as far down the agenda as events will allow. Which means short-term interest may be Westminster, but for Unionism there must be greater focus on Stormont.

That brings us to wider speculation of other talks and fevered speculation on any perceived signals that build on this story. Within the context of all of the above, a merger of the UUP and DUP is by far the more likely and electorally sensible in terms of unionist ‘unity’, particularly in respect of the Assembly elections.  The same sort of issues arise. This would have to be a merger and not a pact, because it is about Party and not political designation in d’Hondt. It is the largest Party that takes the First Minister role.  Something less would be enough to extract maximum value from a hung Parliament, where ten to twelve Unionist seats represent the difference. Timing will be everything.

There is a definite sense that something is stirring among unionists in Northern Ireland. It may be an interesting political Spring. Will it be a new Spring for Unionism?

Picture: parliament.uk picture gallery

The opinion polls are erratic, as discussed on thedissenter earlier, and the potential for a tightly hung Parliament is real. A party holding a small number of seats may gain considerable importance.  So the performance of local parties is of national interest: though notional until the counts are complete.

thedissenter will resist entering a seat by seat analysis: that has been undertaken elsewhere, and there is sure to be more before the date of the election is finally announced.  At this point, selection of candidates is far from complete.  There are a number of factors which have the potential to impact on turnout and final count, and this post will look at those rather than enter fanciful prediction as others have done.

Most probably there will be two elections, again, in Northern Ireland – a nationalist one and a unionist one. There may be movements on the margins, but nothing of importance.  The greatest impact on the final count is most likely going to be the polling strength of the TUV and the way in which that Party’s presence, or not, affects the electoral balance in each constituency.

There is little on the horizon that is likely to impact on the Sinn Fein vote. Some might wishfully suggest that the woeful media management around family matters might wound Gerry Adams, and by association, Sinn Fein. Suzanne Breen spelled out the case in the Tribune.  Liam Clarke lays out the questions that linger in the Sunday Times.  Yet morality is hardly an issue for the Sinn Fein voter, happy to support a Party that has ‘yet to renounce its history of violence and terror, makes the vast majority of people here, sick to their stomachs’: that would be a majority of the total population, but it seems not the ‘nationalist’ population.

Of course things might change if there was a credible nationalist alternative to Sinn Fein, but there is not.

Republicans who hold onto their Marxist socialism etc, those who abide by the ‘physical force’ tradition, or those who hold onto both, are too small in number to have an electoral impact at this time.  Even so it seems likely that there will only be a marginal, though inconsequential, shrinkage of support for Sinn Fein, if not on a matter of morals then perhaps on the other issues within the Republican family which rumble along.

The SDLP is going through a prolonged leadership contest. If the contest is not inspiring, it is because the choice holds little promise. One has built a reputation on being hard on Loyalist paramilitaries (albeit without due care to Ministerial responsibilities) and making ignorant remarks about the Loyal Orders.  The other has proved adept at building on political opportunity in retaining his seat and building a strong and respected SDLP presence in South Belfast. Neither has excelled outside their respective constituencies.

Whether a harder nationalist line or greater organizational capacity, rural nationalism or metropolitan social democracy, is chosen by the SDLP, the May (or even March) election will give little time for a new leader to make much of a mark on the political landscape.  Bar opening statements of intent, the leadership contest seems entirely internal and lacking much rigour.

The SDLP will most probably hold its own in the coming election; not least because while it has little to offer by way of alternative to Sinn Fein, Sinn Fein is not in a place where it is able to build on past success and bury the SDLP. For now, the nationalist electorate is offered stale crusty policy from both parties which will result in a stalemate within that electorate.

There is a range of factors that make the election of much greater importance to Unionism.  The Westminster expenses story has exercised the Unionist community to a far greater extent that it has within nationalism. Movies, the “Swish Family Robinson” headline, and a perception that Unionist politicians are more likely to employ family members combined to offend a Unionist sensibility that  politicians are elected to serve their constituents’ interests and not their own self-interest.

To some extent the expenses issue gave the TUV’s Jim Allister his barn storming result at the European election in June 2009 – though DUP arrogance and UUP delusion probably played far a greater part.  Whether or not the residue of this debate continues to undermine current MPs is something to consider, but would be only one factor of many in determining constituency outcomes. Some of the heat of the expenses row will be removed by sitting MPs, such as Iris Robinson, not standing again.

The debate within Unionism of ‘unity’ candidates usefully detracts from the lack of any discernable policy that makes the Conservative/UUP electoral arrangements any great force for change in the forthcoming election.  It is hard to believe that any serious unionist politician would believe that not taking an opportunity to defeat a Sinn Fein candidate (as might present itself in Fermanagh South Tyrone) will play well with the wider unionist electorate.  Realistically it is only in Fermanagh South Tyrone that any agreement has the possibility of returning a Unionist candidate.  However, the Conservative commitment to stand in every constituency in the UK means it has no time for local sensibilities and no strategy or apparent interest in inflicting a loss on Sinn Fein.

In South Belfast there is little UUP constituency infrastructure to conduct a substantial canvas – and the Assembly poll showed little chance of an Ulster Unionist win.  Furthermore the sitting SDLP MP already represents a broadly ‘conservative’ sort of approach, and the Alliance candidate a more PC choice, that undermines any gain the Conservative Party would hope to achieve from the Catholic electorate in the constituency – not that the Conservative/UUP hierarchies would be so calculatingly sectarian in their final selection.

By far the largest impact on the election will the issue of multi-mandates, or double-jobbing as it is more commonly described. Of course the legislation to enforce sole mandates must complete its course through Parliament, but already the principle has had consequences.  Jeffrey Donaldson seems to have chosen Westminster over a Ministerial position in Stormont. Mark Durkan has chosen Westminster and initiated an SDLP Leadership election. Michael McGimpsey has cited commitment to Stormont for not putting his name forward in South Belfast.

More generally, the multi-mandate is more of a challenge for the DUP than the other Parties because it has a more MPs than any other Party.  It will mean new faces entering the political frame.  The DUP has been building profile for a number of their MLAs and Councillors, though perhaps circumstances will now accelerate advancement for a few.  ‘Knowing’ your politician is important. Name recognition makes a big difference at election time.  The DUP has also been hugely effective at building a constituency network. That should stand it in good stead. Its November conference was uplifting and rallied the troops, despite what might be viewed as setbacks in the previous year. The DUP enters the election in an entirely positive frame of mind.

A haphazard constituency presence and aging membership means the Ulster Unionist Party is less than able for this election.  This may be compensated by the Conservative Party’s money and campaigning expertise: though the Conservative Party seems to be overly relying on the newness of its entry into the electoral field to garner excitement around average and fairly unknown personalities. If it were a straight DUP v UUP/Conservative contest then the DUP would race home lengths ahead.

The TUV showing at the European election, with Jim Allister thrusting into the political arena with as good as a third of the unionist vote, fundamentally altered any consideration of future unionist electoral outcomes. Of all the political leaders within Unionism, Jim Allister has the biggest headache.  The has to perform in such a way as to be seen to make an advance on the European success, or make a case for why the performance is comparable.

Maximising the TUV vote would suggest the need to stand in all 18 constituencies. However, 66,000 votes spread across 18 constituencies will not win Westminster seats.  The TUV autumn conference was notable that many of the attendees were stalwart workers who once knocked doors, placed posters, and manned phones for the UUP and DUP in past elections. These are the members with drive and devotion who delivered at the European election, but are best focused rather than spread thinly.

Of course the Ulster Unionist Party and Conservatives are banking on the TUV standing to damage the DUP vote in their favour. But this is not Dromore or the European elections. There will be no transfers available for Westminster.

The TUV has already said it will not stand in Fermanagh South Tyrone or South Belfast, leaving the other parties to look less than able to put unionist interests first and foremost – even suggesting an agreed ‘non-Party’ candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone. The TUV will not stand in North Belfast. Where there is no chance of a Unionist winning the TUV may stand a candidate to hoover additional votes.  The toughest challenges are of course where a Unionist candidate will win, of one Party or another.

Jim Allister himself has declared his candidacy for North Antrim. East Antrim where he once had a strong base, Lagan Valley and Strangford are obvious targets.  Elsewhere he has the luxury of being able to wait to decide on whether it is worth standing a candidate at all. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

In many seats there will not enough difference between the DUP and UUP canidates to matter which Party is elected, but where a TUV candidate will alter the electoral mathematics a judgment must be made as to whether  the TUV could make a positive difference.

The TUV might also be seen as merely spiteful in engaging in constituencies only to place pressure on the DUP’s sitting MP, especially when TUV support comes from across the unionist spectrum. And why give the UUP/Conservative arrangement a lucky pass? The UUP, and in particular the Conservative Party, will do the TUV no favours, and their joint inflexibility is the greatest reason why Fermanagh South Tyrone will most certainly be retained by Sinn Fein.  Why spread the TUV’s limited resources , only to give the UUP/Conservatives the benefit?

The TUV will most certainly be the election story in 2010, but it is too early to say how the Party will impact on the conduct of the campaign or the result. Failure across many constituencies might reflect poorly on TUV strength, while a win in one or two of the greater certainties will afford huge media attention.

So there will be an election (or two) in 2010. A lot can happen before Election Day. Nothing else is certain.

His analysis of the conflict at the heart of the education debate is that if a clash of ideology over practical pathways to excellence in education. A demonstration of this was well illustrated on the BBC’s ‘The School Report’ (broadcast 9 November) where Sinn Fein’s Caitriona Ruane and Fiona Millar (Alastair Campbell’s partner) shared the same ideological path. Ms Millar’s and Mr Woodward’s inclusion show that the education debate is a national one, and not a new one.

Bob’s speech outlines the case for selection, the failure of the policy and educational theories that are integral to the Sinn Fein, and the liberal educational, approach. For McCartney, quoting Churchill; “Where is the compromise between the Fireman and the Arsonist”?

Perhaps unsurprising for a speech delivered to a Traditional Unionist Voice conference, criticism is almost solely directed towards the DUP as the Party believed to be ready to give up selection in some deal. He said “The real and ultimate issue is this – will the DUP, having sacrificed its principles to obtain power, now surrender selective education to Sinn Fein as the price of retaining power.“

Bob’s belief that the DUP is ready to do a deal seems to be based on the notion that the DUP/Sinn Fein rocky relationship is based on a ‘deal a day’: having done the deal to gain power, the two are now addicted to dealing to retain dominance. Prior to the European election that might well have been a reasonable proposition. Since then there has been less willingness on the part of the DUP to be… willing. On the face of it, the current policing and justice row would also suggest that doing a deal with Sinn Fein is not necessarily a top priority for the DUP.

Oddly, there was no criticism of the UUP and their Conservative friends. Yet it/they are part of a four/five party grouping trying to find a way forward, which includes the SDLP. The SDLP is equally and implacably opposed to selection as is Sinn Fein. So surely any consensus will necessarily undermine selection. Indeed the UUP are so keen to make wider political points about a Sinn Fein/DUP partnership that it is willing to be seen to take a lead with the SDLP, despite the UUP and SDLP approaches to education policy no less diametrically opposed than Sinn Fein/DUP.

A clear and substantial section of those who would send their children to Catholic schools are in direct opposition to the policy of Sinn Fein, SDLP and the Catholic Church. It would seem an ideal opportunity for the UUP to consult with the excellent Michael Gove and discuss innovative and imaginative ideas to help Northern Ireland onto a new pathway to educational reform. Most certainly the UUP and/or the Conservatives could use the education debate to map out a policy that endorses excellence, promotes meritocracy based on open selection, and take leadership on the issue in support of grammar education for all communities, classes and, most of all, children with academic ability. That hasn’t happened.

If the new UUP/Conservative collaboration cannot make progress in establishing leadership in education, bringing something fresh and new to the debate, it is hard to see where else it can stop out from the pack. At this point it would seem that the UUP is equally likely to succumb to the urge to respond to the Belfast Telegraph’s  vacuous campaign to ‘do something’. Doing something, if it is the wrong thing is just as harmful as doing nothing.

While Ruane may well be the ruin of the successful Northern Ireland education system, Sinn Fein is only able to continue because of the inability of any other party to engage with the public. There is a hunger for a dialogue that promotes educational excellence at all levels – building on strengths and addressing the weaknesses. Removing selection tests will not remove the obvious educational underachievement within localities; as much to do with social factors as standards in educational delivery, and at Primary level education int the first instance.

The Education Minister appears to be listening to no-one, and doesn’t really have to – there is no collective responsibility in the Executive and the Assembly clearly has no means of holding the Minister to account. Even if they could hold her to account there is not an ‘opposition’ with a credible alternative to deal with the educational underachievement that is being used to attack selection. Even if there were an Assembly selection next year would education be a big electoral issue; would it result in the removal of the Minister, or a change in the Party taking the Ministry?

Bob’s speech is a good piece of analysis, but was lost in the TUV conference and in his pointed comments on the DUP. The speech provides a start point for a wider discussion. Yet that is not the reason why Bob’s speech gained little attention. In truth, there is no incentive for political parties in Northern Ireland to offer alternatives, and only a marginal chance of any Party with an alternative winning electorally on the issue and then being able to work through their ideas to implementation.

Discussion on educational policy is reduced to throwing blame around the media and scoring political points at every opportunity. Education may be an issue of huge concern to the electorate, and especially to parents, but a debate on the future way forward hasn’t even started, and the references to frame that debate remain undefined.

Robert McCartney: THE POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL CHAOS

I have retired from party politics and I am not a member of any Party including this one. What I have to say I would happily have said on a UUP, DUP or any other conference platform.

As the youngest of 8 children from a 2 up 2 down on the Shankill I was the only one to get the benefit of a grammar school education when I sat the very first 11 + in 1948. Thanks to success in that examination I have enjoyed a university, professional and even a political career.

My mission is therefore that children from my social background retain in 2009 the same equality of opportunity that I benefited from 61 years ago. As National Chairman for the UK of the National Grammar Schools Association I have dedicated my remaining years to that objective.

Politically the most burning issue in Northern Ireland is education. Why? First because electorally it affects the parents of every school aged child; second because the economic and cultural future of our children will be shaped by it; and third because the political and national identity of a community can be changed by it.

What, you may ask, is the essential purpose of an educational system? The answer demonstrates the basic conflict between those who support a selective or differentiated system and those who would destroy it. The first believe that the function of education is to provide every child regardless of class, social status, religion or ethnic origin with an equal opportunity to attend a school best suited to realising that child’s potential. The second view education as a means of advancing some political policy or ideology in which schools are viewed as the machinery for social engineering to achieve a political goal. This is a Marxist philosophy.

The principle of selection, which was supported by some 64% of Northern Ireland’s parent’s means finding out a child’s aptitudes and matching that to a school, that is appropriate. This requires some form of test, which every child has an equal opportunity to sit. Selection and the grammar schools system are generally favoured by the Unionist community and the parties claiming to represent that community. The opponents of selection including the Labour Left, Sinn Fein, and so-called progressive educationalists favour a comprehensive system based on an all ability intake.

The purely educational debate divested of its political content has proved beyond argument that a selective system produces far better results both at G.C.S.E. and Advanced levels than Comprehensive education. Moreover, the Grammar and Secondary modern schools in Northern Ireland are providing greater upward social mobility than their Comprehensive mainland counterparts.

What the Labour Left and Sinn Fein have in common is the political goal of destroying what they perceive as the social and cultural base of their opponents. Education for them is a political and ideological weapon. Under the guise of educational reform and with the help of alleged progressive educationalists, Labour Governments have used education in the belief that it can solve social and economic problems. Instead, it has merely exacerbated and reduced the life opportunities of the disadvantaged classes by creating a large proportion of “bog standard Comprehensives” and a manifest deterioration of educational standards. Instead of increasing the upward mobility of the lower classes, it has reduced it.

What the pro-Union parties clearly do not appreciate is the extent of Sinn Fein’s long-term strategy to destroy the political and cultural identity of the Unionist community through the medium of the educational system. It is no accident that Sinn Fein has always made education its first choice. Indeed, its spokesman, John O’Dowd, has stated that Sinn Fein will continue to do so in the future.

For over a decade Sinn Fein in tandem with Labour governments has put in place educational arrangements that, if not changed, will make the destruction of the principle of selection and with it the Grammar schools well nigh inevitable. An educational system that has manifestly failed in the United States and is presently failing on the U. K. mainland is being forced upon Northern Ireland, not because it is educationally best, but because it serves the political objectives of those who support it.

The ongoing failure of the major pro-Union parties to recognise the dangers of this Sinn Fein strategy and to effectively counter it at every stage is a recurring feature of the present educational chaos. Could this failure be caused by their desire not to confront Sinn Fein on an issue that might provoke the collapse of the Assembly?

The present mess is the product of three major educational reports; those of Gallagher, Burns, and Costello. The membership of all three was heavily loaded with anti-selection members and advisers. Costello recommended a curriculum, reducing traditional subject based teaching in favour of a progressive approach advised by C.C.E.A., a government funded agency headed by one Gavin Boyd and dedicated to the progressive ideas that have comprehensively failed in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany. The proven failures of 60 years ago in America were enshrined in Costello and the Education (N.I.) Order 2006.

A major Sinn Fein/Labour building block was then being put in place with the introduction of a New Curriculum based on previously failed ideas¬; a curriculum which effectively abolishes the capacity to carry out objective testing and is opposed to traditional subject based learning (like science, history, maths, geography) had been established. Its objective was to nullify the ability to select and thereby make the survival of the Grammar school and subject based learning untenable.

Before the parties went to St. Andrews in October 2006 Sinn Fein had already provided for the slow death of both the means and the principle of selection and with them the future viability of the Grammar school ethos.

Let me now turn to primary level teaching; the first steps in education are taken at primary school level and here the Sinn Fein strategy was to allege that the small number of children in disadvantaged areas getting grammar school places from Protestant primaries in North Belfast was due to the selection process. These children had, in fact, been subjected to a pilot scheme farcically entitled “Enriched Curriculum”. Research has shown that far from improving their literacy and numeracy, it had worsened their results.

The poor results had, as one teacher pointed out, nothing to do with selection, but was due to a failure of the primary education sector allied to social deprivation, lack of parental interest, support, and discipline, among other factors. If 5,000 children each year were leaving primary schools with problems in literacy and 4,700 in numeracy, how could they possibly gain success in an objective selection test?

Indeed the vast majority of the children in North Belfast primary’s were not even being entered for the 11 + and therefore could not possibly get to a grammar school place.

Despite the failure of the Enriched Curriculum for primary schools, it was repackaged as the Foundation Curriculum and rolled out across the Province. This programme is contrary to all recent research on the teaching of reading and I have little doubt that the number of children with inadequate reading and counting skills will continue to increase. However, since the results of the Curriculum will not be evaluated for many years, those responsible for the impending disaster will by then have left the scene of the crime.

At the post primary school level the Sinn Fein decision to abolish the 11+ without any viable alternative has provoked the present crisis.

Catholic and non-Catholic grammar schools have provided their own unregulated tests in the face of the public demand from parents for Grammar school education. Of course for children to successfully pass such tests they must have obtained an appropriate level of reading and numeracy. This has placed the Department of Education in a quandary. On the one hand it is charged with improving such standards, but on the other it has introduced a Foundation Curriculum, which is designed to be un-testable. How therefore can one determine whether standards of literacy or numeracy are improving?

The manner in which the Department has attempted to solve this paradox has been a catalogue of failure. First, there was to be a pupil profile on assessment by teachers designed to assist parents in determining appropriate schools for their child’s ability. This proved a complete failure. Parents had no idea of their child’s progress relative to its peers. The assessments were such bland statements as to be meaningless.

Under parent protest the profile was repackaged as an annual assessment in years 4 to 7 at the beginning of each year and a hybrid form of Computer Adaptive Testing (I.N.C.A.S.) provided by C.E.M. Durham University at vast expense was attached to give it the appearance of technological effectiveness. In fact, in recent weeks, a succession of failures in this form of assessment has been acknowledged. Children are not tested to determine what they have learned, but are theoretically assessed to determine areas of strength and weakness to be addressed over the next year.

By providing a primary school Curriculum that is designed to be un-testable, Sinn Fein is ensuring that no form of selection, which indicates a school suitable for the child’s ability, is possible, because no information of an objective kind such as a test result will be available.

Only the revolt of a number of primary schools, which, at the instigation of parents, declared that they will ignore the Curriculum and teach with a test in view, has enabled the Grammar Schools to provide tests, albeit unregulated one. How far the Schools Inspectorate, acting as “educational police”, will successfully enforce the Department’s Curriculum by disciplining those schools has yet to be seen.

The pro-Union and pro-selection parties, if they are to deliver on the assurances they gave on the selective principle issue both before and after St. Andrews, will have to realise that they are being out-thought by Sinn Fein and are being slowly pushed into a compromise that will end with the destruction of a Grammar School system which is producing results the envy of the rest of the United Kingdom.

The well intentioned but naive campaign of the Belfast Telegraph calling upon “The Politicians” to “sort it out” in some form of compromise ignores entirely that there are principles of education that are not amenable to compromise, particularly when one side is not educationally but politically driven. As Churchill once remarked “Where is the compromise between the Fireman and the Arsonist”?

The D.U.P. has already begun the process of abandoning its position. Jeffrey Donaldson, as a member of the Education Committee, endorsed the introduction of the failed “INCAS” system designed to bolster the equally defective “Pupil Profile”.

Having declared opposition to ESA (Education and Skills Authority) headed by Gavin Boyd, the anti-selection architect of the “New Curriculum” the ESA when in place, will have sole control over the whole of education, the DUP are now in the process of accepting it.

The real and ultimate issue is this – will the DUP, having sacrificed its principles to obtain power, now surrender selective education to Sinn Fein as the price of retaining power.

Like the 2007 election it is unlikely its position will be revealed until after the next election.

Electorally, the Conservatives need a substantial swing to ensure a majority. UKPollingReport provides a fun way of keeping in touch with what the latest poll means with a simple swing calculator. A simple exercise on this swingometer shows the volatility of the electorate, and the electoral challenge that faces the Conservatives until May 2010.

This graph was grabbed on the 6th October.

For this example thedissenter  is using the YouGov daily poll (chosen only because this is best suited for the example). You may want to play with numbers from the ICM Guardian monthly polls, or any other of your choice. There will be plenty of opportunity to test the swingometer with the many polls that will appear frequently in the media over the coming months. Using the poll of 6th October provides the Conservatives with a comfortable majority of around  sixty (Con 41, Lab 28, LD 18), just two weeks before the 22nd October poll shows the majority was a less comfortable twenty-four (Con 39, Lab 27, LD 20). The poll on the 22nd showed a very high ‘others’ at 14%.

The strength of ‘others’ is always greater in the aftermath of a European election: when the British electorate seems to enjoy itself by giving one in the eye to Europe and with the other end of the stick one in the eye to the big three established parties. However, the polling of ‘others’ seems to be more resilient this time, and the distance between the European election and the General Election will be less than a year.

It may be that the relative voting strength of ‘others’ at election time that, perhaps for the first time, will be a significant factor in determining the formation of the next Government. For example, the poll on the 22nd October showed a high percentage of ‘others’, but just 2% more for Labour (and less for ‘others’) would have meant that the Conservatives would fall three short of an overall majority. However, 2% for Labour and just one more percentage point for the Conservatives (‘others down 3%) and a majority of twelve is generated for the Tories.

The Conservatives polling is staying stubbornly around the 40%, give or take, rarely allowing for a majority of more than 20 seats, which must be very uncomfortable for Conservative strategists. There is no doubt that a significant percentage of the ‘others’ polling is UKIP, which tends to eat into Conservative votes for the most part; which is why the promise of a referendum on Europe is so important.

While there is no ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the argument that the only Party to offer a referendum is the Conservative Party may be enough to assure that UKIP voters will vote Conservative; UKIP voters having little chance of seeing a UKIP candidate elected and Europe being the only issue they care much about, believing they can win a no campaign.

It is therefore a major question for the Conservative Party as to what the approach will be if Lisbon is ratified before May. As a Treaty, Lisbon would be almost impossible to unravel. While not in power, the Conservatives have little ability to influence the advance of the European project before May 2010. Even if elected, by wandering off with its Teddy Bear from the centre of European dialogue the Conservative Party is unlikely to have sufficient weight to achieve a great deal, or indeed any deal.

Yet without a sufficiently ‘robust’ Conservative approach on Europe for home consumption, and it is far from clear what that could be, the UKIP voter is fickle enough to vote in protest regardless – because to the UKIP voter only Europe matters. While much of the New Labour vote may simply not vote for Labour in 2010, most likely the UKIP vote will go to the polling booths one way or another.

Feedback from the Conservative Party Conference this week has been that there is not the anticipation that there was in the 1996 Labour Conference, when there was a similarly tired and unfocused Government and power seemed within grasp. European policy has added weight in the Conservative election planning because it is abundantly clear from any of the three Party Conferences in recent weeks that there is little chance of offering the electorate a cheerful message of better times ahead. Every vote will count in May 2010.

The difficulty is that while Europe is a factor in securing votes from potential UKIP voters, that same factor makes the Cameron approach to Europe potentially divisive within the Conservative Party. However, thedissenter would expect the prospect of power to outweigh principle for all Conservatives, pre-election, even though whatever the approach adopted should Lisbon be ratified before a British election will need to sound sufficiently antagonistic towards Europe to keep the European sceptic vote on side. Conservative Europhiles will swallow hard and bide their time.

Of course all this is speculation, the swingometer is fun, and the election still some months away. It is, however, abundantly clear that a Conservative majority following a May election is not a certainty at this point in time and there is every chance of a very tight result.

So Europe matters.

So too might Northern Ireland, for once, though not as an election campaign issue.

The Europe factor makes it especially difficult at this point in time to be certain of a Conservative majority in 2010. This may make the couple of seats that may arise from the UCUNF project in Northern Ireland of greater importance to David Cameron than might be generally presumed.

The ‘Others’ and the 18 Northern Ireland seats are generally considered to be part of the opposition against which the pollsters calculate an anticipated majority. Two UCUNF seats could make all the difference between ‘losing’ and the slimmest of majorities. By the same token, so would that block of DUP seats – it would be interesting to see how practical politics would then impact on the Conservative/UUP compact.

Which is why doubts will always hang over what really matters to David Cameron’s Conservative Party. When practicality is the driving force, neither principle nor partnership will be allowed to stand in the way.

The UUP presents its link with the Conservative Party as a way of being at the centre of UK politics.  At the same time that link is likely to push the UUP to the margins of Europe.

The UUP alignment with the Conservatives is presented as part of a wider vision for ‘The Union’, and for the UUP to be at the centre of national discourse.  As we edge towards the European Election, should Jim Nicholson win one of the three Northern Ireland seats he will return to Europe as part of a Conservative led group at the margins of European discourse.

Currently the British Conservatives in the European Parliament are closely associated with the European Peoples Party (EPP) and European Democrats (ED), collectively the EPP-ED.  That is to change following the upcoming European Election in June, with David Cameron committed to leaving the EPP-ED.

The EPP is broadly Christian Democrat in nature and very pro-European Union/Unity.  It is also very much dominated by the Germanic view of ‘social market economy’.  It broadly expects others to share that view.  They are more comfortable with ‘social market’ than ‘free market’, more statist than liberal.  The ED is broadly balanced to believe more in the free market than the social market and more liberal than statist.  The groups probably share more in underlying principle than either would credit the other.

Within the EPP, for example, among the Spanish Popular Party and the Swedish Moderates, there are friends to be found for British Conservatives. But the Conservatives are committed to abandoning these natural friends.

Membership of a group brings the strength in numbers that is necessary to wheel and deal for committee places and influence within the Parliament, as much in Europe as in Westminster. Dan Hannan MEP outlines his support of the Conservative decision to break from the EPP. From Dan Hannan’s position, leaving the EPP makes sense. What is not explained is why this can’t be done within the EPP-ED, building coalitions of like-minded liberal-conservatives from the ED base and using the EPP-ED strength to shift policy.

David Cameron has made a considerable effort to present the Conservative Party as a modern, progressive centre-right party committed to restoring economic prosperity, combined with a strong sense of social justice. The ED is expressly committed to democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, national sovereignty, free enterprise, minimal regulation, low taxation, private ownership, respect and security for every individual and a strong transatlantic alliance. What in that commitment is out of step with the Conservative Party manifesto for Europe, or indeed for the UK?

The ED cannot make a difference within the EPP-ED because it has not the seven parties to work from a position of strength: it currently has five parties; the two from UK, the Czech ODS, the Portuguese Popular Party and Italian Pensioners Party.  The Conservative party has committed to finding new allies. Possibly. From eastern Europe? There are plenty; many unstable, few unaligned. There is certainly room to work. Eastern Europeans to the centre right feel abandoned by the larger nations – and voted for a Europe of free nations, not a nation-numbing collective. A strong (small, broad c) conservative vision would perhaps help shape politics on a wider arena, a conservatism beyond Britain – a vision for a European big house, perhaps, built on principle and not Party interests. Not while the British Conservatives allow British domestic politics dictate European engagement: actually, British Conservative house-keeping dictating European engagement.

What is not clear is why the Conservatives have decided to cut themselves off from the major and strong centre-right grouping rather than work from within, and what they have to offer that would be particularly attractive or particularly different from what would be possible building from that ED base.

The Conservative Party is heading off into a political corner with its teddy bear.  The Party has reached this point after years of neglect in international relations. While taking part in structures such as the old European Democrat Union (EDU) and International Democrat Union (IDU) the Conservative engagement was at best perfuctory – by default rather than design. True, engagement at IDU level with our American friends was undertaken with greater enthusiasm, though little more purpose. But at Euro level there was always exasperation and confusion as to what it was all about.

International relations in the Conservative Party was most often left to enthusiastic individuals, who threw their heart and soul into carving a relevant and significant place for the Party internationally. But more often than not they were left alone, and without a respected Party role.

The Germans with their powerful Stifung (foundations) and the Swedes with a fundamental commitment to international relations bring purpose to all their European activities and engage in a structured and measured way at all levels from youth through to senior Party activity. Against this, Conservative functionality in engagement meant it often looked out of place or out of step with European colleagues because it was defracted and half-hearted.  Current policy will appear to Europeans as churlish and pointless.

Whether or not the Conservative Party is associated with the EPP would not have been relevant to Northern Ireland’s European vote without the recent Conservative/UUP link-up.  Jim Nicholson made a point in his News Letter web chat that he had “been elected by other MEP colleagues during the last five years to sit on the bureau of the Parliament.” This is in no small part a consequence of his long standing association with the EPP.  What happens when he exits from that group?

Through the Conservative link, the representation in Europe will be significantly weakened as the Conservatives group, UUP in tow, go off to do its own thing. That matters. With Nicholson elected it will mean that none of the MEPS will be part of a significant group – though the EPP could be practical enough to make offers to either Diane Dodds or Jim Allister to retain a British component in its group.   But as it seems likely, all Northern Ireland MEPs would be linked to marginal groups, or be independent.  The strength of connections to major political groups, and the centres of influence that these represent, will be lost completely.

No matter how much the Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists promote their link as strengthening the Union, in Europe it will inevitably result in a reduction in Unionist influence. While many Conservatives believe that Europe doesn’t matter, that attitude is something Northern Ireland can ill afford.

The sole Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) Westminster MP Lady Sylvia Hermon finally, publicly, confirmed the widely held belief that she is unhappy with the Ulster Conservative and Unionist New Force (UCUNF). Following a BBC interview, the Belfast Telegraph has followed through with a series of points on which her disquiet may be founded:

• She feels she was excluded from all discussions about the possibility of a link-up between the parties, despite being their only Westminster politician.

• She was left to discover the dramatic changes in a shop where she spotted the newspaper headlines.

• She has been hauled in (thedissenter emphasis) for meetings with Tory heavy-hitters including Ken Clarke, as well as for talks with David Cameron, flanked (thedissenter emphasis) by the party’s Northern Ireland spokesman Owen Paterson, and Andrew MacKay, a former shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

To these is added her general feeling that the Conservatives have little understanding of Ulster politics. Having listened to a number of presentations by Conservatives in Northern Ireland over the past months that is something that has some resonance with thedissenter.

Print journalists use language to emphasise points or to communicate emotion. thedissenter emphasis in the final point above, suggests that meetings with Sylvia to address ‘issues’ were less of a round table and more of a telling off – serious men telling off a silly woman who should only be impressed at meeting Ken Clarke, David Cameron, Own Patterson and (er) Andrew McKay; men of such importance, she must surely have been impressed.

But why does Sylvia speak now? Perhaps it was the simple opportunity; a radio interview on expenses developed onto other topics, as they do. However, a simple answer that suggested she had had a lot on her mind recently and was still taking time to consider the issue would have stopped the new line of questioning in its tracks.

The opaque nature of all the UCUNF deliberations makes it impossible to know exactly what has happened, or is going on, in the background. For certain, Sylvia has always been an Ulster Unionist. It is a heartfelt statement when she says “If my party chooses to move to call themselves by a different name, I’m terribly sorry and terribly disappointed by that but I remain an Ulster Unionist.” Surely in discussions the emotion of her position would have been recognised – though the apparent tenor of the meetings suggests not; the Conservatives talked, but maybe they didn’t listen.

Perhaps though it was Sylvia’s legal eye that made her snap into being perpared to make her position known. It has been suggested that Sylvia may have been upset at the sight of the very Conservative (in line with UK-wide format) Jim Nicholson Conservative and Unionist election posters that expunge the Ulster Unionist connection. How much more would she be upset at the first of the Jim Nicholson election material. In the small print, to the bottom right of the SURVEY on the leaflet, is a Data Protection declaration. Here it is clear that the information being provided is for the benefit of the Conservative Party and the Conservative Party alone: because as there are still two parties as Sir Reg keeps repeating, the information cannot be passed onto a third party (UUP).

Hardly an example of an equal, sharing, partnership.

In all aspects of the UCUNF collaboration Sylvia may simply be concerned at the imbalance of the relationship between the two parties. As her emotions are in the frame, perhaps it is instinct that is telling her this deal is fundamentally wrong. Sure, the Conservative money to fund this election is very welcome to a cash strapped UUP; a lifeline. Sylvia may well be right in questioning a Conservative lifeline that is ever so loosely tied around the neck of the UUP, for now.